U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS

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BRIEFING MEETING FINAL

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FRIDAY, MARCH 17, 2017

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The Commission convened in Suite 1150 at 1331 Pennsylvania Avenue, Northwest, Washington, D.C. at 9:30 a.m., Catherine Lhamon, Chair, presiding.

PRESENT:

CATHERINE E. LHAMON, Chair

PATRICIA TIMMONS-GOODSON, Vice Chair

DEBO P. ADEGBILE, Commissioner

GAIL HERIOT, Commissioner

PETER N. KIRSANOW, Commissioner

DAVID KLADNEY, Commissioner

KAREN K. NARASAKI, Commissioner

MICHAEL YAKI, Commissioner*

MAUREEN RUDOLPH, General Counsel

MAURO MORALES, Staff Director

^{*} Present via telephone

STAFF PRESENT:

TERESA ADAMS

ROBERT AMARTNEY

LASHONDA BRENSON

MARLIK XAVIER-BRIER

ROIAINE CASTRO

PAMELA DUNSTON, Chief, ASCD

LATRICE FOSHEE

ANA FORTES

ALFREDA GREENE

JONAS MEKSEM

DAVID MUSSATT, DIR., RPCU

GRACE OBERG

WARREN ORR

SARALE SEWELL

JUANDA SMITH

BRIAN WALCH

MICHELE RAMEY

COMMISSIONER ASSISTANTS PRESENT:

SHERYL COZART

ALEC DUELL*

JASON LAGRIA

CARISSA MULDER

AMY ROYCE

RUKKU SINGLA

ALISON SOMIN

IRENA VIDULOVIC

* Present via telephone

PANELISTS PRESENT:

CHIRAAG BAINS, J.D., Visiting Senior Fellow; Criminal Justice Policy Program at Harvard Law School

DEREK M. COHEN, PhD., Deputy Director, Center for Effective Justice; Texas Public Policy Foundation; Right on Crime

CYNTHIA DELOSTRINOS, J.D., Administrative Manager; Washington State Administrative Office of the Courts KARL DEMARCE, J.D., Associate Circuit Judge; Circuit Court of Scotland County, Missouri

THOMAS HARVEY, J.D., Co-Founder & Executive Director; Arch City Defenders

MARC LEVIN, Esq., Director, Center for Effective Justice; Texas Public Policy Foundation; Right on Crime

MITALI NAGRECHA, J.D., Director, National Criminal Justice Debt Initiative; Criminal Justice Policy Program at Harvard Law School

GROVER NORQUIST, M.B.A., Americans for Tax Reform

SHERRI PASCHAL, Court Business Services Director; Missouri Office of State Courts Administrator

SARAH SHANNON, PhD., Assistant Professor; University of Georgia

DAVID SLAYTON, M.P.A., Administrative Director; Texas Office of Court Administration

NEIL SOBOL, J.D., Associate Professor of Law; Texas A&M University

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PROCEEDINGS

2	9:33 a.m.
3	CHAIR LHAMON: All right, thank you.
4	And I call this meeting to order.
5	This briefing of the U.S. Commission on
6	Civil Rights comes to order at now 9:33 on March 17th,
7	2017. Happy St. Patrick's Day.
8	This briefing takes place at the
9	Commission's Headquarters which is located at 1331
10	Pennsylvania Avenue, Northwest, Washington, D.C.
11	I'm Chair Catherine Lhamon.
12	Commissioners present at this briefing include Vice
13	Chair Timmons-Goodson, Commission Heriot,
14	Commissioner Kirsanow, Commissioner Narasaki,
15	Commissioner Adegbile and Commissioner Kladney.
16	Commissioner Yaki, I have heard you on the
17	phone, will you confirm that you are present?
18	COMMISSIONER YAKI: Yes, except that your
19	audio is cutting in and out on the phone line.
20	CHAIR LHAMON: Thanks for telling me.
21	I'll try to speak right into the microphone.
22	A quorum of the Commissioners is present.
23	Is the Court Reporter present? She is.
24	Is the Staff Director present?
25	STAFF DIRECTOR MORALES: Yes.
	1

1 CHAIR LHAMON: Thank you. 2 So, I welcome everyone to our Briefing on 3 Targeted Fines and Fees Against Low-Income People of 4 Color: Civil Rights and Constitutional Implications. 5 Last year, we conducted a briefing in light 6 of the 2015 Department of Justice Patterns and Practice 7 Investigation into policing and municipal court 8 practices in Ferguson, Missouri. 9 This continue explore year, we 10 developments in municipal court reforms and, 11 particularly focus on the Department of Justice efforts 12 in this area. 13 I invite Vice Chair Timmons-Goodson to 14 introduce this topic as the impetus to discuss this 15 important issue came from you. 16 VICE CHAIR TIMMONS-GOODSON: Thank you 17 very much, Madam Chair. 18 Good morning all. I want to begin by 19 thanking the people behind the scenes who brought all 20 of us together for what I believe will be an informative 21 and engaging briefing. 22 I want to say an extra word of thanks to 23 LaShonda Brenson, Maureen Rudolph, Pamela Dunston, 24 Latrice Foshee and Sheryl Cozart for all of their hard

work in putting this briefing together.

1 Also, of course, I want to thank my fellow 2 Commissioners in supporting this briefing topic as the 3 Fiscal Year 2017 Statutory Enforcement Report. 4 With this briefing, Targeted Fines and 5 Fees Against Low-Income Minorities: Civil Rights and Constitutional Implications, the Commission seeks to 6 7 expound on the work that we began last year. 8 As you may recall, in the wake of civil 9 unrest following the shooting death of Michael Brown, 10 the U.S. Department of Justice investigated the 11 Ferguson Police Department and municipal courts and 12 they published an extensive report. 13 The report concluded, among other things, 14 that the Ferguson Municipal Courts operated not as 15 neutral arbiters of the law or a check on unlawful 16 police conduct, but rather, to compel the payment of 17 fines and fees that advanced the city's financial 18 interest. 19 For instance, a minor violation -- for a 20 minor violation, parking, large sums of money were 21 required to satisfy the fines and fees. 22 One Ferguson woman, as set out in the 23 report, had a parking ticket for a single violation totaling \$151 in fees. She paid on that ticket over 24

seven years, yet, she still owed \$541 after paying \$550

in fines and fees, having multiple arrest warrants 1 issued against her, being arrested and jailed on 2 3 several occasions. Keep in mind, this was for a 4 parking ticket. 5 civil rights Many advocates with from media reports and investigative 6 assistance 7 journalists also focused the nation's attention on the 8 targeting of citizens by police and courts in order to 9 generate revenue and the illegal enforcement of fines 10 and fees in certain jurisdictions. 11 In part, this attention was the result of 12 the Ferguson report. 13 light of the Justice Department's 14 response to municipal targeted fines and fees, both in 15 Ferguson and elsewhere across the country, the main 16 purpose of this briefing is to investigate DOJ's 17 enforcement efforts regarding municipal court reforms 18 and whether any other efforts are being undertaken. 19 Our three panels today consist of State 20 Court Administrators, community advocates, professors 21 and criminal justice experts. 22 is our sincerest hope that the 23 panelists' insight will inform the public about what 24 DOJ has accomplished and what is left to do.

I thank you, Madam Chair, for affording me

1	a few moments for these remarks.
2	CHAIR LHAMON: Thank you, Vice Chair.
3	Commissioner Heriot, I also understand
4	you'd like to speak?
5	COMMISSIONER HERIOT: Actually, I'm going
6	to defer to Commissioner Kirsanow.
7	CHAIR LHAMON: Okay.
8	COMMISSIONER KIRSANOW: Thank you.
9	And, I would just add a couple statements.
10	First of all, I appreciate all the panelists coming
11	here. I think this is an important briefing.
12	As someone who lives in inner city
13	Cleveland has got my share of fines because I tend to
14	maybe go a little too fast from time to time, although,
15	I can probably afford it more readily than some of my
16	neighbors can.
17	I'm looking forward to hearing what
18	evidence can you hear me?
19	Commissioner Yaki, by the way, I'm glad
20	we're not together again. Otherwise, I think the
21	universe would implode.
22	COMMISSIONER YAKI: Well, Armageddon is
23	once again avoided, Commissioner Kirsanow. But,
24	unfortunately, for us on the listening line, we are
25	catching about three out of every five words that you

1 are saying and the volume is extremely low. 2 COMMISSIONER KIRSANOW: Okay. I'm not 3 sure what I can do about that. I'm technologically 4 inept. 5 But, one of the things I'm interested in something that's peculiar 6 to 7 communities. I know that, in my own travels throughout 8 9 the Greater Cleveland area, that these steps of fines 10 and fees are not necessarily reserved for minority 11 areas. 12 And, there is a question of jurisdiction 13 I'm prepared to accept that because of some of here. 14 the evidence that was introduce before, but I'd like 15 to hear more evidence in that regard. 16 In addition to that, what I'm truly 17 interested in is, what are the alternatives? 18 of someone who is concerned about these issues, I know 19 that if there aren't alternatives to this, there are 20 certain negative implications to what happens if you 21 can't assess fees, if you can't -- don't have any other 22 kind of deterrents to it, do we simply just let people 23 do these things and come with other alternatives that 24 can achieve the same objectives.

look forward to the briefing.

So,

Thanks for the witnesses and thank you, Madam Chair.

CHAIR LHAMON: Thank you both.

I want to now turn us to the important topic, the widespread effect of the topic we will discuss today cannot be understated. As one panelist put it last year, there is, quote, a devastating impact on families, communities and public safety when courts turn to revenue generation rather than the fair and equal administration of justice.

And, that access to justice issue is squarely within our jurisdiction and core for us in what we investigate today.

I look forward to hearing from today's panelists about reforms occurring in states to guard against those injustices and about the efficacy of the Federal Department of Justice efforts to promote and secure those reforms.

Before beginning the briefing, I thank Sandra Vujnovich, the Judicial Administrator of the Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana and Ronald Lampard, the Director of the Criminal Justice Reform Task Force at the American Legislative Exchange Council. They both submitted written testimony for the record, but were unable to participate in today's briefing. We are grateful for their materials.

1 For any other member of the public who 2 would like to submit materials for our review, we welcome it and our public record will remain open for 3 4 30 days following today's briefing. Materials can be 5 submitted by mail to the U.S. Commission on Civil 6 Rights, Office of General Counsel at 1331 Pennsylvania 7 Avenue, Northwest, Suite 1150, Washington, D.C. 20425 8 or by email to municipalfees@usccr.gov. 9 I also join the Vice Chair in thanking our 10 staff who have put such hard work in today's briefing, 11 particularly LaShonda Brenson, Maureen Rudolph, 12 Latrice Foshee, Pam Dunston and Juanda Smith. 13 I also thank three interns who provided 14 research assistance for today's briefing, Rolaine 15 Castro, a student at Fresno Pacific University is 16 interning with us through a program at the Council for 17 Christian Colleges and Universities and through our 18 annual spring break hosting from Carbondale High School 19 in Illinois, Grace Oberg and Jonas Mekesm. Thank you 20 very much to all. 21 briefing 12 Today's features 22 distinguished speakers who will provide us with an 23 array of viewpoints. 24 The first panel who are seated of State

Court Administrator will focus on the U.S. Department

1 of Justice "Dear Colleague" letter and grant money issued by the DOJ for municipal court reforms. 2 3 Panel Two will speak to DOJ's Pattern and 4 Practice Enforcement in this area. 5 Panel Three will discuss And, data collection and policy recommendations. 6 7 During the briefing, each of the panel 8 members will have seven minutes to speak, all except 9 Thomas Harvey, who just submitted his materials should 10 assume that we have read your materials before this day. 11 And, so, you can please use your time to highlight the 12 points you especially want us to know. 13 After each panel presentation, my fellow 14 Commissioners and I will have the opportunity to ask 15 questions within the allotted period of time and I will 16 recognize the Commissioners who wish to speak. 17 In order to maximize the opportunity for 18 discussion, I ask each of our panelists to stick within 19 your seven minutes for your speaking time. And, you 20 should know that I will strictly enforce those seven 21 minutes for each panelist. 22 You'll notice a system of warning lights 23 that we have set up. When the light turns from green 24 to yellow, that means that two minutes remain and when 25 the light turns to red, you should stop speaking.

1	My fellow Commissioners and I also are
2	committed to keeping our remarks concise so that we can
3	stay within our time.
4	So, I will first introduce our first panel
5	in the order in which they will speak.
6	Our first panelist this morning is David
7	Slayton. He is the Administrative Director within the
8	Texas Office of Court Administration.
9	Our second panelist is Martha Wright.
10	She's the Supervising Analyst of Criminal Justice
11	Services at the Judicial Council of California.
12	Our third panelist is Cynthia Delostrinos,
13	the Administrative Manager of the Washington State
14	Administrative Office of the Courts.
15	And, our fourth panelist is Sherri Paschal
16	of the Missouri Office of State Courts Administrator.
17	Mr. Slayton, please begin.
18	II. PANEL ONE:
19	DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE'S "DEAR COLLEAGUE" LETTER
20	AND OTHER VOLUNTARY COURT REFORM EFFORTS
21	SPEAKERS' REMARKS
22	MR. SLAYTON: Thank you very much, Madam
23	Chair and Commissioners. Thank you for the
24	opportunity to appear before you today to discuss
25	efforts underway in Texas to address the impact of fines

and fees on low-income individuals.

My name is David Slayton, as mentioned, I'm the Administrative Director of the Office of Court Administration in Texas and also serve in the role as Executive Director of the Texas Judicial Council, the policy making body for the Texas Judicial Branch.

Much has been done in Texas and much is being done in Texas in response to our efforts. But, before I get to the specific efforts and actions, I'd like to give you a little background on the Texas court system and the overall picture with regard to fines and fees which I think will help illustrate the work we're doing.

Texas's court system has been described by the State Supreme -- in State Supreme Court opinions as unimaginably abstruse, as juris-imprudent and Byzantine. But, today, I'll try to briefly describe it to you.

Texas has 2,735 separately created courts with over 3,300 Judges in those courts. The largest number of Judges of any State Court system.

The courts have varying levels of jurisdiction and authority over assessing fines and fees. But, the vast majority of the cases and assessments occur at the 806 justice courts and 933

1 municipal courts in the state. 2 In addition to some civil jurisdiction, 3 these courts have jurisdiction in fine only misdemeanor 4 I will stress that again, fine only misdemeanor cases. 5 cases. Rising to a peak of over 11 million cases 6 7 in 2007, these courts handled over 7 million cases last 8 year in fiscal year 2016. Almost 80 percent of those 9 cases were for violations of State traffic laws. 10 Assessments of fines and fees in these 11 courts exceed \$1 billion per year. Last year, \$1 12 billion per year. 13 Texas's court structure only may 14 surpassed in complexity by its system of court costs 15 and fees. 16 A 2014 study by the Texas Office of Court 17 Administration found there are 143 distinct criminal 18 court costs separated into 17 categories. Court costs 19 that were created by the Texas legislature. 20 To determine the appropriate amount of 21 court costs and fees applicable to a particular case, 22 one must perform an exercise best visualized by a 23 popular game, Twister. A typical fine only offense will incur 24 25 court costs of \$87 with about 55 percent of those costs

1 flowing to the State and the remainder being kept 2 locally. 3 A fine of up to \$500 may also be assessed 4 in these cases. 5 The vast majority of defendants and the over 4 million convictions in these cases, pay the fines 6 7 and fees either immediately or through a payment plan. However, in at least 18 percent of those 8 9 cases, the assessments were satisfied by some other 10 method authorized by law. 11 In fact, 15 percent of all convictions for 12 fine only offenses where jail is not an option as 13 punishment for the offense, were satisfied through 14 jail, while only 3 percent were satisfied through 15 community service options and less than 1 percent we 16 waived due to indigence. 17 With all of this as backdrop, I now turn 18 to the efforts that Texas has been -- has made so far 19 and where we're headed in the future. 20 After the United States Department of 21 Justice report from Ferguson, Missouri, Texas Supreme 22 Court Chief Justice Nathan Hecht directed the Office 23 of Court Administration to review practices in Texas 24 and make suggestions for improvement.

I'll point out to you that the report in

Ferguson, about 20 percent of it, focused on municipal court practices. And, after reviewing those recommendations, we looked at them in light of what Texas was doing.

Immediately, OCA, our office, recommended Judicial Council's Collection with the problems Improvement Program Rules. These rules, meant to provide guidance to local courts and best practices for ensuring the convicted defendant satisfied their legal financial obligations, places inflexible requirements in the collection of payments and did not provide local courts with flexibility to ensure that collections efforts did not result in an undue hardship on defendants and their dependents.

To address this situation, the Judicial Council embarked on an eight month effort to review the rules and include input from various stakeholders.

While the effort was not without resistance by some stakeholders, the Council approved revised rules in August 2016 effective January 1st, 2017.

The revised rules provided mechanisms to address individuals who have inability to pay, ensure that local courts have flexibility in working with defendants to ensure the compliance with obligations

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1 and encourages local courts to offer appropriate 2 alternatives to payment when appropriate. 3 Initial reports from local courts 4 operating under the new rules are very positive. 5 During the rules revision process, three major impediments in local courts were revealed. 6 7 First, courts expressed concern in their 8 lack of ability to determine an individual's ability 9 to successfully pay the fines and fees. 10 Second, courts expressed concern in their 11 ability to find and manage appropriate alternatives to 12 payment. 13 And, third, courts expressed a desire to be better educated about the status of the law on fine 14 15 and fee assessment and collection as well as best 16 practices in those areas. 17 In response to these impediments, the 18 Office of Court Administration applied for and received 19 from the United States Department of Justice a Price 20 of Justice grant. 21 This half a million dollar grant will allow 22 OCA to do three things. 23 First OCA's in the process of building an 24 automated tool that will use data available and 25 government sources to allow Judges to assess a

1 defendant's ability to pay. 2 Second OCA's in the process of building an 3 automated tool that will link community service and 4 other alternative options with defendants seeking 5 those opportunities. Think of this similar to the applications 6 7 you might use when you're seeking transportation 8 network services, someone is offering their services 9 and you're seeking them. Without an intermediary 10 application, it's sometimes difficult to connect 11 those. 12 This application will seek to do just that 13 with community service and other alternatives. 14 Lastly, OCA is working with judicial 15 education providers in Texas to develop and deliver 16 curriculum to Judges across the State regarding current 17 law and best practices with regard to fines and fees. 18 We're grateful to DOJ for the grant and 19 hope that our efforts will not only improve practices 20 in Texas, but also have application in other States 21 across the country. 22 In addition to these technology areas, the 23 Texas Judicial Council has recommended 18 specific 24 reforms for legislative action in the

25

legislative session.

1	These reforms include items such as
2	requiring standard language on citations and other
3	notifications from the court about alternatives to
4	payment and of consequences of failing to appear in
5	court, providing 30-day language notice with
6	language on regaining compliance prior to the issuance
7	of a warrant for failure to pay or appear, clarifying
8	that Judges are required to assess a defendant's
9	ability to pay prior to assessment of fines and fees,
10	providing Judges the express authority to waive fines
11	and fees, expanding alternative options for satisfying
12	these obligations and limiting additional fees
13	assessed simply because defendants cannot immediately
14	pay fines and fees.
15	Several bills to enact these provisions
16	have been filed in the current session and we're hopeful
17	for their passage.
18	Thank you very much.
19	CHAIR LHAMON: Thank you, Mr. Slayton.
20	Ms. Wright?
21	MS. WRIGHT: Thank you for inviting me
22	here today. My name is Martha Wright. I'm an analyst
23	with the Judicial Council of California. I work within
24	an office that we think is unique among State court

administrative agencies.

We have a Criminal Justice Services Office 1 2 and we are a team of -- a lean team -- but a team of 3 attorneys, researchers and program staff working on a 4 variety of criminal justice reforms. 5 So, I'll tell you a little bit about our 6 Price of Justice project and what we're focusing on and 7 why. 8 About a year ago, we applied for a grant 9 under this initiative. We were very pleased to be 10 awarded. 11 Our project started in October. As with 12 the others, we have a three-year time frame. 13 For our effort, we're looking specifically 14 at traffic and infraction focus. And, really, in terms 15 of making an impact, we're looking at developing and 16 further enhancing our Ability to Pay process to help 17 people who are facing fines and fees. 18 There's basically five components to the 19 We have a work group that we project. 20 established. We are conducting a jail study. 21 working with a trainer and technical assistance provider through DOJ's Center for Court Innovation. 22 23 We're developing the Ability to Pay tool 24 and working on evaluating how that tool is working for 25 the courts that we pilot it in and what the impact might

be statewide.

I should mention that, while we applied for this grant, as we were working on it, our Traffic Advisory Committee to the Judicial Council did have new Rules of Court approved, which we were very glad to see.

Several new Rules of Court went in to effect in January and they will be implemented by May and they apply to all infraction cases.

And they do a variety of things. Essentially, they require reminder notices, advisal of rights to request an Ability to Pay determination, allows defendants to request that determination at any time when -- after a fine is levied.

And, it authorized the use of online interfaces, again, encouraging more ways to make this process more transparent and more applicable to more people.

In terms of the parts of the project, we did establish our work group and it's a multidisciplinary group. We had our first meeting February 28th. We had a panel of advocates come from a variety of different advocacy organizations and legal aid offices to speak to our work group. And, we will have our next meeting in June or July.

This work group really serves as advisors

1	to the project and sort of a touchstone as we proceed
2	and as we try to make sure the Ability to Pay tool that
3	we use in California courts is truly workable and
4	applicable and will make the process more efficient.
5	Part of the project is conducting a jail
6	study. This is something that U.S. Department of
7	Justice.
8	COMMISSIONER YAKI: We can't understand a
9	single thing going on.
10	CHAIR LHAMON: Ms. Wright, why don't we
11	just take a pause. I think we have a bad line and we
12	can try to get this correct for him.
13	MS. WRIGHT: Sure.
14	CHAIR LHAMON: So, Michael, hang on one
15	moment, we're just going to try to get it corrected.
16	Thank you. Sorry.
17	COMMISSIONER YAKI: All I can hear is
18	static on our line.
19	CHAIR LHAMON: We're going to get it
20	corrected. Thank you.
21	And, this does not count against your time.
22	MS. WRIGHT: Sure.
23	CHAIR LHAMON: But, I can't do anything
24	about that.
25	MS. DUNSTON: Testing one, two, three.

1	Good morning to U.S. Commission on Civil Rights.
2	Testing one, two, three. Still talk? Good morning,
3	this is the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights. Testing
4	one, two, three.
5	COMMISSIONER YAKI: Still bad.
6	MS. DUNSTON: Yes, we're still trying to
7	fix some of the cords and see.
8	Give me a few minutes, we have to change
9	a cable perhaps.
10	(Whereupon, the above-entitled matter
11	went off the record at 9:56 a.m. and resumed at 10:04
12	a.m.)
13	CHAIR LHAMON: So, I'm going to start us
14	again. I'm sorry that we can't get this totally
15	functional, but we do have a transcript. Happily, the
16	Court Reporter's here and I want to make sure that we
17	can use our day without losing too much of our
18	lunchtime.
19	So, Ms. Wright, if you will continue.
20	MS. WRIGHT: So, I was mentioning, as a
21	grantee, one of the things that we need to do is report
22	our performance measures.
23	A key point of interest for the Department
24	of Justice and for us is our corrections costs saved
25	and minimizing confinement, issues around that.

1 So, the question in California really is 2 how many might be in jail as a result of the failure 3 to appear or failure to pay. 4 In California, we are a unified court 5 We do not have municipal courts. In California, infractions left unpaid 6 7 don't result in an arrest warrant, they can result, 8 though, in a civil assessment of an additional \$300. 9 They can result in license suspension. 10 Driving without license, if а that happens, is a misdemeanor and, in that instance, 11 12 somebody can end up in jail. So, you can see sort of 13 the ripple effect of the initial unpaid fine or fee. 14 So, in a preliminary analysis we did of ten 15 counties where we did have jail data, bookings data, 16 access to data's always a challenge, but in running some 17 initial numbers, it looked as though about 700 people 18 a month in California in these ten counties were booked 19 and detained an average of about three days in the last 20 fiscal year, '15, '16. 21 So, what we're going to be looking at is 22 with our pilot counties that are going to be working 23 on this Ability to Pay tool with us, we're going to look 24 at their data specifically and try and understand

what's happening with folks ending up in jail.

1 hopefully see a decrease over time as we implement the 2 Ability to Pay and more people avoid the fines and fees. And, as I mentioned, another piece of this 3 4 is working with the training and technical assistance 5 provider, Center for Court Innovation, so we know that they will be very helpful in the evaluation that we're 6 7 doing of the tool in pilot sites. 8 I should mention that just in the three 9 pilot sites that we're considering, and they're 10 relatively small California counties, there are about 11 300,000 in a year traffic infraction filings. 12 So, we will look at sort of chipping away 13 on that issue in these three pilot counties and seeing 14 what we can do with the Ability to Pay determination 15 there. 16 The other part of the project is the tool 17 itself. So, the tool itself, from an initial meeting 18 we've had with Judges and with the various 19 representatives on the work group, it definitely seems 20 that automation is going to be a key here. Again, just 21 because of volume just with traffic infractions that 22 we're dealing with in California. 23 So, we're really looking to find the best 24 tool possible to improve access to make the process more 25 efficient so that Judges are getting the right

1	information and so that defendants aren't burdened with
2	providing too much information. And, so, that the fine
3	or fee that's assessed is appropriate and is payable,
4	potentially a payment plan.
5	And, also, in consideration and always has
6	been in California, but we would like to strengthen it
7	a bit, our community service options, too.
8	And, then we will evaluate the Ability to
9	Pay tool and what we're hoping to see is a high number
10	of interactions with an online process with whatever
11	we use to determine ability to pay.
12	We hope case completion time will go down.
13	We hope it may take less court and judge time. We hope
14	to do an end user survey to make sure that the tool is
15	usable, is accessible, and is understandable for
16	everybody using it.
17	And, potentially even that revenues
18	court revenues are not affected.
19	And, that's what we will be looking at with
20	our project.
21	CHAIR LHAMON: Thanks very much, Ms.
22	Wright.
23	Ms. Delostrinos?
24	MS. DELOSTRINOS: Is this on? Hello?
25	It's on?

1	CHAIR LHAMON: Yes, I can see the light.
2	MS. DELOSTRINOS: Okay.
3	CHAIR LHAMON: I can't hear you very well,
4	but I can see the light.
5	MS. DELOSTRINOS: Okay.
6	Madam Chair and Commission
7	CHAIR LHAMON: Maybe Ms. Wright will pass
8	hers down.
9	MS. DELOSTRINOS: Thank you, Madam Chair,
10	Members of the Commission, my name is Cynthia
11	Delostrinos. I'm the Administrative I'm an
12	Administrative Manager for the Supreme Court
13	Commissions which is housed at the Administrative
14	Office of the Courts in Washington State.
15	I'm here representing the Washington State
16	Supreme Court's Minority and Justice Commission who
17	received the Department of Justice grant on behalf of
18	our State.
19	The Minority and Justice Commission
20	provides a voice for racial and ethnic minorities in
21	the State's highest court. And, it works to promote
22	equity and fairness for the most vulnerable and
23	historically marginalized groups in Washington's
24	courts.
25	Part of the work that the Commission does

is to investigate racial disproportionalities in the 1 2 court system in Washington. 3 One of those issues that we've looked into, 4 in 2008, we commissioned a report looking at legal 5 financial obligations which is, you know, also includes court fines and fees. 6 7 This study was done by Dr. Alexes Harris 8 and Katherine Beckett of the University of Washington. 9 And, one of the findings among many 10 findings was that Hispanic defendants in Washington 11 were assessed significantly higher LFOs than white 12 defendants, even after controlling for relevant legal 13 factors. 14 And, I want to say that, at the time, the 15 data on race was very limited. So, we've also done 16 studies looking at just racial disproportionalities in 17 the criminal justice system and we found that there were 18 disparities. So, we know or we can infer that these 19 issues are happening to more than just Hispanic 20 defendants. 21 Other problems in Washington which have 22 been revealed in the 2008 report and also in subsequent 23 reports done by the ACLU of Washington and some of our 24 legal aid organizations, the Columbia Legal Services

as well as pointed out through legal challenges to the

1 courts, one of the things is Washington has one of the 2 highest interest rate on court fines and fees at 12 3 percent interest. 4 For felonies, the mandatory minimum fine 5 that is given to every defendant is \$800. That fine cannot be reduced or waived by Judges in any way. 6 7 non-discretionary. So, it can't be reduced. 8 \$800 just starting out for all felonies. 9 In addition to that \$800, courts have 10 discretion to add additional fines and fees which are 11 outlined by statute. These fees include public 12 defense recoupment, filing fees, costs for serving a 13 warrant, costs for requesting a jury trial. 14 If you request a jury of six, that's \$125; 15 if you request a jury of 12, that's \$250. 16 Most have limited of our courts 17 jurisdiction which include our municipal courts which 18 handle most all of the traffic fines and fees. 19 contract with collection agencies for legal financial 20 obligations which adds additional fees for use of their 21 service. 22 Courts in Washington have been found to 23 jail indigent defendants who fail to pay. One county

in Washington, there was approximately 20 percent of

people in the jail were there for failure to pay, mostly

24

1 indigent who lack the ability to pay. 2 Our State law requires Judges to conduct 3 an individualized inquiry into a defendant's ability 4 to pay before ordering LFOs. And, if the defendant is 5 found indigent, the Judge can waive LFOs. That duty was further clarified in 2015 6 7 with a Supreme Court ruling that Judges must consider 8 the impact of LFOs for each individual, both for their 9 current and future ability to pay. 10 But, what we found is that Judges are still 11 not making those assessments and more work needs to be 12 done around that area. 13 When we heard about the Department of 14 Justice grant, the Minority and Justice Commission knew 15 that it was an opportunity for us to really tackle these 16 issues in Washington State. 17 Under our leadership, prior to the grant, 18 the Minority and Justice Commission had produced bench 19 cards for Judges, just a one page sheet that they could 20 have on the bench for them to see what the laws are 21 around LFOs and what their obligations were. 22 Because, one of the problems was that our 23 statutes were just everywhere. And, it was hard for 24 Judges to really see where we were.

I see I'm getting low on time, so I really

-- I'll get into what our plan is in terms of what we're 1 2 going to do with the grant. 3 We seek to do three things, first, like the 4 other States, we're establishing a consortium made up 5 of multidisciplinary stakeholders, Judges of all court levels, court administrators, court clerks, defense 6 7 prosecutors, Department of Corrections and community 8 organizations, people who represent people with LFOs as well as victims' rights groups. 9 10 This consortium will serve as our advisory 11 group as we move forward with the project. 12 We seek to do a study on LFOs, recognizing 13 that a lot of -- that there are so many issues involved 14 with LFOs and everybody just needs to get on the same 15 page and understanding the gravity of the problem. 16 What are the actual issues and kind of come 17 together because everybody's kind of on different pages 18 in terms of where they stand on LFOs. 19 I want to point out a website that was 20 created by one of our consortium members, it's called livingwithconviction.org and this website highlights 21 22 a lot -- highlights people who are living with LFOs and 23 what that impact of LFOs is on them and their families. 24 And, I encourage you all to check that out.

And, lastly, similar to California, we're

1	going to be creating an LFO Calculator that helps Judges
2	determine ability to pay. We're modeling off of a
3	calculator that was created by a Judge in Washington
4	State and we've actually partnered with Microsoft who
5	is going to be joining us in the project to help develop
6	this calculator tool.
7	And we hope that the other States could
8	it could be something that the other States could also
9	use in the future.
10	Just one last point, I want just everyone
11	one of the things I do is I remind myself how
12	important it is to be connected to why we're even doing
13	this.
14	These are real people, families and lives
15	who are burdened by LFOs. And, there has to be a better
16	way, there has to be solutions. And, so, I'm
17	encouraged for hearing all these States working on
18	this, but I know that there's a way for us to make real
19	changes.
20	Thank you.
21	CHAIR LHAMON: Thanks very much, Ms.
22	Delostrinos.
23	Ms. Paschal?
24	MS. PASCHAL: Good morning. I am from the
25	Missouri Office of State Courts Administrator.

1	And, as a result of the Department of
2	Justice report on Ferguson as well as
3	CHAIR LHAMON: We're going to move the
4	microphone closer to you.
5	MS. PASCHAL: as well as the Commission
6	Ferguson Commission the Governor appointed and they
7	developed a report.
8	The Supreme Court appointed the Municipal
9	Division Work Group, which also developed a report on
10	our municipal divisions in Missouri and the National
11	Center for State Courts was invited in and they did a
12	study.
13	All of that information on those reports
14	was used and Missouri has taken, I would say, very
15	significant strides in working with our municipal
16	divisions which Judge DeMarce and will talk more about
17	on the next panel.
18	But, what I was invited for this piece was
19	what we are doing with the Price of Justice grant.
20	Again, as a result of all the reports, we
21	applied for grants to seek ways that we could improve
22	our municipal divisions and come up with alternatives
23	to paying fines and fees.
24	So, what we are doing is implementing a web
25	based self-represented litigant portal and it's for

those cases that are considered minor violations that would not require a court appearance.

But, the goals basically are to expedite the ability for a Judge to determine indigency, eliminate or reduce jail time for failing to appear, to give individuals the ability to pay online, make community service accessible and hopefully, in most instances, eliminate the need for a court appearance for those individuals that can't take off work, have issues with transportation.

Through the grant, as with the other States, we will have a multidisciplinary oversight group that will work with us.

The first phase of the project, we will be working with this group to identify all of the specific cases that would qualify to be handled through this portal as well as determining community service hours in lieu of the payment of fines and fees, how many hours would equal how much in a fine, all of those things still have to be identified.

And, we will then begin the development of the tool. The State Court Administrator's Office is currently building our own case management system for the State Courts of Missouri.

And, we have some functionality that we're

currently working on that we can also use for this portal. One of them is Track This Case. Individuals can go out and track their case and receive email notices as well as soon to be text messages. 5 And, there's a portal for the prosecutors to go in and look at tickets and determine whether or 6 7 not they want to file on the case. 8 So, some functionality has been started but we still need to continue building the product. 10 So, basically, how it would work, if an individual gets a violation that qualifies to go through this portal, 12 they can go out and plead guilty or not guilty. 13 If they plead guilty, they can complete and 14 indigency form so then the Judge can determine whether 15 or not the individual has the means to pay fines and 16 Or they can determine if they want to send them 17 through community service. 18 Ιt allows government entities and 19 nonprofit organizations to sign up through the portal 20 to provide the community service hours. Or an individual can choose to plead guilty 22 or not guilty, sorry, and the case would be forwarded 23 on to the court. 24 But, an individual could -- if they are 25 assessed fines and fees can pay online through e-checks

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1	or credit cards. They can post their community service
2	hours if they are working community service hours in
3	lieu of a fine.
4	A Judge can also choose, if the person is
5	indigent and there's other circumstances that a Judge
6	can choose to waive the fines or fees all together.
7	And, again, all of this would be done
8	online and would not require an individual to come in
9	for a court appearance.
10	Again, three years to develop the tool and
11	there is still a lot to be done, but that's what we are
12	using the Price of Justice funds for. And, again, very
13	grateful to get the funds.
14	And welcome the opportunity to be here and
15	answer any questions that you might have.
16	CHAIR LHAMON: Thank you very much, Ms.
17	Paschal.
18	Thank you to all the panelists and I will
19	allow for questions from my fellow Commissioners.
20	Mr. Kladney:
21	COMMISSIONER KLADNEY: Thank you.
22	I have lots of questions I can speak of.
23	CHAIR LHAMON: I should also mention, I'm
24	sorry
25	COMMISSIONER KLADNEY: Can you hear me.
	1

1	CHAIR LHAMON: Mr. Yaki can now hear,
2	so I apologize for the technical difficulties.
3	COMMISSIONER KLADNEY: I was wondering,
4	in all your studies, have you ever figured out what the
5	profit margin is in courts of limited jurisdiction?
6	MR. SLAYTON: This is David Slayton, I'll
7	take a shot at that.
8	We've not I don't know that we would say
9	profit margin. So
10	COMMISSIONER KLADNEY: Well, they do
11	collect in excess of what they need to run.
12	MR. SLAYTON: So, in our State, as I
13	mentioned in my testimony, and I want to be clear, all
14	the court costs and fines are set by legislature in our
15	State, so they're not set by the courts.
16	And, as was mentioned by several of the
17	other panelists, a lot of those are mandatory
18	assessments.
19	And, one of the things that we're trying
20	to do is give the Judges some discretion to waive some
21	of those.
22	And, in our State, a significant amount of
23	those go to the State. About half of them are going
24	to the State. In fact, last week, our highest criminal
25	court in the State ruled two of them unconstitutional,

1	saying they were unconstitutional taxes because they
2	weren't being used for any criminal justice purpose,
3	they were being used for other functions.
4	COMMISSIONER KLADNEY: So, you say
5	there's no way of knowing?
6	MR. SLAYTON: As of right now, you know,
7	in our many of our jurisdictions, those collections
8	do exceed the amount appropriated.
9	So, for instance, in the State of Texas,
10	the amount of revenue generated from court costs and
11	fines exceeds that's sent to the State, exceeds the
12	entire budget for the judicial branch.
13	COMMISSIONER KLADNEY: In all your
14	presentations that I've read, I didn't see any
15	reference to where prior to jailing someone, that they
16	had entitlement to a lawyer to argue their indegency.
17	I saw operations for tools that Judges could use.
18	Do you believe that it's constitutionally
19	correct that prior to jailing someone, they should have
20	a lawyer to argue their case?
21	MR. SLAYTON: I'll take a shot at that
22	question.
23	It is that is a very difficult question
24	if any of my colleagues want to jump in, please do
25	so.

(LAUGHTER)

MR. SLAYTON: You know, one of the -- in our State, individuals who -- for whom the offense is jailable, which would be, in our State, our Class A and B misdemeanors, our felonies, they are entitled to counsel.

In our Class C fine only misdemeanor offenses, the law does not specifically entitle them to counsel because the offense for which they are charged is not jailable.

COMMISSIONER KLADNEY: But, it becomes that.

MR. SLAYTON: It can become that. And, so, that's certainly something that we've been looking very closely at. And, I know the -- I didn't get a chance to mention it, but I know it's in my testimony, written testimony, that National Task Force on Fines, Fees and Bail Reform, that the Conference of Chief Justices and Conference of Stakeholder Administrators are looking at is that issue of whether or not people are entitled to counsel.

It's certainly something that, in Texas, we're looking really closely at because, you know, and the question becomes when does that right attach?

Because is it when they can't pay their fines and fees

1	then they get a right to counsel because of that issue?
2	Or, are they, in fact, entitled to it all
3	along the process because of the fact that they might
4	be jailable somewhere down the road?
5	So, it's a very difficult issue, but I know
6	it's something we're looking at in our State
7	particularly.
8	COMMISSIONER KLADNEY: Anyone else can
9	answer, however, I do want to ask one more question.
10	I have a penchant for asking too many questions,
11	according to my fellow Commissioners.
12	So, my last question is
13	CHAIR LHAMON: His microphone doesn't
14	work.
15	COMMISSIONER KLADNEY: It's on.
16	CHAIR LHAMON: His microphone's not
17	working.
18	COMMISSIONER KLADNEY: It's not working.
19	My last question is, the City of Biloxi
20	case, have y'all read that?
21	(NO AUDIBLE RESPONSE)
22	COMMISSIONER KLADNEY: The oh, there we
23	go sorry, now this works.
24	The City of Biloxi case, prior in time when
25	they would serve FTAs, they would serve on Friday

1 nights, Saturday night, whenever they would stop 2 somebody and take them to jail or Monday night or 3 Tuesday night. 4 And, as a result, people would stay in jail 5 up to 48 hours without getting bail and then trying to Indigent folks would lose their jobs. make bail. 6 7 And, in the City of Biloxi case, they, and 8 I didn't hear anybody talk about this either, they were 9 limited to serving FTAs only during the times courts 10 were open and Judges were available and the defendant 11 was brought directly to the Judge and not booked into 12 jail. 13 But, what do y'all think of that? 14 David? 15 MR. SLAYTON: I hate to hog the time here, 16 but I'll answer. 17 This is a particular challenge that we're 18 In our statutory recommendations to the 19 legislature, we've tried to clarify this in law. 20 So, our law in the State of Texas says that 21 when someone is arrested on what you refer to as a capias 22 pro fine, this is a warrant. 23 And, particularly, when someone doesn't pay their court costs and fine. I'll talk about that 24 25 one first, if it's okay.

1 They are to be, if they are arrested on 2 that, they are to be brought immediately before a 3 magistrate, before the Judge who issued that or some 4 other Judge of competent jurisdiction. 5 What we are finding in our State is that many times or most times, that's not happening. 6 7 Instead, they're being taken directly to jail as they 8 would be on other warrants. Law enforcement takes them 9 to jail. 10 And, by the time a magistrate or Judge were 11 to find that they are in jail, they've set out the time 12 that they would have needed to do pay off the court costs 13 and fines. 14 And, so, we've got the Judicial Council has 15 specifically recommended a couple of changes in law to 16 where basically, before you issue the capias pro fine, 17 they have to have a show-cause hearing where they're 18 actually brought before the Judge to say, why didn't 19 you pay that court cost and fine? That way, it's not 20 just an automatic warrant where they go to jail. 21 Because, there needs to be a determination 22 under federal case law, the U.S. Supreme Court case law 23 and Bearden, to make sure that the failure to pay was 24 a willful noncompliance not just an inability to pay.

So, it is a challenge.

25

It's an issue

1	where, and as you heard in my testimony, the statistics
2	are somewhat alarming the percent of people that are
3	ultimately laying these court costs and fines out in
4	jail is pretty significant. It's a much higher
5	percentage than the people who are working them off
6	through community service or other alternatives.
7	And, so, we believe that's a problem in our
8	State and we're looking to try to address it.
9	COMMISSIONER KLADNEY: And, how are the
10	rest of your States handling it?
11	MS. PASCHAL: If I could back up and answer
12	a couple of your other questions.
13	COMMISSIONER KLADNEY: Sure.
14	MS. PASCHAL: Missouri does not have the
15	ability to determine how much fines and fees are being
16	collected through our municipal divisions, except for
17	those I had mentioned, we are working on a statewide
18	case management system that all of our state courts are
19	currently using.
20	Our municipal divisions are funded through
21	local municipalities even though they are considered
22	under the judicial branch of government. They are not
23	required to use that automated tool.
24	We do have some that have voluntarily gone
25	on the automated system.

1 So, there's no way for us to extract that 2 data other than asking the 440 municipal divisions to 3 provide us with that information. I should say there's 4 no easy way to determine that information. 5 Texas, And, like in our legislator determines the amount. All the fines and fees and 6 7 surcharges are set by legislation. And, as a result 8 of Ferguson, the legislators passed -- put a cap on the 9 amount, lowered the cap on the amount that can be 10 charged on municipal violations. I think it is \$225, 11 I have to look. 12 So, and, with regard to your last question, 13 one of the recent things that the Supreme Court, and 14 I -- recent as in the last week, are looking at pretrial 15 service programs and looking at the pretrial aspect and 16 jail and individuals that are held too long. 17 MS. WRIGHT: And, I can just mention that 18 in California, as a court administrator, I can't help 19 but sort of see the distinction between, or at least 20 in terms of how we're organizing our efforts, between 21 the infractions issues and ability to pay and what can 22 happen as a result of an infraction that goes unpaid 23 and then, you know, snowballs into a problematic issue. 24 And, then, that sort of misdemeanor or

felony other part of the criminal justice world here

and issues of bail and inability to pay bail. 1 2 We do have sort of two sister projects. 3 have our Ability to Pay project supported by Department 4 of Justice and the looking at the fines and fees. And, then, our Chief Justice has also 5 established a work group looking at the bail issue. 6 7 And, she has made very clear that we need to look at 8 whether or not bail is serving its purpose in terms of 9 the pretrial arena. 10 And, by the end of this calendar year, 11 there will be a work group that makes recommendations 12 directly to her around bail reform and those issues. 13 MS. DELOSTRINOS: So, for Washington, 14 that issue of court funding is one that we are going 15 to tackle head on. I think that's one of the huge 16 barriers that we've faced in terms of the data that's 17 lacking on this issue. So, hopefully, when our report 18 comes out, it'll help to answer your question about 19 profit margins. But, that's the big elephant in the 20 room in terms of what I think the legislatures and what 21 people want to know. 22 In terms of the second issue, like the 23 other States, we're also looking at pretrial. I can't 24 tell you exactly what the practices are in Washington,

but hopefully we'll do some of that investigation

1 through the grant money that we were given. 2 COMMISSIONER KLADNEY: So, how much of 3 your judicial system is funded by fines and fees? 4 MS. PASCHAL: In Missouri our -- the fines 5 and fees go to the school system at the State level which is different at the municipal level. They actually go 6 7 back to the municipality. I don't know exactly how 8 MS. WRIGHT: 9 much, but I -- as with what was mentioned for Texas and 10 California, the fines and fees go to a wide variety of 11 projects and programs at the State and county level. 12 A list of the programs and projects and it's grown over 13 time that's in the two pages range, I believe. 14 Yes, basically the same MR. SLAYTON: 15 I mean, the data I have -- so, when these fines 16 and fees are collected, the courts don't retain them. 17 So, they are submitted to either the local government 18 or the State government. 19 And then, of course, the courts get funding 20 provided to them in some form or fashion. 21 And, so, as I mentioned, at the State 22 level, the collections exceeds the appropriation to the 23 entire branch. At the local level, that just depends, 24 depending on the cities and the counties. 25 I would point out, I think it's important

and I can't remember if I submitted this in my materials, but I certainly would be happy to supplement afterwards, the Conference of State Court Administrators has addressed this issue head on, that's my colleagues in all the 50 States. And several policy papers starting with the one that said that courts are not revenue centers.

The Conference has taken a pretty strong position that courts should not be looked to be revenue generators for the State court system, but, in fact, in many places, that is a challenge for the courts.

And, as that paper points out and subsequent paper policy papers have pointed out, a real challenge, especially for our municipal courts, in Texas, they are not -- most of our Judges in Texas are elected, but our municipal court Judges are appointed may times by City Councils who, obviously, are looking at that issue.

I know that was a particular issue raised by DOJ in its Ferguson paper with regard to what is the true independence of the court when perhaps the revenue collection issue is such a big one.

And, in our State in several places, the Judge actually reported -- a municipal court Judge who's appointed reports to the City Finance Director.

1 And, you know, we're looking at that issue as a -- and, 2 I know the National Task Force is looking at it, too, 3 as a particular challenge because what is that -- what 4 message is that sending to the Judges? 5 And, our justice courts which are county level courts some of these not only many times the 6 7 Judges are told, if you don't generate enough revenue 8 to pay for your staff, then we're going to have to cut 9 your staff. 10 So, you know, those are definite pressures 11 that are placed upon Judges with regard to fines and 12 fees. 13 CHAIR LHAMON: Thanks. 14 I want to see if my fellow Commissioners 15 -- other fellow Commissioners have questions. 16 Commissioner Adegbile? 17 COMMISSIONER ADEGBILE: Yes, I think Ms. 18 Delostrinos spoke about racial disparity. 19 wondering if any of the rest of you have taken a lense 20 to this issue that consider the race disparities of 21 these practices in your respective States, both as to 22 amount of fees assessed and also with respect to jail 23 or incarceration? And, as an amendment to 24 CHAIR LHAMON: 25 that question, Ms. Delostrinos, if you actually could

1 share with us the 2008 study that you mentioned in your 2 testimony, we would appreciate it. 3 MS. WRIGHT: I can mention that 4 California, there was a group of advocacy organizations 5 that did a report, it's called Back on the Road, I believe. And, they did look by Zip Code at traffic fine 6 7 and fee assessment and traffic citations by ZIP Code, 8 found a disproportionate impact there. 9 I will say that, at the court level, what 10 we're trying to do is just make sure that anyone and 11 everyone who comes to court however they got there, 12 whatever the traffic infraction is, is given the 13 opportunity to present information so that their fine 14 or fee is appropriate to their income. 15 COMMISSIONER ADEGBILE: Sorry, just one 16 follow up. 17 So, I take the point that it's important 18 to certainly have that lense with respect to everybody 19 that comes before the court, but I'm wondering if there 20 is a sense that, to the extent that the courts are 21 involved in a system of fines or fees that 22 contribute to racially disparate results. Is that a 23 consideration that courts should have their eyes on as 24 well?

MS. WRIGHT:

25

I will say that it's part of

what we're looking at with the grant. It's definitely 1 2 imbedded in the performance objectives and in some of 3 the technical assistance we are working on with Center 4 for Court Innovation as part of the project. 5 It will be an element of our jail study to see what we can learn about race. And, we will keep 6 7 that data point, if you will, and that factor as a part 8 of the project. 9 And, again, we look to our advocacy 10 organizations as partners and informing that, too. 11 MS. PASCHAL: One of the other things that 12 the Supreme Court did, they appointed a Commission on 13 racial and ethnic fairness. And, the group is divided 14 into six subcommittees. 15 I think they're looking at the judicial 16 The civil justice, criminal system as a whole. 17 justice, juvenile, municipal and then within the 18 practice of law, each of those six groups are tasked 19 with studying in those areas. 20 COMMISSIONER ADEGBILE: Is there any time 21 frame when we expect the output of those studies? 22 MS. PASCHAL: I think some have been 23 submitted, but I am not sure if they all have been 24 submitted. I can double check for you and get back. 25 COMMISSIONER ADEGBILE: Ιf they're

1 available, we'd welcome them. 2 MS. PASCHAL: Okay. 3 COMMISSIONER ADEGBILE: ${\tt Mr.}$ Slayton, 4 anything on this? 5 So, our efforts have been MR. SLAYTON: 6 looking at this from the broad issue of seeing the 7 problems statewide and making sure that courts are 8 doing a true determination. 9 You know, obviously, we've had studies in 10 the past with regard to particular case top practices 11 where we've -- where our studies have shown racial 12 disparities and have taken actions to address some of 13 those. 14 We're seeing this as, quite frankly, just 15 a broad across the board. Obviously, people in poverty 16 are clearly being impacted more disparately than 17 others. So, to the degree that those issues overlie, 18 that's certainly a huge issue for us. 19 We've taken a look at it specifically with 20 regard to bail and we've just released a study in the 21 last week, and actually, the legislature has before it 22 pending now a bill to revise completely the pretrial 23 bail practices in the State of Texas. 24 And, that's one where we've seen -- we 25 looked at that by ZIP Code in a couple of jurisdictions

1	in our study and that study was just released last week.
2	I'm happy to provide that, too.
3	And, it looked at basically showing that
4	clearly your ability to pay, your resources that are
5	available to you directly correlate to your ability to
6	get out of jail. So, that's a bit of a problem for us.
7	COMMISSIONER ADEGBILE: One quick follow
8	up.
9	One of your statistics was that 15 percent
10	of individuals that receive fines and fees in context
11	in which jail is not an option end up serving jail time?
12	MR. SLAYTON: That's correct.
13	COMMISSIONER ADEGBILE: Can you explain
14	to us what appears to be a misnomer that jail isn't an
15	option if people ultimately serve jail time, how the
16	law operates to allow that pathway?
17	MR. SLAYTON: Sure.
18	COMMISSIONER ADEGBILE: And, then, can
19	you also explain to us what you understand the driver
20	of this to be. I mean, is this just an indication of
21	the indigency of the people that come before the court
22	and receive these fines such that they have no option
23	but to offer themselves for incarceration for crimes
24	that, by statute, are not jail eligible?
25	MR. SLAYTON: Right. So, Commission

1 staff actually reached out to me after I submitted my 2 testimony and said, is this right in your testimony? 3 Because, obviously, there's a bit of a disconnect 4 there. 5 So, in our State, fine only offenses are strictly that, fine and court costs only. 6 7 someone who does not pay the court costs and fines 8 assessed, they can be arrested and basically lay that 9 out in jail. 10 The -- so, that's where the 15 percent 11 comes from. 12 So, individuals -- so there was a billion 13 dollars assessed and 15 percent of all satisfactions 14 was done through jail credit, meaning the individuals 15 who presumably either couldn't pay or willfully did not 16 pay went to jail and satisfied them that way. 17 We expect that a significant number of 18 those were people who had an inability to pay. 19 You know, the way the judicial council has 20 looked at this issue and the resolution that I think 21 was included in my materials that the judicial council 22 passed, said that individuals who are willfully 23 noncompliant, that jail should perhaps be an option for 24 them.

But, if it's simply because they have an

inability to pay, they should not be going to jail and 1 2 we should be looking to have those satisfactions by 3 other alternatives other than jail. 4 COMMISSIONER ADEGBILE: Are some of the 5 pending legislative initiatives that you spoke of on 6 this point trying to clarify that the only people who 7 should be eliqible for incarceration are those who 8 willfully have failed to satisfy as opposed to those 9 who exist in a condition of poverty? 10 MR. Absolutely. SLAYTON: So, Ι 11 mentioned in my testimony that I think there's two 12 answers. 13 The direct answer is yes, the legislation 14 will address that directly. 15 The other thing the judicial council has 16 a rulemaking authority over counties over 50,000 and 17 cities over 100,000 with regard to collections. 18 And, last year, as I mentioned in my 19 testimony, we amended those rules and they went into 20 effect on January 1st, and basically, those rules 21 require before a Judge -- since we can do that through 22 rule, require that a Judge basically hold -- look into 23 the ability to pay prior to their issuance of a warrant 24 and jailing for those inability to pay.

So, some of those things are already

moving. I was telling my colleagues earlier, as I mentioned in my testimony, the rule changes were not without controversy and push back from some of the stakeholder groups in the State.

And, a lot of the discussion was, well, this is going to dramatically decrease revenue. And, what we've seen just, I mean, we're now three months in approximately to these rules and what the reports from the courts have been back is, one, increased compliance by defendants who now can truly comply with the requirements. Either they're able to set up appropriate payment plans to pay these off or they're able to do other satisfaction through other means.

And, in fact, increased collections because defendants, what we're seeing in these courts is, defendants do want to comply with what their obligations are as long as we work with them in a way that they can actually successfully do that.

And, then, when they don't have an ability to pay, work with them in satisfying their obligations through some other means if they're able to do that without some undue hardship.

And, then, ultimately, obviously, a waiver where that's appropriate where they can't pay it and it's an undue hardship to do, if there's some

1 alternative. 2 And, so far, reports are very positive from 3 those efforts. 4 CHAIR LHAMON: Thank you. I want to make sure that Commissioner 5 Kirsanow has a chance to ask his questions. 6 7 COMMISSIONER KIRSANOW: Thanks, Madam 8 Chair and thanks to the panel members and to the staff for putting together this panel. Very helpful. 9 10 Presumably, and if not the defensible 11 purpose for fines and fees is to enforce some type of 12 compliance or deterrence from engaging in the type of 13 activity that's been fined. 14 Do you know of any studies, any data that 15 show whether the various alternatives to fines deter 16 recidivism at the same rate as fines? Such as, let's 17 say that someone has a broken taillight and they're 18 fined \$15. Will they come back with a similar problem 19 in the future if they are, instead of being fined, sent 20 to community service or jail or some other kind of 21 sanctions imposed upon them? 22 MS. WRIGHT: I can tell you that, 23 California, this issue of acknowledging the violation, 24 of looking at the deterrent factor was foremost in the

mind of the Judges and Commissioners and court

1 executives that we worked with. We are looking at those studies. 2 3 actually, there's an interesting one that is soon to 4 come out of a professor's work at UCLA. 5 And, there was a practice back in the day many years ago and a practice in Europe called Day Fines 6 7 and it's sort of -- it's something that considers both 8 the violation and ability to pay in terms of somebody's 9 income calculated down to the day. 10 And, you could take a day's worth of income 11 at a multiplier acknowledging the fine or fee and come 12 up with sort of a hybrid method of assessing a fine or 13 fee that does also acknowledge that violation. 14 It was a long, long time ago that those 15 sorts of practices were used and I don't know that 16 they've been used recently. So, we'll be interested 17 to learn more about the study. 18 COMMISSIONER KIRSANOW: One other 19 I think we've heard that California is question. 20 approximately 700 approximately 700 people 21 individuals per month who are incarcerated for failure 22 to pay. 23 And, then, I think you said in Washington about 20 percent of the inmates are in jail as a result 24 25 of failure to pay.

1 Is there any data for Missouri or Texas 2 related to how many individuals are incarcerated as a 3 result of failure to pay or failure to abide by whatever 4 sanction has been imposed? 5 Again, I could get that MS. PASCHAL: information on the State side in terms of traffic and 6 7 misdemeanor. On the municipal side, we don't have that 8 information available without doing a survey. 9 And, just to clarify real MS. WRIGHT: 10 quickly, in California, I can say that it was just for 11 only ten counties that we were able to get that data 12 for, that 700 number. 13 And then, it is the number of individuals 14 who were arrested because they were driving with a 15 suspended license. So, it's that issue of an unpaid 16 fine or fee ultimately ending in an incarceration 17 situation. 18 MR. SLAYTON: So, in Texas, the jail data 19 that's submitted to the State does not include the 20 specific number of defendants who are serving jail time 21 for failure to pay or failure to appear. 22 What we do have is the statistics I've been 23 referring to. We have from every court in the State 24 reported monthly to us the number of defendants who are

satisfying their assessments through jail credit.

we have the number of cases where that happens. 1 2 So, you know, to the degree those align one 3 for one with people, we would know. But, presumably, 4 some of those individuals have more than one case. 5 But, as I mentioned, it's a pretty -- in our State, a pretty significant number of people who are satisfying 6 7 it one way or another through jail credit. COMMISSIONER KIRSANOW: Is there any --8 9 and maybe you've already discussed this and I guess --10 you could probably extrapolate from this, but have 11 there been any studies that show how effective certain 12 levels of fines are for deterring certain types of 13 offenses? 14 through You know, when Ι go codes 15 haphazardly, I don't do this. But, you know, sometimes 16 I just happen to see, you know, municipal codes and 17 statutes that have nothing to do with my area of 18 discipline, but it'll say, for example, for a broken 19 taillight, X number of dollars is the fine. 20 Before that's assessed, is there any kind 21 of a study that is performed to determine whether or 22 not this actually has some type of salutary effect on 23 the number of broken taillights in the State? Or you 24 just kind of come up with a figure?

MR. SLAYTON:

25

I'm not aware of a study

1 that's been done along those lines. You know what? 2 Interestingly enough, sort of, we, at our office, we've 3 done a study sort of to the opposite side, which is if 4 the purpose really is to increase public safety from 5 the issuance of these tickets, is it doing that? And, because of several policy decisions 6 7 made in our State, we've seen a pretty significant 8 decrease in the number of traffic citations that have 9 been written and in particular areas of the State. 10 And, what we're seeing is an increase in 11 public safety issues in those areas. 12 And, so, that's what we have. I don't know 13 if there's a study that's been done with regard to the 14 true effectiveness of whether or not these actually do 15 cause deterrents for the offenses. 16 COMMISSIONER KIRSANOW: Thank you. 17 CHAIR LHAMON: Vice Chair, do you have 18 some questions? 19 VICE CHAIR TIMMONS-GOODSON: Yes, just a 20 couple. 21 Mr. Slayton, anecdotally, we know that not 22 all of the recipients of the Dear Colleague letters to 23 the Chief Justices and the heads of the Administrative 24 Office of the Courts necessarily passed those materials 25 on.

1	But, I noted that you indicated that upon
2	receipt of the Dear Colleague letter that your office
3	disseminated it to the courts with jurisdiction over
4	ticket and ordinance violations.
5	I wanted to know specifically what you
6	meant by to the courts? Did they go to the individual
7	Judges?
8	MR. SLAYTON: So, I was telling my
9	colleagues during the break, Texas is, as I referred
10	to earlier, what was it juris imprudent system. Every
11	Judge is a court in our State. So, sometimes I refer
12	to it as a court and what I really mean is every Judge.
13	So, what we did was we distributed it to
14	every not just Judges with jurisdiction over fine
15	only, but every single Judge in the State received the
16	letter.
17	VICE CHAIR TIMMONS-GOODSON: Wonderful.
18	Now, what made you decide to do that?
19	Because, as I've said, everybody has not chosen to take
20	that route.
21	MR. SLAYTON: You know, a couple of
22	things.
23	First of all, we were already embarking
24	upon work in this area and there was a lot of question
25	from stakeholders, Judges, others saying, you know,

1 what exactly are we doing? Why are we doing this? You 2 know? 3 And, so, when we received the letter, the 4 Justice, Chief Justice Hecht and I had a 5 discussion about we felt like more information to the Judges was better on this issue and DOJ specifically 6 7 asked us to send it to all the Judges in the State and 8 so, we felt like it was incumbent upon us to make sure 9 they all received it. 10 VICE CHAIR TIMMONS-GOODSON: And, that's 11 an excellent point. DOJ did ask but that was not done. 12 And, just finally, what type of feedback 13 have you received from the Judges upon them receiving 14 the letter? 15 So, when we sent out the MR. SLAYTON: 16 letter, we received very positive feedback from the 17 Judges. You know, the letter addressed, I believe, 18 five or six specific areas and I think the Judges felt 19 like the information was helpful. 20 Honestly, the Dear Colleague letter, I 21 believe it was in March 2016 when it came out, as I 22 mentioned, we began our process of revising our rules 23 in our State in February. That was when it sort of 24 became public. We had done some work before that, but 25 February 2016 was the first sort of public look at that.

1	And, it was, honestly, it was very helpful
2	to us to be able to use that letter as part of this.
3	You know, these are the this is the way the federal
4	government thinks about these issues and DOJ thinks
5	about these issues, so we used it to our advantage and
6	I think it was very helpful and very well received by
7	the Judges across the State.
8	VICE CHAIR TIMMONS-GOODSON: Ms.
9	Delostrinos, I noted that y'all did flash cards or some
10	kind of cards for the benefit of your Judges. Would
11	you care to comment?
12	MR. DELOSTRINOS: So, we put those
13	together even before the Dear Colleague letter came out
14	because we, based on the 2008 report, we knew that this
15	was an issue.
16	Based on those cards, we did a lot of
17	judicial training at each level of the court. This
18	leadership came from the Supreme Court.
19	And, you asked about feedback, it was
20	interesting because we found out that a lot of the
21	Judges were divided in how they viewed this effort in
22	terms of us trying to tell them.
23	We're a non-unified court system and our
24	Judges, we kind of look at them the same way as that
25	they'll do their own thing.

1	But, it was on both sides. There's the
2	problem of the of, you know, courts being revenue
3	generators and these fines and fees generate money for
4	the courts. And, so, the, you know, asking courts to
5	do these individualized inquiries and follow these
6	rules, I think, is difficult because, when they go into
7	their local settings, there's a lot of pressures on in
8	terms of funding their court.
9	But, a lot of them found that it was really
10	helpful to have this tool that lays out all the laws.
11	But, the leadership did come from the
12	Supreme Court.
13	VICE CHAIR TIMMONS-GOODSON: So, did your
14	Supreme Court Chief send out a copy of the letter or
15	see that a copy of the Dear Colleague letter go to each
16	Judge?
17	MS. DELOSTRINOS: No, we didn't.
18	VICE CHAIR TIMMONS-GOODSON: You did not?
19	MS. DELOSTRINOS: Yes.
20	VICE CHAIR TIMMONS-GOODSON: Any other
21	from California or Missouri, did a copy of the Dear
22	Colleague letter go to each Judge? Each court?
23	MS. PASCHAL: I am not sure if it did or
24	not.
25	VICE CHAIR TIMMONS-GOODSON: Ms. Wright?

1 MS. WRIGHT: Yes, as far as I know 2 California, it went to every county and there were 3 public statements. 4 It became a part of our Chief Justice's 5 State of the Judiciary Address last year. So, it was made well known in California. 6 7 VICE CHAIR TIMMONS-GOODSON: Thank you. 8 CHAIR LHAMON: Ms. Paschal, I saw in your 9 testimony that you have a new requirement and it's Rule 10 37.04 that each of the -- that the presiding Judge has 11 to report to the clerk of the court twice a year that 12 the municipal divisions within their circuit are in 13 compliance with the minimum operating standards. 14 that have the same effect as having the information from 15 the Dear Colleague letter or is that different and how 16 effective is that? 17 MS. PASCHAL: There's ten, Ι think, 18 operating standards that were basically 19 identified through one of the Commission's developed 20 by the Supreme Court. Judge DeMarce mentioned that he 21 did get a Dear Colleague letter. 22 CHAIR LHAMON: Good. Okay, thank you. 23 Commissioner Narasaki, I think you'll have 24 our last questions. We'll go a little bit over because 25 we had the break.

1 COMMISSIONER NARASAKI: Thank you. I'll 2 try to keep this short. 3 This is one of our special hearings because 4 we're really focused on the Agency and how well they're 5 enforcing their charge. And, so, I'm interested in knowing, we have 6 7 a new administration, right, so, how important do you 8 feel is it for the Department of Justice to sustain the 9 work that they are doing in this area? 10 And, is there anything that they should be 11 doing that they're not yet doing that would be helpful 12 to support your efforts? 13 MR. SLAYTON: So, I'll take a shot at that 14 first. 15 One of the things I know the National Task 16 Force on Fines, Fees and Bail Reform set up by the 17 Conference of Chief Justices and the Conference of 18 State Court Administrators has a very close involvement 19 from the Department of Justice. 20 And, I can tell you it's been very helpful. 21 There have been issues in the past where DOJ has taken 22 more of an adversarial role in certain issues. 23 I think sometimes State courts might not respond the 24 same way. 25 DOJ, I think, has, in this instance, been

seen as a very close partner in helping us work through these issues. I think the State, you'll find across the State and in the two conferences, the Conference of Chief Justice and the State Court Administrators, a very keen interest in addressing these issues and correcting them.

And, DOJ, I think, has really become a very close partner to each of the States in making those efforts. And, we're, you know, we're grateful for the funding they've put out there. We're grateful for their continued involvement in the National Task Force.

And, from my perspective, I think, you know, their continued involvement and assistance in this area would only continue to help us. And, you know, help us if they see issues that come up in certain, you know, cases they're working on across the State to ensure that the State courts are aware of those.

You know, quite frankly, the Ferguson report was -- shed a light on something that maybe at least at the highest levels of the States courts, we weren't aware were going on in some of the jurisdictions.

And, so, I think those -- their continued involvement is something that's beneficial to the State courts.

1	MS. WRIGHT: Yes, I would say that for
2	California's part, having the federal level support on
3	this is extremely important.
4	It allows us go further than we could as
5	a State alone. It allows another voice. It gives us
6	more support for what we want to do and it gives us more
7	resources. It gives us resources that we couldn't
8	apply on our own.
9	Having the training and technical
10	assistance providers is extremely valuable.
11	So, it magnifies what we're able to do in
12	a very important way.
13	MS. DELOSTRINOS: And, I echo what my
14	colleagues have said. It's very helpful in each of the
15	ways that they have mentioned.
16	MS. PASCHAL: I think if they continue to
17	provide information on what other States are doing is
18	very helpful.
19	Someone may think of something that we
20	didn't and continue to share that information.
21	I think it also helps politically. If
22	there's a national push to urge the States to continue
23	to improve the system and process.
24	COMMISSIONER NARASAKI: Thank you.
25	I just have one more question and it's to
11	

1 Ms. Paschal. 2 So, I'm getting the sense, given the court structure, that it's been difficult to impact the 3 4 municipal courts. And, it seems like that's where a 5 lot of the issues have been. So, I'm wondering what you feel 6 7 effective and does -- is there anything that DOJ can 8 do given that it's municipal courts rather than State 9 courts who may be receiving federal funds, is there a 10 role that DOJ could be playing to help push the lower 11 courts? 12 Again, I think sharing of MS. PASCHAL: 13 information and certainly the funding received has been 14 beneficial because it's very difficult, at this point, 15 to get any funding through the State. 16 And, because the municipal divisions are 17 funded by the municipalities, our General Assembly 18 generally views that it's not the State's 19 responsibility to use GR money, General Revenue money, 20 to assist. 21 However, again, our Supreme Court has 22 taken very significant strides in providing tools, 23 information, rules, and standards to assist municipal 24 divisions.

It's taken about two and half years but I

1	think the latest standards that were minimum operating
2	standards and putting the presiding Judges in the role
3	or, I guess they always had the authority, the
4	administrative authority over the courts, but
5	reinforcing that so that the presiding Judges at the
6	State level are accepting more responsibility and
7	oversight for the municipal divisions in their
8	counties.
9	That's been helpful.
10	COMMISSIONER NARASAKI: I do have a quick
11	follow up on that.
12	So, it seems unlikely that the State courts
13	or State Judges would be willing to necessarily hold
14	the municipal courts accountable.
15	So, does that mean that the Department of
16	Justice may be the only enforcement agency situation
17	to try to, if carrots are not working, push the issue?
18	MS. PASCHAL: Actually, the Supreme
19	Court, if the presiding Judge reports that there's
20	issues at the municipal level, you know, steps were
21	taken to try to alleviate and it didn't work.
22	The Supreme Court does have authority to
23	use a hammer versus a carrot.
24	(Whereupon, the above-entitled matter
25	went off the record at 11:03 a.m.)

1 CHAIR LHAMON: Thank you, which from your 2 testimony it appears slow to you, so far at least. 3 I understand that Commissioner Yaki has a 4 few questions. Commissioner Yaki, if we could keep it 5 to the next few minutes we will not be too far off time. COMMISSIONER YAKI: Well thank you very 6 7 much, Madam Chair but since I'm remote, I usually try 8 and flag this earlier. I just --9 CHAIR LHAMON: Thanks. 10 COMMISSIONER YAKI: -- at this point. 11 My question has to go with, is a little 12 different than Commissioner Narasaki's. Mine goes to 13 the issue of how the money actually gets sent around. 14 So my question is -- and actually I would 15 say if you can answer this in writing to us -- if you 16 can't do it today, that would be fine. Since the DOJ 17 "Dear Colleague" Letter and since the advent of these 18 programs, I would like to know whether or not there has 19 been any change in the number or types of infractions 20 that have been coming to your courts and whether or not 21 these are being analyzed. As I think the previous 22 commissioner asked for racial disparity, I'm looking 23 at this has occurred has there been any difference in 24 the inputs into the system from the -- at the arrest

level or infraction or citation level.

And then secondly, I'm really curious to know whether or not there has been any diminution in actual revenues going to the different pots that these programs were currently going to prior to the "Dear Colleague" Letter and prior to the advent of these programs.

And the reason I'm asking this is this. I'm curious to know whether or not there's been any impact on the actual discretion of law enforcement in what I believe is the over-citation, what could be the over-citation of racial minorities for these kind of low-level traffic citations that have been, unfortunately, have means of funding various programs within a municipality or a state.

And then secondly, as you have tried to implement these changes in these programs, I'm curious to know whether or not there has actually been any real diminution in the revenue or if, in fact, people are just becoming more creative in how many inputs are coming into the system and whether or not it's actually having any real impact or not because to me, all of this can sound fine and look fine but if the actual result is that we're just putting more people into the system or figuring out different ways to hit them up to make sure that communities meet their budgetary levels or

budgetary needs, I would like to know that.

If it's not, if there are actual diminutions, if there is an impact on charging because people know that this isn't going to happen like it did before, I'd like to know that as well because to me, this is a part of an overall system in terms of criminal justice that I am concerned about.

I'm concerned about officers, cops who may believe that this is a way to help fund their town. I'm worried about courts who think this is a great way to help fund their town. I'm worried about -- mostly I'm worried about the people who are the victims of this, who are being the unwitting bearers of the financial burden that is being inflicted upon them by the budgetary needs of states and localities.

So, I don't know if you can answer this today. It may be too big. But if you can tell me, generally now or in writing later the difference in the -- has there been any difference in the amount of and types of infractions that have been coming up to you. Has it had any impact on budgets or not? I would be very curious to know that.

MS. PASCHAL: Commissioner, this is Sherri Paschal with Missouri. I had provided some data on the number of filings and dispositions from fiscal

1 year 2012 through 2016 and there has been a significant decrease in the number of cases that have been filed. 2 3 The peak during this time frame was in 2014 and they 4 have -- the number of filings has reduced I think about 5 30 percent since then, as well as the number of warrants issued is almost half as many. And I think Judge 6 7 DeMarce's materials he actually had some of the 8 monetary figures, as far as how much has been collected 9 on a spread sheet. 10 MR. SLAYTON: One thing -- this is David 11 from Texas. 12 I think what is being represented by 13 Missouri is a national trend. The State Court 14 Administrators have been looking at this. 15 I guess the question becomes how much of 16 this is related to efforts in this area versus other 17 factors. For instance, reduction in federal money for 18 overtime for officers for traffic enforcement is down. 19 Demographically, less people are driving, especially 20 in the demographics that are most likely to receive 21 these offenses. 22 So we are seeing this across the board 23 drop, a significant drop in the number of infractions. 24 So the question becomes is that related to this or is

that related to other things.

With regard to the budget, obviously, when you see that drop, the budgets will drop pretty dramatically. In our state right now, we're seeing impacts in all the areas that receive funding from this from that. The drop is also significant in relation to the number of drop in the number of offenses.

So I think, from our perspective, in Texas
I mean I'm happy to -- we'll go get the data. I will
provide it to you specifically.

I'm worried it may be too early yet to be able to see the full impact since the "Dear Colleague" Letter came out in March of '16. In Texas, our efforts, the rules were changed January first of '17. Any statutory changes would go into effect presumably sometime either this summer or in September. So, I think it is something we need to continue to watch to see. We've certainly seen the drop. I just I think we need to wait to see how much of it is really to these efforts.

MS. PASCHAL: Anecdotally, I would also mention -- this is Sherri from Missouri, like Texas, at the state level our fines go to the school system. The court fees go to general revenue. There is also surcharges that are assessed at the state and municipal levels. Again, those are set by statute but our

offices have been contacted by some of the recipients of the surcharge, like the Head Injury Fund, and the Crime Victims Fund, expressing concern with the fact that they are seeing a significant decrease in the amount of funds that they are getting through the surcharges.

CHAIR LHAMON: I want to give Ms. Wright a chance to answer quickly. We need to move to the next panel.

MS. WRIGHT: Yes, I would just say that in California reports are showing that traffic filings are down. Filings are down in general court-wide, case type-wide.

I can also say just anecdotally, we are seeing counties like San Francisco not issuing bench warrants any longer for citations related to homelessness, for example. So some of those things we know.

I would agree also, though, that it's too early to make any final determinations. Data connectivity I would say from system point to system point, from law enforcement to jail to court is not what we would like it to be. And we're hoping to really make those connections as best we can, especially in our pilot sites.

1 MS. DELOSTRINOS: And we don't have any 2 data right now but I think you raised some really good 3 questions that all of us can kind of incorporate into 4 our future work and recording that we'll be doing. 5 Thanks very much and thanks CHAIR LHAMON: to each member of this panel. And I'm looking forward 6 7 to ongoing conversation with you and also to our next 8 panel. 9 So I'll call up the members of our next 10 panel so we can move quickly to. 11 III. PANEL TWO: 12 FERGUSON AND BEYOND: PATTERNS AND PRACTICES 13 CHAIR LHAMON: And as you are coming, I 14 will talk about who each of the panelists is in the order 15 in which they will speak. 16 Chiraag Bains, with the Criminal Justice 17 Policy Program at Harvard Law School will be our first 18 panelist. Our second panelist is Judge Karl DeMarce 19 with the Circuit Court of Scotland County, Missouri, 20 and he will be accompanied, again, on this panel, by 21 Sherri Paschal, from whom we just heard. And our third 22 panelist is Thomas Harvey, Executive Director of Arch 23 City Defenders, whom I will note testified before our 24 Nevada State Advisory Committee on this topic this week

as well.

1 So, thank you. Mr. Bains, when you are 2 seated, please go ahead and begin. 3 MR. BAINS: Good morning. Thank you for 4 having me. I'm excited that the Commission has 5 continued to make this issue a priority and I'm glad to be here with you today. 6 7 As you mentioned, Madam Chair, I'm at the 8 Harvard Criminal Justice Policy Program now but I was, 9 until January, at the Civil Rights Division at the 10 Justice Department and working on the Ferguson case and 11 also helping to lead our efforts on fines and fees 12 issues that this commission is looking at now. 13 I will also say that everything in my 14 remarks today and everything in my written testimony 15 is based on publicly available information, nothing 16 that is privileged or confidential. 17 I'm going to rewind and cover some of the ground that I think the Commission is familiar with 18 19 because I think it's important to understand DOJ's role 20 and equities and responsibilities. 21 Ferguson has been a household name now for 22 two and a half years. The nation's attention and, 23 importantly, DOJ's was drawn to the city -- the small 24 city of 21,000 people due to the police shooting, the

fatal police shooting of Michael Brown on August 9th

of 2014.

The outpouring that we saw there stemmed from much more than that single incident. There were deep roots to the anger and the distrust that we observed, that we all observed in the community there, and particularly the black community, and that they felt toward the police department. The municipal court in Ferguson played a role in that story.

So on September 4th of 2014, the Civil Rights Division opened a pattern and practice investigation into the Ferguson police department. Six months later, we issued our report. We found a pattern of constitutional violations, unlawful stops, arrests, excessive force, discrimination against African Americans, violation of First Amendment rights, and violation of equal protection and due process rights in the operation of the municipal court. The harm was acute. We felt it when we were out there in the city. We found a community that was -- where many people felt under siege by those who had been sworn to protect them.

The root of the distrust -- at the root of the distrust, rather, was a policy decision -- this is important to understand -- a policy decision by Ferguson's civilian leaders and that is the choice to

use the municipal court as a revenue-generation center and its police department, by extension, as a ticketing and collections agency. And we uncovered hard proof of this that I think folks are aware of: emails between the city manager and the finance director and the police chief.

On the previous panel, it was mentioned that sometimes these courts report to the finance director and that, ultimately became the case here in Ferguson as well, the finance director asking for the police chief to ramp up ticket-writing to make up for a "substantial shortfall in sales tax," and other emails about "filling the revenue pipeline."

The message filtered down the chain of command to line officers. They got the message and they wrote more citations because their performance evaluations depended on it; two, three, four, eight, in one case 14 citations on a single stop as officers competed to see who could get the most citations on a stop.

The revenue generated for the city exploded and the consequences for policing were dire.

And this is an important point I think the Commission should count as within your jurisdiction here. Here in Ferguson we found that the focus on revenue

generation led policing in Ferguson to become unduly aggressive, unmoored from community relationships, and likely to cross the line, the constitutional line in everyday encounters with civilians.

The municipal court, meanwhile, was no longer an arbiter of law, a neutral arbiter of law, rather, and a protector of individual rights. It was part of this system of generating revenue and you can see that from the email communications with the officials as well. In my written testimony, I have cited examples of that. I'm happy to cover them further if that would be helpful.

We also found massive racial disparities both on the police side and on the court side. On the police side, 85 percent of vehicle stops, 90 percent of citations, 93 percent of arrests were of African Americans who made up two-thirds of the city. Use of force was more significant; 90 percent of use of force was against blacks; every single canine bite was against a black person in each instance.

On the court side, black defendants were 68 percent less likely to have their cases dismissed. Their cases took longer. They were 50 percent more likely to have their cases go to warrant. 92 percent of cases in which warrants were issued involved African

Americans; 96 percent of those arrested actually on warrants were African Americans.

We are now far down the road. We ended up negotiating with Ferguson and filing suit against Ferguson, and then getting back together and resolving the case and there is a consent decree that is now being implemented.

The consent decree calls for the complete reorientation of policing and court services in Ferguson toward public safety, rather than revenue generation.

After Ferguson, the Department [of Justice] became attuned to these issues, of fines and fees. It was a real awakening for the Department. Advocates, including Thomas Harvey, who is here on the panel and others that the Commission I think has heard from had been working this issue for some years but for us, it was relatively new.

And we used our jurisdiction in this case. And then we thought there must be other ways in which we can help contribute to the conversation here, including enforcement because Ferguson is not the only place in the United States that had this set of problems. So there are some examples I cited in my testimony of other actions we took with regard to filing

of briefs or integrating reforms into related -- in to cases that had related problems, such as jail conditions.

We also put out the "Dear Colleague"

Letter, which has been discussed extensively here, put

out the grant, put out a resource guide to assist

jurisdictions, and support of a national task force.

So the goal here is to use all of DOJ's tools.

During the time I was at the Civil Rights Division, used the enforcement tool, we grant-making tool, the guidance, and really tried to this a partnership but also fulfill mandate congressional to protect people's constitutional rights.

A couple of points before I close here. One, I think this has had a significant impact. Other people are probably better situated to explain the impact of DOJ's work in this area but I will say at least the direct impact is visible. In Ferguson, over the last two years, cases are down 85 percent. These are extremely low-level minor cases that, in many cases, probably shouldn't even be crimes, like failure to mow your lawn. And collections are down as well.

Second, I think this set of issues is not a particularly partisan or political set of issues and

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that's actually evident from the agenda you have before 1 2 These practices often violate our most basic 3 American values, the liberty fairness and equality. 4 And the last thing I'll say ---CHAIR LHAMON: You said your last thing. 5 Thank you. 6 7 MR. BAINS: Oh, okay. I'll say that last 8 thing later, if you're interested. 9 CHAIR LHAMON: Judge DeMarce. 10 JUDGE DEMARCE: Good morning, Madam Chair and honored commissioners. I will not try to restate 11 12 everything that was in the written testimony submitted, 13 in the interest of time, but just a few notes. First of all, I serve as an Associate 14 15 Circuit Judge, which is a general state-level trial 16 court jurisdiction judge in Scotland County, which is 17 200 miles to the north and east of the Saint Louis area 18 on the Iowa border. And I'm here because the Supreme 19 Court of Missouri has found it in their interest to make 20 me chair on their new Committee on Practice and 21 Procedure of Municipal Courts that they convened last 22 May. 23 The fines and fees issues, obviously and some of the commissioners have alluded to it, do not 24 25 pertain solely to the activities of the judicial

branch. They involve executive and legislative branch decisions but here, I can speak primarily to reforms that have been put in place by the judicial branch since 2014 and more substantially since last summer.

Ms. Paschal alluded to it in her remarks but if you want to take an analogy from the world of information technology, the municipal court system, if you could even call it a system in Missouri, was the ultimate legacy system. It was a mishmash of all sorts of different kinds of forms of administration. Roughly, a fifth of the cities has taken advantage of the option our state constitution provides to simply refer all of their cases to the state courts to be heard by state judges. That's how I interact. I hear the cases for my city because the city chose not to have its own municipal court but just to send their cases to us. All cities of under 400,000 can do that.

However, they also have the option to run a free-standing municipal court. And now we are exploring options where cities can consolidate municipal courts and have a free-standing municipal court run by several cities.

Within those systems, there are variations as to how they are organized. Most municipal judges are appointed by the mayor and the council and subject

to periodic reappointment but in some cities, municipal judges are elected. And in some cities, they have managed to persuade the state court judge to come down to the city and hear their cases in the municipal court. So you have all sorts of variations and they have all sorts of case management systems and some have no case management systems. Somewhere exceedingly well run, very professionally run. Some were very poorly run. And the cities, themselves, vary in size from Kansas City at over 400,000 to many small rural cities of less than 100 people that have taken advantage of the statutory option to organize themselves as cities, pass their ordinances, and try to enforce them.

Skipping forward to the changes since the events of Ferguson, after a period of study and review of the reports that Mr. Bains and his colleagues prepared, that others prepared, the Municipal Division Work Group that the Supreme Court itself commissioned, its Racial and Ethnic Fairness Commission reports that are in various stages of draft progress, the Supreme Court then decided last year that they had enough information in front of them. They convened their new Committee on Practice and Procedure in Municipal Courts. And rather than simply attempting to focus on Ferguson and a few other problem areas, they decided

to take a statewide approach.

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The result of that has been the promulgation of the Minimum Operating Standards. Many of those were drafted to be directly responsive to concerns raised in the "Dear Colleague" Letter that was issued by the Department of Justice but they go well beyond that into other matters of court administration, court facilities, independence of the judiciary and so on. I'll be happy to go through those into more detail if any commissioners desire.

They also promulgated a code of conduct for municipal division court personnel, including the clerical staff. They formalized the authority which has always existed for the presiding circuit judges in each of Missouri's 46 judicial circuits to exercise their administrative authority over these divisions to supervise them more closely, to require the divisions to certify their compliance with the standards twice a year and, in the case of Saint Louis County, where the most pressing problems have been identified, they have already hired one and are in the process of hiring a second individual to assist the presiding judge in carrying out these supervisory responsibilities, visiting the courts, and helping the courts to improve their performance.

There have also been statutory reforms that were fairly significant in nature that addressed matters of confirming ability to pay, that limited the fines that could be assessed, that did away with the practice of allowing people to be charged money in association with performing community service, and placed some fairly significant restrictions on the cities, in terms of how much of their total budget could come from fines and court costs and threatened the cities with real consequences, including a mandatory vote on dissolution, should they exceed.

The cities, of course, are fighting back in court and that litigation is ongoing and that is referred to in my remarks.

To close, ultimately what I believe we have is a problem of public corruption, which is made possible by the fact that the cities can retain money that is generated by law enforcement activities and processed through the courts. This is compounded by the fact that the judicial selection process in the municipal courts allows the executive branch complete control with periodic appointment control over who was doing the judging. This created a great temptation. And to the credit of the lawyers and judges of our state, only a minority of the courts fell into it.

1 In certain municipalities and probably 2 most notably in Northern Saint Louis County, places 3 like Ferguson, this public corruption 4 compounded by issues of actual racism. And that has 5 been discussed by Mr. Bains. It was discussed at some length in the DOJ report on Ferguson. 6 7 Ferguson is not representative of the 8 a whole. But the problems that state 9 identified there have led to statewide reforms. The 10 problems that Commissioner Kirsanow alluded to -- what 11 are our real options as we make these reforms and what 12 are the collateral impacts? Those are issues our Work 13 Group wrestled with. And these are tough but we have 14 seen 31 percent decrease in municipal division filings 15 statewide since 2014; 51 percent decrease in arrest 16 warrants issued out of municipal divisions since 2014. 17 So, I think there are real changes on the ground. 18 will be happy to respond to 19 commissioners' questions to the best of my ability. 20 CHAIR LHAMON: Thank you, Judge DeMarce. 21 Mr. Harvey. 22 MR. HARVEY: Thank you for the opportunity 23 to comment on the ongoing need for transformative

change in the municipal courts not only in Saint Louis

but across the country.

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My name is Thomas Harvey. I'm the cofounder of Arch City Defenders. We're a nonprofit civil rights law firm that provides legal advocacy to the poor and homeless in Saint Louis.

I recently testified in Las Vegas, Nevada on Wednesday and I heard a presentation there about the amount of fines that were collected in Nevada -- in Las Vegas, that put the reduction in revenue from Saint Louis County's municipal courts into a different perspective for me.

\$53 million in 2015 to \$29 million in 2016. The committee on Wednesday in Las Vegas was stunned to learn that its municipal courts collected \$67 million over a five-year period. If we took the new and improved massively reduced amount of revenue collected in Saint Louis County as ostensibly the result of the reforms that we're talking about here and we projected it over five years, it would be \$145 million or twice as much of the amount that stunned the people in Las Vegas.

This changed what I intended to share today. It struck me that we're using the wrong words to describe the changes since 2014. Most of what we're calling reforms are simply promises to follow already existing law. Why would we declare victory when all

we have is promises to do the following: allow the public to enter the courthouse; ask people if they too poor to pay fines; don't charge illegal fines and fees; stop making destitute people pay court costs; offer community service when people are poor; take people who are arrested and jailed before a judge within 48 hours; don't use the police or jail to raise revenue; adequately staff the courts; require strict compliance with due process before locking a human being in a cage because she owes your city some money.

What we're calling reform represents promises to either follow already well-established law, or simply accept that poor people exist in your jurisdiction. Should we laud this as progress? To quote Malcolm X, if you stick a knife in my back nine inches and pull it out six inches, there's no progress. If you pull it all the way out, that's not progress. Progress is the healing of the wound the blow made. And they haven't even pulled the knife out, much less healed the wound. They won't even admit the knife is there.

These promises seem equally especially unimpressive when you consider what had to happen to get the court to make them. Darren Wilson shot Mike Brown, setting off protests that lasted more than a year. People would not go out on the streets. If the

QuikTrip had not been set on fire, we wouldn't even be having this conversation today. When people took to the streets, they were not just protesting police violence against unarmed black men. They were protesting system representing largely а uninterrupted collaboration between police, courts, and local governments, not only to oppress black people and poor people but to also profit from collaboration, starting with legalized slavery that built the United States of America, and continuing on to reconstruction of area block codes, followed by the replaced it. debt peonage that and further criminalization of black life and poverty.

Whether it's the creation and selective enforcement of trespassing, vagrancy, and panhandling laws, whether disparities in traffic stops and mandatory sentencing for drug cases, the legal system has always reflected the most pernicious stains of racism in America.

In Saint Louis, we call these municipal courts. What they are is poverty-producing examples of systemic racism.

On the day Mike Brown was murdered, there were 600,000 active warrants for arrest in a region of 1.2 million people, most of them stemming from poverty

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violations in municipal courts. Poor people and black people were literally killing themselves because they couldn't get out of the jails. People protested police killings but they also protested 91 cities with 81 courts and 67 police departments. They protested for only 21,000 people. 32,000 warrants protested raising \$2.6 million in fines and fees on the backs of the poor. They also protested long lines to pay fines from racial profiling. They protested being locked in a cage because they were too poor to make a They protested Saint Ann collecting \$3 payment. million from its court, Florissant collecting \$2 million from its court and pretending this was about public safety instead of race and class.

They protested being jailed without access to medication, getting locked in a cage without blankets, not being given a shower, being forced to share a toilet, and being forced to strip naked to use it.

Black women with children protested being stolen from their kids because they didn't have \$350 in cash.

While the protests went on, we published studies and filed law suits to end illegal practices in municipal courts. The DOJ published its findings

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and entered into a consent decree with Ferguson. though the Ferguson Commission included calls to action concerning the municipal courts, the Missouri Supreme Court appointed a work group to study municipal courts. Even though the people called for police reforms, the Missouri Senate passed Senate Bill 5 capping revenue and ordering them to end unlawful practices. Throughout it all, people like Keilee Fant and Samantha Jenkins denounced the systemic abuses. like Kayla Reed, Kennard Williams, and Julia Ho testified at hearings about the racist predatory police and core practices.

Elite universities and law schools across the country dedicated countless conferences to the horrors of municipal courts, cash bail, illegal fines and fees, and police misconduct.

Given the incredible amount of damage these low-level superfluous pieces of the criminal legal system has subjected people to, why are we still listening to their promises? How much more data? How many more stories? How much more testimony do we need before we have the courage to call for the wholesale elimination of courts that prosecute status violations in low-income communities of color that typically stem from poverty, as if they were actual crimes?

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We cannot put our hope into promises from
the same people who have been running these courts for
decades. If we want to end the systemic abuses in these
courts, we have to accept that you cannot punish the
poor into compliance when the law stems from their
poverty when the violation of the law stems from
their poverty. If you're too poor to get your car
registered, it does not matter how many times you are
being punished by being stopped, ticketed, jailed,
fined, or given community service. Until your poverty
goes away, you cannot comply with the law.
Thank you.
CHAIR LHAMON: Thank you, Mr. Harvey.
Thanks to each member of the panel. I
appreciate it. I want to give my fellow commissioners
a chance to ask questions.
Commissioner Yaki, shall we start with
you, since we ended with you on the last panel? No
questions for the moment?
Commissioner Kirsanow?
COMMISSIONER YAKI: Sorry, I was on mute
and I was talking.
CHAIR LHAMON: Oh, sorry. Well, go
ahead. Then, Commissioner Kirsanow will follow. We
couldn't hear you.

100 1 COMMISSIONER YAKI: It's one of those 2 things where you ask a question, I start to answer it 3 and then I realize no one is listening, which occurs 4 more often than I care to say. Anyway, so one, thank you very much, all 5 of you, for your testimony. Some have addressed some 6 7 of my questions that I had with the first panel. But I really wanted to sort of get at, for 8 9 all of you, and I think it is going to ride a lot upon 10 Mr. Harvey's statement as well, is that is this 11 enforcement strategy from DOJ enough in getting at the 12 issue of targeted fines and fees or is there a deeper 13 need to go deeper into the criminal justice system as 14 a whole, as Mr. Harvey had suggested, to start wholesale

restructuring of these types of offenses such that we don't have these debates and discussions in the first I guess I would start with Professor Bains.

MR. BAINS: I think the law professors at Harvard would be horrified to hear I got that title but I'll take it for the moment.

DOJ's enforcement on these issues definitely not enough if that is the question. DOJ was not doing any enforcement on these issues until the Ferguson case. And as I mentioned, that was sort of an awakening and then we have now incorporated fines

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and fees reforms into other degrees, consent specifically the Hinds County case, which was investigation under CRIPA, a prison conditions case, where jail violence, one of the root causes was population. Just unnecessary population in the jail, overcrowding. And so as a result of scrutiny and taking best practices from other places and what we learned from Ferguson, we incorporated a change there that required that the jail not accept anyone for incarceration without documentary evidence that the judge considered their ability to pay and found that nonpayment was willful, where their incarceration was for nonpayment of fines and fees.

So, that is another example of enforcement but you can see that this is a pretty limited tool set that we're working with here. If DOJ were to have more tools, we could do more enforcement. But even then, we're not going to sue our way out of the problem here, even between us, DOJ and the private plaintiffs. It's going to have to be sort of a local level change from the grassroots up, working, I think, hand in hand with local officials who are seeing the need for change and restructuring these systems, questioning whether these courts should exist in the way that they exist, whether they can be mainstreamed, whether they can — we should

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1 extend right to counsel and a number of 2 protections and decriminalize a lot of these offenses. 3 So I think there is a whole strategy that 4 goes much beyond what DOJ can do. 5 COMMISSIONER YAKI: But I mean it may begin with what DOJ is doing but is there a way that 6 7 DOJ can, as they did through the initial grant program, 8 kind of to structure some а best practices 9 collaborative that could look at it from a more holistic 10 way? 11 MR. BAINS: Yes, I think there are two 12 things that come to mind immediately. One is through 13 the National Task Force on Fines, Fees and Bail. 14 DOJ has supported that. And so the question is what 15 will the work coming out of the task force look like. 16 It's just beginning. They have a Bench Card. A Bench 17 Card is productive but it is also one of the easier 18 things to accomplish. It is giving judges a tool that 19 they can use when they are trying to assess ability to 20 pay and make sure they stay within the constitutional 21 lines. 22 So I think there is much more that that 23 commission can do, that task force. And the question 24 will be will DOJ continue to support that work, the work

of local judges or state judges, rather, and court

1 administrators who are working with advocates. 2 On the grants, I think that is also an important question. 3 That grant program seems very 4 promising from the first panel. So the question is 5 will that grant program, will it be extended or will there be other resources? 6 The Center for Court 7 Innovation will have a lot of lessons learned as the 8 technical service provider there. And I would hope for 9 more programs along those lines. 10 Although I would say I would also hope for 11 more enforcement, so DOJ using the enforcement tools 12 that it has. 13 COMMISSIONER YAKI: Great, thank you. 14 JUDGE DEMARCE: Commissioner, this is 15 Judge DeMarce. 16 Obviously, these are difficult issues for 17 a serving trial judge to discuss within the context of 18 the code of conduct. However, since my chief sent me 19 here, I assume that she wants me to answer your 20 questions. 21 It's a two-edged sword. If the question 22 boils down to how much does the DOJ wish to substitute 23 its judgment for the judgment of democratically-elected 24 legislatures and cities 25 councils, that is a policy question that the DOJ itself

must answer. But how the DOJ approaches these problems has to be informed by that analysis. I don't think there's a way around it.

Courts are, for the most part, reactive entities. We don't decide what cases we are going to get. We process the ones that are brought to us by law enforcement out of the executive branch and they have the laws at their disposal that are passed by the legislature.

It has troubled me as long as I have been a judge that the burdens of many laws fall most heavily on the poor. Certainly, this is true with regard to driver's licensing laws, with regard to mandatory insurance laws, with regard to vehicle registration laws and so on. However, I think most people when they're out driving around are hoping that they are surrounded by drivers who were capable of passing a driver's test and have not had 50 violations, and who might be insured.

So these are public policy questions and then where we get to them here is a question of enforcement. Where we have seen the worst problems, in our own state, and from what I have read, perhaps in some others, is where law enforcement and local government can directly profit from enforcement of the

laws because this creates the possibility for an inappropriate motive for enforcement.

Law enforcement and court operations should, ideally, be general revenue functions. The governing bodies should appropriate the amount of money that is necessary to achieve the necessary level of public peace and safety. However, where the funding stream comes from the law enforcement activities themselves, the incentives are warped. And in some jurisdictions, and particularly many of those in northern Saint Louis County, which were hit very hard by what we referred to as the Great Recession of the last decade and saw their other revenues plummet, some fell victim to the temptation to give their law enforcement agencies and their courts, which they controlled, revenue targets.

And so, ultimately, I believe that the best policy response is to separate the funding of law enforcement and courts from law enforcement activities. And as I note in my materials in Missouri, state court fines go to the school funds of the state; law enforcement doesn't benefit from them. But they did something different with municipal cases and this creates a perverse incentive. And when times get tough, people do wrong things.

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I don't know what the best possible role for DOJ in addressing that problem is. Municipal Division Work Group met, I think that was the single most important recommendation that we gave to the legislature, that they should end the practice of municipalities being able to profit from enforcement activity which would, hopefully, restore law enforcement activity to its proper incentives of maintaining public peace and safety at a level of expenditure that people thought was worth paying taxes for, rather than getting the taxes through the back door and in a way that creates many rather nasty collateral consequences for people.

But again, DOJ, when it comes in, it's substituting its judgment for the judgment of the voters and their elected officials. And I can't answer that question for you as a sitting state trial court judge.

COMMISSIONER YAKI: I appreciate that, Judge. And I just wanted to note for you and for the other Missouri speaker that I have actually spent a fair amount of time in your beautiful state over the past two years and I have begun to deeply appreciate the intricacies of how things work in your state.

So thank you very much for your candor. I

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1 appreciate it. 2 CHAIR LHAMON: Mr. Harvey, do you want to 3 respond? 4 MR. HARVEY: Sure. Just really quickly, 5 I would echo what Judge DeMarce and Chiraag said about 6 these issues. 7 The DOJ has an important role to play but, 8 obviously, I would slightly differ and say I don't think 9 they are substituting their judgment for the people 10 because if they are doing what they did in Ferguson and 11 what they have done in other jurisdictions, they are 12 finding violations of federal law and trying to enforce 13 those laws. And that gets at my underlying theme in 14 my remarks is these laws already existed. They were 15 already on the books and they were well-known. 16 people in charge of these courts, and prosecutors, and 17 judges, and defense attorneys, they just were ignoring 18 them wholesale. 19 So to answer your question about deeper 20 problems within the criminal legal system, of course, 21 yes, we have massive problems at state level and federal 22 level as well. 23 What's I think attractive about focusing 24 time and energy on these courts is, they are the lowest

possible level form of our courts. They prosecute the

1	low-level interactions with the legal system. They
2	could be eliminated. We are spending a lot of time and
3	money trying to buttress a failed legal system. What,
4	even under some international human rights law would
5	garner sanctions from the United States of America if
6	this happened in a foreign country, we're saying why
7	don't we give you some money to fix that, as opposed
8	to saying here's this extra thing that doesn't have to
9	exist. As Judge DeMarce said, these could be handled
10	through the associate circuit court where you have
11	fulltime professional courts, with fulltime judges,
12	prosecutors, clerks, defense attorneys and that will
13	be a better option.
13 14	be a better option. So, thank you.
14	So, thank you.
14 15	So, thank you. CHAIR LHAMON: Thank you.
14 15 16	So, thank you. CHAIR LHAMON: Thank you. Commissioner Kirsanow?
14 15 16 17	So, thank you. CHAIR LHAMON: Thank you. Commissioner Kirsanow? COMMISSIONER KIRSANOW: Thank you, Madam
14 15 16 17 18	So, thank you. CHAIR LHAMON: Thank you. Commissioner Kirsanow? COMMISSIONER KIRSANOW: Thank you, Madam Chair, and thanks to the witnesses. This has been
14 15 16 17 18	So, thank you. CHAIR LHAMON: Thank you. Commissioner Kirsanow? COMMISSIONER KIRSANOW: Thank you, Madam Chair, and thanks to the witnesses. This has been helpful.
14 15 16 17 18 19 20	So, thank you. CHAIR LHAMON: Thank you. Commissioner Kirsanow? COMMISSIONER KIRSANOW: Thank you, Madam Chair, and thanks to the witnesses. This has been helpful. In addition to reducing or eliminating the
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	So, thank you. CHAIR LHAMON: Thank you. Commissioner Kirsanow? COMMISSIONER KIRSANOW: Thank you, Madam Chair, and thanks to the witnesses. This has been helpful. In addition to reducing or eliminating the types of abuses that many of you have testified to,

One of the other questions, an ancillary

question, something I alluded to before, and that is 1 2 what, if any, deterrent effect can we discern from the fines and fees or other sanctions that were levied 3 4 against individuals prior to any reforms that were 5 instituted versus what has transpired since then. In other words, has there been a beneficial 6 7 effect to forms that were instituted that can be 8 demonstrated by a decline in the kind of offenses that give rise to these fines and fees? Does anybody have 9 10 any data along those lines? 11 I mean for example, the data I see doesn't 12 necessarily go to those types of misdemeanor penalties 13 but there has been, in the last year, or the last two 14 significant increases. years, In Ferguson, for 15 example, there is a 58 percent increase in robberies, 16 60 percent increase in murders, a 68 percent increase 17 in aggravated assault. So there has been tremendous 18 spikes in violent crimes. 19 I'm wondering if there's been a deterrent 20 effect on misdemeanors by result of implementation of 21 these reforms. 22 JUDGE DEMARCE: Ιf might try, 23 Commissioner, and I don't know that there's hard data 24 and I don't know how you would create it.

With regard to the more serious offenses

like robberies and the violent assaults, they are really a different class of offenses than those that are usually dealt with in most of Missouri's municipal courts, except for Kansas City that processes more serious offenses.

I think it's hard to get a true read because the levels of citations in parts of Saint Louis County were so high prior to Ferguson, we don't know what the real rates really were. They were citing their population and hapless passersby at a much higher rate than most municipalities in other parts of the state, including the state's other major urban areas, Kansas City and Springfield.

So again, the revenue incentive had skewed things and we weren't getting a true read.

What's the deterrent effect? Well, we only have two authorized punishments in the law -- jail and fines. And for many municipal violations, jail isn't on the table so fine is it. And then the only alternative is probation with various conditions, which can be things like community service and other, sometimes programs that people are sent to help make them more ready for jobs and various things like that, substance abuse. But you come back to the same punishment if they don't do their probation or if they

commit new violations while they're on probation and that's where it's hard to close the circle.

If fines are all that's on the table and we don't want to fine people because they've told us they can't pay them, in a way, we have given people who understand the weakness of the system a way to avoid its sanction, while, at the same time, continuing to punish the most honest, the most meek, and the most courteous. We have, to a degree, created a system that defeats its own purpose.

If any of you have the answer to that, you are much smarter than I am. That is what our Work Group really wrestled with. But anecdotally, as a sitting judge, I know that where people are aware of a targeted enforcement effort, fines can have a deterrent value but people have to be made aware of it and I think it's limited in time.

In my own community we had, at least communicated to me by school officials and law enforcement at one point, they said people are not stopping for the stopped school buses. And the municipal prosecutor and the police chief said, Judge, is there anything you think we could do? I said well, everyone who comes to me is presumed innocent but here's what I think I can do. Within my discretion, within

the authorized range of punishment, I'm going to double the standard fine for passing the stopped school bus and I'm just going to do one of our rather boring looking court orders that says we did it and you can take that to the newspaper and get them to write an article. And they did. And the passing of the stopped school buses went away for a while. But very local and had to create an awareness.

Just the fact that people can get fined for stuff, I don't know whether that has a great deterrent effect but you know if you've ever looked at things like the seven classical punishments of antiquity, most of them have been justly abolished because they were extraordinarily cruel and all we have left is fines and incarceration. If we don't use those, we don't have any at all and I don't have a better answer if we can't even enforce those.

So again, these issues are extraordinarily difficult. On the one side, we're looking at the rights of people who've been hauled into court and the other side, we're looking at the quality of life in the community among the many people who haven't been hauled into court. And we're trying to balance it all and make it work.

CHAIR LHAMON: Are you not a believer in

community service, among other options?

And we have used it extensively in my court for years before any of this became a national issue of interest. We use it a lot on traffic and we use it a lot with youthful offenders if people want it. Here's the problem: what if they don't do the community service? What if you say, and particularly standard in my court, a minor traffic violation, you have ten hours of community service and you have to get it done in 60 days. You can do it for any public agency or not-for-profit organization, as long as we can verify it. That's our standard.

Ninety-five percent of the people who get that deal do it. What do you do with the ones who don't? That's the hard question.

But yes, absolutely, I believe in community service. And our Work Group has encouraged its use. We encouraged the elimination of associated fees. The cities really hate that, by the way, and they're trying to get that repealed. But the legislature did that and right now in municipal divisions they can't be charged fees for community service work.

MR. BAINS: I'll just add to that,

briefly. I agree with most of what the judge said. I think, when you step back, it's worth recognizing that, in the case of Ferguson and many other municipalities in that area, the Municipal Code was not the result of sort of a considered process in recent history about what the community decided should be criminal and what should not be. The Municipal Code makes every single violation, every ordinance violation punishable by 90 days in jail, \$1,000 fine, or both. And in Ferguson, they actually enforce that and in many other places as well for housing code violations.

So we know we're starting in the wrong I think you get to these harder questions, once place. you get past that but there are some options, as Madam Chairwoman, you mentioned, community service is one. Starting with more reasonable fines and fees in the first place or assessing someone's ability to pay before you impose the fine so that you increase the likelihood of compliance, and I was interested to hear that that seems to be happening in Texas that is another And then other forms of achieving public option. Commissioner Kirsanow, for safety, example, fix-it-tickets is something that we built into the Ferguson consent decree. If someone is being pulled over and ticketed for a broken tail light, it may make

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more sense to ask if they would pay the \$200 to fix the tail light than pay the court \$200 or more. And if they come back and do it within a reasonable amount of time, then the case can go away. And that, of course, has a beneficial effect on public safety.

And so I think, just along those lines, the last thought is that the police department also has to operate differently. There are -- I think we have to get out of the mentality of just enforcement. are more things that we can do to increase public safety than arrest and cite people and looking for underlying causes of public safety problems, sort of like disorder that could be with targeted problems resources abandoned addressed, buildings, for example, particular things that seem to be the causes of crime neighborhood-specific in neighborhoods. So, information, not really at large but you have some intelligence here, I think could go a long way.

Now that's quite outside of the realm of what a court can do but I think it's relevant to the conversation.

CHAIR LHAMON: Thank you. Do you want to speak to that Mr. Harvey?

MR. HARVEY: Yes, really quickly I just want to emphasize that many of these that kind of

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Chiraag alluded to are not -- many of the violations that were charged in Ferguson and in our region are not about public safety and they weren't -- the charges weren't issued within the cities sort of downtown neighborhood. A lot of these places were contiguous with the highway.

So they were pulling people over on the highway, as opposed to allowing that to be done by State Highway Patrol. And that's where you get these driving while suspended, no proof of insurance, failure to register to a vehicle. If you imagine that the initial incident was a speeding, then you could say well there's some question of public safety.

But after you've been in the system for so long where you've got 600,000 warrants for arrest, officers are just scanning license plates for warrants for unpaid traffic tickets, pulling people over, whether or not there's an additional moving violation that occurred, and then issuing driving while suspended, no proof of insurance, and failure to register a vehicle, which are the most common poverty violations for people who are truly indigent.

And I think that that's something that's missed. There's a lot of time in the Supreme Court's Working Group report spent on how do we address the

1	indigent scofflaw, which I was here last year where
2	Professor Alexis Harris talked about this. And her
3	research shows that this is a statistically
4	insignificant number of people. They exist but this
5	isn't worth centering your policy around.
6	There are many more people who are
7	experiencing deep poverty, levels that I don't think
8	many of our judges and prosecutors even comprehend and
9	so they are faced with it is factually true. You
10	don't your license is suspended. You don't have
11	proof of insurance and your vehicle isn't registered.
12	If we want it to be about public safety,
13	we're going to help them achieve those goals, not fine
14	them more or jail them.
15	CHAIR LHAMON: Thank you.
16	Commissioner Kladney?
17	COMMISSIONER KLADNEY: Thank you, Madam
18	Chair.
19	Your Honor, I think you said 31 percent
20	citations are down and 51 percent FTAs. Is that
21	correct?
22	JUDGE DEMARCE: Commissioner, that is
23	statewide in all the municipal divisions of the state,
24	the change between 2014 and 2016 numbers.
25	COMMISSIONER KLADNEY: And the FTAs,

they've really lost a lot of money on that, right?

JUDGE DEMARCE: Oh, the city -- it varies.

Again, it varies. The cities that were making a lot of money from citation revenue, a number of them have lost a lot of revenue. Although I don't have numbers in front of me to quantify that but the most recent numbers Т have seen from our state court. administrator's office suggest that in that two-year period, total disbursements from municipal divisions are probably down between a quarter and a third. So that would be -- again, in cities that never generated much money from their municipal court like the one I served in because they don't write that many and the more serious ones they send to the state court, it doesn't make a difference. But in a city like Ferguson and some of the other cities in North County, it has made a very substantial difference and the Missouri Municipal League is reacting. pushing legislators to try to roll back some reforms. So there's a give and take in politics and it never ends.

But to me, the better answer and probably not one that can be accomplished in our state's current political climate is that, as I've said before, they should divorce law enforcement activity from revenue production. But to make that work, they also have to

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1	give the cities the authority to go to their voters and
2	ask for money that can be used for law enforcement at
3	a level that that is really deemed necessary, and that's
4	where you'd find out what people really thought was
5	necessary. What would they be willing to tax
6	themselves to pay for, as opposed to sitting on the
7	highway picking off someone else's residents as they
8	drive through.
9	COMMISSIONER KLADNEY: Well, Judge,
10	Commissioner Kirsanow is, I think if I understand his
11	questions correctly, he's interested in deterrents.
12	And since these statistics have dropped 31 percent in
13	citations, 51 percent in FTAs, have accidents and
14	injury accidents gone up at all in your state, do you
15	know?
16	JUDGE DEMARCE: I don't have that
17	information, Commissioner. I don't know.
18	COMMISSIONER KLADNEY: Who would?
19	JUDGE DEMARCE: The Missouri State
20	Highway Patrol would have overall accident and incident
21	reports. We could attempt to get that information for
22	the Commission and get the most information but I do
23	not have it.
24	COMMISSIONER KLADNEY: And one last
25	question. Only three this time.

1	You mentioned that since you sounded like
2	your jurisdiction is fairly enlightened when it comes
3	to community service, you mentioned that out of every
4	hundred that you give community service to, 95 percent
5	of them complete it without a problem around, more
6	or less.
7	JUDGE DEMARCE: I am estimating roughly
8	because we don't keep the statistics but I know I don't
9	get many probation violations back for failure to
10	complete the community service.
11	And a lot of the ones who get it, even if
12	they don't get it done by the first date, if they come
13	in and tell me why, then we give them another month and
14	usually they do get it done.
15	COMMISSIONER KLADNEY: So really, it's
16	working very well is what you're saying.
17	JUDGE DEMARCE: In Scotland County.
18	We're a very small rural county to the north.
19	COMMISSIONER KLADNEY: More compliant
20	folk?
21	JUDGE DEMARCE: Well, I don't know if
22	they're temperamentally more compliant but it's easier
23	for us to find them if they're not. That's just the
24	reality. We're small and rural. There's not many
25	places to hide.

Do you know any 1 COMMISSIONER KLADNEY: 2 other jurisdictions that are larger, anybody on the 3 panel that may know how it works in other, larger 4 municipalities? 5 JUDGE DEMARCE: Well it varies widely. Let me give you the example -- and this is one reason 6 7 there were fines and fees. In Springfield, they had a very organized 8 9 program that if a judge referred people to community 10 service, they would send them to them. There was an 11 associated fee and then this was an oversight entity 12 that collected all the groups that wanted community 13 This is in a larger urban area. service workers. 14 it's varied. 15 cities and counties have Some 16 assessed that fee and have just done it like we do it. 17 Our sheriff's office has always been willing to 18 undertake the effort to verify with the organizations 19 that provide community service opportunities and never 20 ask for money. But in the places -- once the practice starts, then people's salaries start to depend on it 21 22 and things like that, it's much harder to break that 23 cycle. 24 I don't know if the other panelists have

their own insights into it but I can't speak very well

1 outside my own part of the state. 2 COMMISSIONER KLADNEY: Thank you, Your 3 Honor. 4 MR. HARVEY: So prior to 2014, I would say 5 that I had no idea how community service was handled because they wouldn't offer community service to anyone 6 7 who wanted to use that as an alternative to paying the 8 fines. 9 Since then, it's been easier. There is no 10 fee associated with it, to my knowledge, with the 11 exception of maybe one two municipalities. or 12 Typically, what you're asked to do is just go to a 13 nonprofit, get a letter saying that you completed X 14 number of community service hours and submit that to 15 And that will stand as your fine. 16 I would still say that the flaw I find with 17 the community service is it assumes that while you were 18 there it was a crime. It starts with an assessment of 19 a dollar amount in fines that isn't related to your 20 ability to pay. So they often use the \$10 an hour rate 21 to convert fines to community service. 22 So, if you were going to do this in a more 23 fair way, I think you would assess the person's ability 24 to pay -- determine that in a dollar amount and then

convert it to community service.

1 So if there's a \$10 an hour equivalent, \$50 2 may be a fine for a poor person, which would be five 3 hours of community service, as opposed to what ends up 4 being often 40 to 60 hours. 5 COMMISSIONER KLADNEY: I understand that to be process but how is community service working, 6 7 regardless of the process, in those larger communities? I think for people who are 8 MR. HARVEY: 9 capable of completing community service, it works just 10 fine right and there a lot of people who want to do that. 11 People we represent are not the total 12 population of people who go before these courts. 13 are homeless folks who have mental health problems and 14 substance abuse problems. Community service does not 15 If you're in a shelter and you're a mom work for them. 16 with kids in a shelter and now you've got to go get child 17 care so you can go do community service while you're 18 also working, it doesn't work. And we've just ask the 19 courts to waive completely the fines and 20 associated because it's not possible at that stage in 21 this person's life to complete community service, even 22 though that's better than fines or incarceration. 23 COMMISSIONER KLADNEY: And what do you do with the recidivist, per Commissioner Kirsanow? 24 25 MR. HARVEY: You mean the person who fails

to --

COMMISSIONER KLADNEY: Who say, continues to wind up in court. Because I know there's no mental health services in the community. So if someone has a mental health issue, they may continue to do dysfunction according to the law and wind up in court.

MR. HARVEY: I mean so part of the work we do is to connect people to those services. During our legal representation, we're connecting our clients with social workers and mental health care workers. And the intent is to address that while the legal case is continuing.

So, we've had great success, where we've been able to get our clients some deferred prosecution or additional time to pay or come up with, or complete community service, or, frankly, just get rid of the case.

But if the case is about your poverty, it's never going away. It's just not going to go away and we're going to have to accept that there's going to be some small percentage of people for whom we're not going to be able to force them to get their license reinstated to get insurance that they can't afford and to register their car. It's an economically insurmountable obstacle for them.

CHAIR LHAMON: Commissioner Narasaki?

COMMISSIONER NARASAKI: Yes, I would say if you have mental health issues, another fine is not going to deter you from whatever it is that got you there in the first place and that charging more fines makes it actually harder to pay for the registration and everything else.

I know this is a little off-topic but I've been concerned because as we've started to look at this, we have discovered the issue of surcharges. So, taxes or additions for your share of alcohol dependence issues, or domestic violence, or improving courts, or paying for juries that I would think should be coming out of the general fund and not being paid by people who are coming before the court, particularly if that isn't even related to what they are in the court for.

I'm wondering, Mr. Bains, whether the Department of Justice has looked at that issue, whether there are some concerns, legal concerns about the fact that that's happening so widely.

California has one of the highest fees and, when you look at the breakdown, a lot of it is because they are charging for programs we all like but they're charging poor people for them, as opposed to the whole citizenry of California.

MR. BAINS: I share your concerns about surcharges and they seem to be in conflict with the idea that the courts and the justice system is in the business of producing a public good, not just a service for the person who is going through the justice system.

But in terms of the Department's activity in this area, I don't have a lot to point to. The Access

to Justice Commission -- or I'm sorry, the Office for Access to Justice is an office that would have some emphasis on this, I think. So, working with stakeholders and looking at this issue. That's not an enforcement office but as I tried to make clear in my remarks, enforcement is important but there are other things that the Department does that can be helpful, in terms of partnering with stakeholders and local governments and advocates. And so that is one office I think that could potentially look at that issue more and, of course, on the grant-making side, that's the something both in terms of research experimentation through the Office of Justice Program.

One other thought on surcharges -- if it comes back to me I'll let you know.

JUDGE DEMARCE: Very briefly, surcharges I would think of as charges that the legislative body has attached to every case that really don't have anything

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to do with that case itself or, necessarily even, with the administration of justice, although they vary.

And as the legislatures in many states have fallen -- have had less and less appetite for raising general revenue and have replaced it with these kinds of things because there's no one to stick up for these people, we have had at least one sort of firewall in Missouri.

There's a 30-year-old case from our Supreme Court called Harrison against Monroe County. And what it held was that court costs actually must be related to the administration of justice. And that sort of put a limit on some of the things that could be done. Our base municipal court costs in the City of Memphis, which is mine, is \$37.50. I believe that is probably less than in many states. And so that would be on a traffic ticket or another minor ordinance violation, that would be the costs that would be attached.

Now, we are seeing an increasing tendency in our legislature to want to use special costs to do things that used to be done by bond issues like building courthouses. That is justice-related. And the reason legislators give for wanting to do it is because the people won't appropriate a tax. So the question

1	is, do you want a courthouse with a leaky roof that's
2	not secure or and the voters won't approve one.
3	Again, these are difficult things in the
4	current climate.
5	COMMISSIONER NARASAKI: Does it change
6	your view, because one of the things I have heard, right
7	is that some courts are charging people who come before
8	them if they want a jury, which
9	JUDGE DEMARCE: In Missouri
10	COMMISSIONER NARASAKI: seems to me a
11	huge concern.
12	JUDGE DEMARCE: Well, in Missouri, you are
13	assessed the costs of a jury if you are found guilty.
14	You are not assessed up front and you are not assessed
15	if you are acquitted.
16	But, yes. I think that some of the
17	commissioners may not like that answer but I am simply
18	telling you that that is
19	COMMISSIONER NARASAKI: Can you tell?
20	JUDGE DEMARCE: what the law of the
21	state is, that it is a cost that can be attached if you
22	are found guilty.
23	And again, we don't the judges don't
24	establish the costs.
25	COMMISSIONER NARASAKI: Oh, I'm not

1 blaming the judges. I'm just saying the practice --2 Well no, you're not. JUDGE DEMARCE: 3 Now, there is case law that says you cannot be asked 4 to put down a deposit for a jury. Apparently, some 5 clever person tried that once but you can't be asked to do that. 6 7 And now, since the Supreme Court's minimum 8 operating standards, they have clarified that you 9 cannot be forced to pay \$30 simply for the privilege 10 of asking for one. That is still in state law but the 11 Supreme Court simply preemptively decided, no, you're 12 not going to do that. 13 So now, there are costs that can be 14 attached based on things that go on in an individual 15 depending on the outcome. Missouri 16 prohibits the assessment of costs if the case is 17 dismissed or if you are acquitted. That was a 18 violation that was going on in a number of the municipal 19 courts and particularly in the Saint Louis area prior 20 to 2014 and that has been something that the Supreme 21 Court has tried to clarify and now trying to more 22 vigorously enforce you are not supposed to do that. 23 I just wanted to --MR. BAINS: 24 CHAIR LHAMON: I think the vice chair has

some questions.

1 Oh, I just wanted to add to MR. BAINS: 2 for certain surcharges that types of because 3 Commissioner Narasaki's additional information I think 4 changes my answer a little bit. The Department has 5 jurisdiction to investigate where there is a pattern 6 of practice of due process violations, as well. 7 the 14141 statute explicitly includes juvenile 8 justice. So there is very clear jurisdiction there. 9 So depending on the type of surcharge and 10 how it operates, if it's impinging on people's due 11 process rights, I think there is grounds for an 12 investigation. 13 The other part of it is if there is a 14 disparate impact and it can't be justified by 15 nondiscriminatory reasons. And that would be both the 16 Civil Rights Division or the Office of Civil Rights at 17 the Office of Justice Programs. 18 MR. HARVEY: So I don't think it is a -- it 19 hasn't been a huge problem for our clients in Missouri. 20 I do think that there's especially in the state courts there aren't as many surcharges as you're describing 21 22 that are assessed upon a plea of guilty or a trial. 23 I will say that when I was in Nevada, you 24 should look at that report, there was an amazing number

of charges, including the judge's retirement that came

1	out of every fee that was charged in municipal court.
2	And previously, apparently, they paid a constable who
3	could issue tickets on the road was entitled to \$100
4	payment at the time of the issuance of the ticket and
5	the constable got to keep the \$66 out of \$100. So, I
6	think there's a ton of work to be done in that area.
7	CHAIR LHAMON: Thank you. We'll let the
8	Commissioner from Nevada speak to that in a moment.
9	But first, the vice chair.
10	VICE CHAIR TIMMONS-GOODSON: In a moment,
11	Commissioner.
12	Judge DeMarce, I, like you well, I'm a
13	former judge in North Carolina. And you indicated
14	early on that the problem that we saw in Ferguson was
15	largely one of public corruption and that it was
16	compounded by actual racism.
17	As we continue to look at reforms, even
18	though Mr. Harvey doesn't like that term, as we continue
19	to look at reforms, I was wondering whether there's been
20	any effort there in your state at any kind of training
21	to help deal with implicit bias and if so, if you'll
22	discuss that for a moment or two.
23	JUDGE DEMARCE: Yes, there has, Your
24	Honor, and it is ongoing right now. In 2016 first
25	of all, in our state-level courts, the State of Missouri

offers two times a year what we call the Trial College, which is a general continuing legal education for all the state trials judges, 400 or so of us. Half of us go in August, half in October.

There was a lengthy implicit bias session in this year's Trial Colleges for all the state trial judges.

Αt municipal court the level, the Municipal Judge Education Committee, which is chaired by my colleague, Roy Richter of the Court of Appeals, is now adding implicit bias training for municipal They are in the Municipal Clerk Education Committee that has been convened since all of these And Judge Thornhill from Springfield, who was events. on both the Work Group and the Racial and Ethnic Fairness Commission, he's been very involved in that and they are working on implicit bias training for the clerks of the court, who are the front line employees who deal with people the most often.

So in the judiciary, the answer is yes.

In law enforcement, where the need may be perhaps greater, I don't know the answer to that question and it would, I suppose, depend on the law enforcement training standards that are by and large overseen by the highway patrol but not all of the

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training is conducted by them.

VICE CHAIR TIMMONS-GOODSON: But do you see that as a reasonable reform effort worthy of our investment?

JUDGE DEMARCE: Well, Your Honor, I see it as something that is beneficial to those who are amenable to improvement. I think it has the danger that many things carry that it becomes an industry in itself that wants funding forever. So, I know that's out there and we've seen that with other kinds of things. And in a sense, then it puts it back on the criminal justice budget. And who does that end up falling on? The people we've just been talking about we want to protect. So, there's a risk.

If governments could change hearts and minds by fiat, we would have eliminated racism decades ago but we have seen that this was not so easily done.

I think it helps to a degree. To the extent it gets people to think about assumptions that may have been in their minds that they never contemplated, it may have a beneficial impact. I have real doubts that doing it over and over and over again in a repetitive fashion is going -- I think there's a point of diminishing returns probably and I think that the possibility of it becoming an ongoing cost to the

1 system creates the risk that it will become ultimately 2 a burden upon the people Mr. Harvey's trying to protect. 3 So, I don't like that answer Your Honor, 4 but in the world of limited resources in which we exist, I would be remiss if I didn't raise it. 5 I do think it's important to do it. 6 7 think it's very important to do it with new employees. 8 I would like to see it become institutionalized for new 9 judges, new clerical employees, and would hope that the 10 executive branch would certainly work on it in the 11 initial law enforcement training. And it may be 12 beneficial periodically but to do it repetitively may 13 actually be counterproductive is my sense. 14 VICE CHAIR TIMMONS-GOODSON: One last 15 one, Madam Chair, if I could. 16 Mr. Harvey, I believe the last time that 17 you were with us there was no doubt that you put a 18 tremendous amount of responsibility on the judges for 19 this situation. And I think you even advocated that 20 they face criminal charges. You know you know what the 21 law is or you should know what the law is and you are violating it as you impose these various fines and fees. 22 23 Do you still hold that position? Do you 24 see that as a possible, quote unquote reform? 25 MR. HARVEY: Yes, absolutely. I don't

think there can ever be trust in this legal system if we don't have accountability. And we have now three years, at least, of judges not only in Saint Louis and Missouri but across the country admitting that they impose fines on people and jail people who they knew they couldn't pay. And the result of that was they got more training and a Bench Card. They got a cheat sheet on what the Constitution was.

And let's be frank. Our clients, when they violate the law, don't get a cheat sheet. They get to go to jail and forever owe money to that city.

So I think it's a good illustration of the way we punish or don't punish people in power and the way we punish people who are extremely vulnerable.

And I think if there were a single federal prosecution of a judge or a prosecutor for knowingly violating the law, I think one, these courts would be gone because no one would take these jobs because they wouldn't want to take that risk. There would be very few of them left and it would send a real message that we take this seriously. The DOJ would have an army of lawyers going around the country looking for bad judges and they wouldn't be hard to find.

CHAIR LHAMON: So it's fair to say that you differ from Mr. Slayton's view on the last panel that

1	the DOJ's effective role would be collaborative rather
2	than enforcive?
3	MR. HARVEY: Yes, that's fair to say.
4	CHAIR LHAMON: All right, Commissioner
5	Kladney, you stand between lunch and the next
6	panel so, you and your questions.
7	COMMISSIONER KLADNEY: Well, I would just
8	like to thank Mr. Harvey for bringing the condition of
9	the State of Nevada to this body, not that I didn't know.
10	No, quite honestly, I was thinking when you
11	were talking about add-ons, I mean this was years ago,
12	I haven't practiced criminal law in a long time,
13	somebody would be convicted in the District Court and
14	they would add a fee on for public defender fees, things
15	like that and I don't think that's uncommon in the
16	United States.
17	But I was wondering if any of you know if
18	there's a compendium that exists regarding fines and
19	fees in all 50 states. I know we have collateral
20	consequences, the ABA has one and I think another body
21	has one. And so I was just wondering, one, if one
22	exists; and two, how comprehensive it is.
23	MR. HARVEY: I think your next panelists
24	will be able to answer that question.
25	COMMISSIONER KLADNEY: Okay. And I would

1	just say, Mr. Harvey, that I know you think the whole
2	system needs to be changed and it probably does, but
3	it takes small steps at first. And I think that in the
4	last couple of years, the light that has been shown on
5	this subject has really awakened a lot of people in the
6	judicial system and hopefully, we have a lot of good
7	people in there that want to see change.
8	So, thank you all very much.
9	CHAIR LHAMON: So I also thank the
10	panelists and invite you to come back after lunch and
11	we'll say to all present that we will begin again on
12	time at 1:15 and look forward to the rest of the day.
13	Thanks very much.
14	(Whereupon, the above-entitled matter
15	went off the record at 12:19 p.m. and resumed at 1:16
16	p.m.)
17	CHAIR LHAMON: Thanks all for your
18	continued attention to this topic and thank you to our
19	next panelists for joining us now.
20	V. PANEL THREE:
21	DATA, RESEARCH, AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
22	ON MUNICIPAL FEES AND FINES
23	CHAIR LHAMON: We're going to proceed with
24	the third panel and I'm going to introduce in the order
25	of their speaking who each of them is.

First, Dr. Sarah Shannon, Assistant Professor of Sociology at the University of Georgia. Next, we'll hear from Derek Cohen, Deputy Director of the Center for Effective Justice at the Texas Public Policy Foundation and Right on Crime. Our third panelist is Mitali Nagrecha, with the Criminal Justice Policy Program at Harvard Law School. Our fourth panelist is Grover Norquist, President of Americans for Our fifth panelist is Marc Levin, the Tax Reform. Director of the Center for Effective Justice with the Texas Public Policy Foundation and Right on Crime's Policy Director. And our sixth panelist is Neil Sobol, Associate Professor of Law at Texas A&M University School of Law.

Dr. Shannon, please begin.

DR. SHANNON: Well, thank you so much, Madam Chair and commissioners for inviting me here to participate in this briefing today. I am very glad to be here.

Since 2015, I've been researching monetary sanctions as part of a multi-state grant-funded project led by Dr. Alexis Harris at the University of Washington. This is funded by the Laura and John Arnold Foundation. The focus of my part of the project has been on the State of Georgia but what I'm sharing

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today is the product of a multi-state collaborative effort to understand legal financial obligations across eight states. A full report of our findings from our first year's efforts will be published soon by the Laura and John Arnold Foundation.

So just briefly -- I don't know if someone's here to switch slides but I have slides -- I will just tell you a little bit about the eight states that are in our study. So those states are California, Georgia, Illinois, Minnesota, Missouri, New York, Texas, and Washington. And the first slide, I won't go into great depth for the sake of time, but it just demonstrates that our states vary substantially, not only in terms of demographics and politics, but also in terms of the socio-legally, in terms of the criminal justice system. So our states range a great deal in terms of rates of criminal justice supervision that you can see there in that Table 1.

And just as these states vary a great deal in terms of things such as community supervision rates and incarceration rates, we found in our review of state legal statutes regarding legal financial obligations that there is a great deal of variation in state systems of monetary sanctions.

So, if we could flip to the next slide,

Table 2 shows how fines, fees, and surcharges are stipulated in state legal codes for a first conviction for driving with a license suspended for unpaid tickets, which is a relatively common offense.

In particular, Table 2 shows how states varied with respect to the centrality of these different types of legal financial obligations. So fines appear to be fairly central for California, Georgia, Missouri, and New York but fees are highly salient in Illinois, Missouri, North Carolina, and Texas. And surcharges are more prominent in California, Georgia, Illinois, and Washington.

So while each of these types of legal financial obligations is present in every of these states' legal codes, there is variation in the frequency they are imposed and how much they contribute to the total amount of legal financial obligations.

So we show this Table 2 for one particular offense but we find that these same things are very systematically within states.

So in terms of revenue generation, which has been a topic of conversation today so far, Table 3, if we could switch slides, displays the total criminal justice revenues from fines and forfeits, which is defined as receipts from penalties imposed for

violations of law in civil penalties in 2013, which is the most recent year available and this is aggregated at the state level.

What you can see is that collections from fines and forfeits ranged anywhere from \$110 million in Minnesota to over \$2 billion in California and New York. And when we standardize this for total state population, we see again that Minnesota has the lowest rate per capita of revenue from fines and forfeits at about \$20 per capita and New York had the highest at about \$110 per capita.

So these criminal justice revenues are a relatively small portion of state's own They constitute over one percent of general revenues. revenue only in Georgia, New York, and in Texas. it should be noted that these federally-collected data do not include revenues generated by fees, costs, or surcharges. And Table 3, likely, so very significantly underestimates the total revenues associated with legal financial obligations.

And of course these rates vary a great deal within states. So for example, in 2013, Georgia counties reported anywhere from zero to 31 percent of their own source revenues coming from fines, fees, and forfeitures according to data from the Georgia

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Department of Community Affairs. Municipalities within Georgia range from zero to 86 percent on this same measure. There are nine municipalities in Georgia that generate over half of their own source revenues from fines, fees, and forfeitures and 17 municipalities in Georgia that generate over one-third of their own source revenues from these sources.

So of course we know that formal statutes and rules governing legal financial obligations may not adequately represent how they're imposed or how they're enforced. Local practices do not always follow the law as it is written.

So much more attention needs to be directed toward understanding how the law is practiced and how legal financial obligations are interpreted by those who impose and enforce them. And that's where we're headed with our eight-state study in the next four years.

A substantial challenge that we're finding here is that there are no nationally-representative data that cover the full scope of monetary sanctions. As a result, existing research at the individual level and aggregate level have focused mainly on individual states and localities within them. In our current research, some of us are having great difficulty

obtaining numerical data, even from local jurisdictions, much less statewide.

For example, Minnesota has a uniform statewide data collection system for their courts but Georgia has no such thing.

Even extracting data from individual courts has been stymied by the lack of electronic data systems to record and track these vital data. And because we lack these quantitative data nationwide, we currently don't know the full extent of the impacts of monetary sanctions on inequality writ large, which is one of the subjects of today's briefing.

So we know, though, that from these state level studies that have been done, from qualitative evidence, that criminal justice debt has become a significant force in amplifying the economic, political, and social marginalization of poor people and people of color. And we know that the criminal justice system itself, especially at the felony level, we have much evidence to suggest that there are racial and class disparities in terms of people who are most likely to come in contact with the criminal justice system.

And we know that the repercussions of criminal justice debt ultimately touch many aspects of

life. One of the most detrimental consequences of sanctions is driver's unpaid monetary license suspension. Our review of statutes in these states reveals that all of them allow for driver's licenses to be suspended for unpaid monetary sanctions, in at least some cases, whether for total unpaid debt or limited to traffic offenses. This practice widespread and also directly undermines the goal of people successfully separating from the criminal justice system in that it can restrict access to employment and childcare. In my own observations thus far in the Atlanta courts, as well as interviews with people who have experienced this consequence, having your license reinstated as quickly as possible, even though it incurs a non-negligible subsequent financial cost, is often the first thing on people's minds when it comes to managing their debt.

So in the next phases of our research, we're turning our attention to how the law is practiced on the ground and with what effects. We're already underway conducting courtroom observations and interviewing individuals, both people who owe debt and also court actors, judges, prosecutors, et cetera, involved in the administration of justice. And our goal is to rigorously examine these different aspects

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of the imposition and enforcement in order to show us, and hopefully all of you, how legal financial obligations affect the efficient, effective, and fair administration of justice, as well as the poverty and inequality of citizens and their communities.

Thank you very much.

CHAIR LHAMON: Thanks, Dr. Shannon.

Dr. Cohen.

DR. COHEN: Thank you. Well, the Texas Public Policy Foundation applauds the Department of Justice for considering its role in the execution of criminal justice. However, it is important to recall one of the bedrock principles of the United States and that is of federalism. The originating sovereigns of the federal government, the states retain most of the police powers.

This is not to discount the federal government's role in ensuring that the citizens' unalienable rights are not sacrificed for expediency or budgetary necessity. Recent administrations have been quick to place police departments and municipal governments under consent decrees or memoranda of understanding, which, while oftentimes seen as the proximate remedy for correcting abuses, are incredibly costly, fail to outperform similar remedies, and are

antagonistic to the principles of federalism.

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The assessment of fines and fees by municipal governments, in nearly all cases, would fall outside of the authority of federal oversight absent directly biased enforcement or where disenfranchisement exists. Municipal ordinances and state laws enshrining fines and fees are enacted by the respective legislative bodies and enforced by agents ultimately accountable to elected officials.

Budgeting in anticipation of fines and fees revenue is bad public policy. Necessities must by funded by a stable revenue sources, not subject to fluctuations of law, or offending patterns, but it is not unlawful if uniformly enforced.

there is the of However, matter transparency and disclosure, as the doctor spoke to. Presently, the only uniform metric on the local assessment of fines and fees is the United States Census Bureau's Survey of Local and State Finances under the "Fines, Fees, and Forfeitures" variable. This single variable fails to convey, however, how much of the reported value is assessed through each mechanism, leaving researchers to speculate on how public policy affects the aggregate amount. More granularity is needed to be actionable at any level of government.

Now, there is one area where the federal government can directly provide more just policy outcomes by abiding by the principles of federalism and that is in the area of civil asset forfeiture. Forfeiture is a mechanism through which the government obtains ownership and control of an individual's property, usually via legal convention following an alleged crime. The property is often held by the government while the case is still pending. This is wholly distinct from seizure, where the state takes possession of the property of evidentiary value or contraband to be used later in criminal proceedings.

The most well-known form of asset forfeiture used in law enforcement is criminal forfeiture. That is when the actual property is taken for use evidentially or pursuant to a criminal charge.

However, the practice of civil asset forfeiture operates in a more ambiguous area of law. Unlike legal action taken against a person, the allegation of criminal conduct is usually against the property itself and not the owner. This occurs regardless of whether any charge is actually brought against the person. These actions, known as in rem proceedings, accusations against property. This legal fiction is basically that holds that property

ascension and can be held to account for criminal activity. That's why we see such cases as the United States vs. One Pearl Necklace and .39 Acres of Land vs. the State of Texas, et cetera.

Perhaps even more costly to liberty and why this bears direct importance here to this panel is through equitable sharing. Equitable sharing is where the federal government provides a parallel venue, even if the actual state that is engaging partially in the seizing, has raised the burden of proof in order to actually make the forfeiture. It provides an end around that gets around any sort of state procedural protections that might have been enacted.

Now, granularity in the reporting of fines and fees is necessary and currently not provided through the United States Census Bureau. However, the Department of Justice has no analogous, routine survey administered to localities outside of the Uniform Crime Reports. In such cases, law enforcement personnel who aggregate crime statistics likely will not have the ability to access the information assessed on fines and fees. The Department of Justice should work with the Census Bureau to expand the extant question on the Survey of Local and State Finances to provide more information.

1	Now more directly, the Department of
2	Justice should stop providing that parallel venue for
3	forfeitures and reform equitable sharing. The
4	procedural standards established by the states should
5	be respected in agreements concerning forfeitures that
6	arise from those states. This has been done
7	administratively by the Department of Justice's
8	prohibition on adoptive forfeitures under the previous
9	administration and should be codified.
10	Finally, the Department of Justice Asset
11	Forfeiture Program's reporting protocol should also
12	delineate between forfeitures that were processed
13	through federal jurisdiction in which there has been
14	an actual party and a conviction as well.
15	With that, I'll take any questions.
16	CHAIR LHAMON: Thank you.
17	MS. NAGRECHA: Good afternoon and thank
18	you for having me.
19	When I last spoke to the Commission, I
20	discussed the family and community impact of fees and
21	fines. Returning here today, one year after the "Dear
22	Colleague" Letter, I have been reflecting on how much
23	has progressed over the last year.
24	Over the last few years, in fact, there has
25	been additional research, writing, litigation, and

advocacy on this topic. And in my opinion, awareness has exponentially increased after the "Dear Colleague" Letter. As CJPP sees it, we are now at the point of beginning to answer the question what's next.

When I started this initiative about six months ago, my team and I set out to understand what it is that the recipients of the "Dear Colleague" Letter had done in response. We wanted to learn what reforms were taking place around the country and we surveyed about 30 states to learn that information. That research will be released in a paper in the fall called Recommendations from the Field: Judiciary-Led Criminal Justice Debt Reform and I will preview some of our recommendations today.

In the paper we provide policy suggestions based on the hard work happening across the country since the "Dear Colleague" Letter and, in some instances, before.

I should also note that our research and our policy suggestions take the position that reform of municipal courts can, in fact, start at the state level, the state level law reform and change, if necessary, because state law can set the basic framework authorizing and constraining practices, create transparency mechanisms and bring reforms to

scale.

In a report that CJPP released in September of last year, we also set forward a framework for thinking about reform in this area. We believe that reform has to happen in four categories. The first is conflicts of interest. And so we know that throughout the country court and government actors face pressure to bring in revenue and we must think about how to fundamentally restructure the system. Otherwise, we will breed distrust and harm the public's faith in our system.

The second is around ability to pay reforms. Much interest has gone into thinking about this question and that is because of the constitutional mandate that we not jail people before we look into their ability to pay.

The third category is poverty penalties and poverty traps. We know that as the fees has increased in the system, so too have the harshness by which we collect these fees.

Poverty penalties penalize people really because they are unable to pay. An example is that in Arizona there is a \$20 mandatory assessment to enter into a payment plan. No waiver is available and this payment is prioritized right after restitution.

Poverty traps further entrench individuals into the difficult situations that made them unable to pay in the first instance. Driver's license revocation is one such poverty trap. I will note one example here. In Arizona, nonpayment of a civil penalty, such as a traffic fine, results in an automatic mandatory driver's license suspension and driving on a suspended license is a misdemeanor.

Finally, we think that reform in this area requires reform of transparency laws or we need it so that the public can access and request information about how these systems are operating at a broader level and I think these mechanisms will be critical to understanding and assuring against racial disparity. It will also bring transparency to the individuals, themselves, who are often facing fees and fines from across the system in many different places.

I will focus, in my remaining time, on sort of mentioning some of the recommendations that we have derived from our research.

In the area of ability to pay, we have learned that ability to pay brings out more questions than it answers and we take the position that to truly effectuate Bearden and to reform in this area, courts must inquire into ability to pay up front. And we see

across the country jurisdictions moving towards this principle. The panel before mentioned the minimum operating standards in Missouri and one of the standards includes this practice.

Similarly, people's financial situations change quite regularly. As the interviews in the paper that I had written on community impact bring out, poor people are often — it was often actually quite surprising that people were able to make payments at all. Financial situations and poverty are quite unstable and, therefore, the court should have mechanisms to look, again, at someone's ability to pay, should they represent that they no longer have that ability.

Judges must be empowered to waive fees and fines. And interestingly, the National Task Force, in their recently released Bench Card, discusses the ability to pay inquiry at the point of enforcement and suggests that even mandatory fees and fines should be waivable.

Jurisdictions need to define ability to pay. And here, there are many different models but I think it is important to note that some presumptions of an inability to pay are important and then very specific guidelines so that individuals are able to put

forth additional evidence.

Colorado's recent statutory changes, I believe, point to interesting language that focuses on not that individual's ability to pay but really to also support their family.

There are issues of implementation and we have heard from across the country an interest in thinking about to shift judicial culture on this and to get people to do things differently than they have been.

On poverty penalties, I would note that we learned in our research that you know we brought forward a serious concern that payment plans are just a way to extend the payment into a very long period of time, where really a poor person is still accountable for the same very large sum. I am somewhat suspicious of sort of budget-neutral payment plan solutions. I have also seen a lot of reforms to address the use of warrants in knee jerk ways. So I think here it is very critical to figure out how courts can feel that they have the tools to address the cases before them, while also avoiding frequent use of orders to show cause and warrants.

Finally, I mentioned the importance of keeping data on rates -- and I'm out of time. So, I'll

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CHAIR LHAMON: Thank you, Ms. Nagrecha.

Mr. Norquist.

MR. NORQUIST: Thank you, Chairman and commissioners.

I run a taxpayer group and when one uses fees and fines as a method of tax collection, it is abused in all the ways you'd expect it to be and that you see it in other opportunities. Who do you tax? You tax people who are politically vulnerable. Well, someone who's broken the law because they are supposed to pay this ticket and they haven't, fees and taxes get added on to those. And so even though the underlying ticket doesn't sound like, you know \$100, they add on fees for courthouse upkeep and other things. you're trying to raise money, it's not a bad place to stick a little bit more, if you're an elected official because what are you taxing? You're taxing bad people who have tickets and it tends to just pile up on and on.

It specifically targets the vulnerable, people who are politically difficult to talk to, and because a lot of these are traffic tickets, you're kind of taxing people who might be driving through town, which means they might not be able to vote against you

in the next election. So you have taxation without representation, which is why they place a lot of, when they go to give tickets, in certain areas where people are passing through any given town or city because those are the exact people who, when you annoy them, don't vote against you. They don't know who to vote against because you decided to tax the other, the traveler, the stranger, the person who doesn't live under your jurisdiction.

And then it gets to worse because you have hidden taxes or secondary effects to the taxes when somebody can't pay the tax -- pay the fee or fine or tax on time. You take away their driver's license, which is actually then, in many cases, taking away their job. I was looking at one study that 40 percent of the people who lost their licenses in New Jersey lost their jobs.

Now, I don't think that the guy who gives the ticket says to himself you parked here too long, I think you should lose your job. I don't think they understand the damage they're doing to the person when they hit the -- it was just a ticket. And then on the ticket come taxes. And on the ticket comes losing a license. And on the ticket comes perhaps losing your job, 40 percent in the case of the New Jersey case.

Four million Californians are driving with suspended licenses. I've heard actually even higher numbers in California but that does suggest that people are risking even greater penalties, never mind going to the question of whether you put people in prison for not paying the ticket, and the fees, and the accumulated interest.

So it seems to me if you are going to tax people, you should sort of note they should have taxation with representation. You should be clear what the tax is. This is a cascading tax. It ends with losing your job or putting you in prison for a ticket that was supposed to just be a certain amount for a minor facility.

This all came to national attention, anyway, with Ferguson, Missouri and you had a situation where 20 percent of that city's budget came directly from fines and fees. This is not the only city in the area that did it. The eight surrounding towns got 30 percent of their revenue from the same mechanism. And it not only damages the individuals that they are targeting but what it does to relations between police and citizens when the policeman you see is going to -- how cheerful are you to meet IRS agents? Did your parents ever tell children, you know the IRS agent is

your friend; if you have a problem, go up and ask the IRS agent for directions? When you turn policemen into tax collectors, the Romans found when Turkey revolted that they killed all the tax collectors. They're not popular structures and it's unfair to police to put them in that position.

Worse, in Ferguson, in 2010, the finance director is sending emails to the police chief. The finance director is sending to police chief explaining that there are tax shortfalls and we really need to reorient the police resources towards fee collection -- not go out in this area; there's bad traffic; a kid got hit; the cars are not stopping at that stop sign; we need to watch for that; there is speeding going on.

This is there's more money to be made Unless ticket-writing -- this is the finance there. director instructing Chief Jackson how to organize the police: unless ticket-writing ramps up significantly before the end of the year, it will be hard to significantly raise collections next year. your thoughts? Given that we are looking at a substantial sales shortfall, tax it's not an insignificant issue.

Jackson stressed that additional police officers

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would allow him to hit a \$1.5 million target. So, we want more police to protect citizens, to make the world safer, to keep the traffic -- no, no. Because if you give me more cops, I'll get you \$1.5 million more in ticket dollars and we're looking at different shift schedules which will place more officers on the street -- that sounds good -- comma, which in turn will increase traffic enforcement per shift.

So the police are being misdirected to become not what we think police are supposed to be but tax collectors.

It is interesting that when Missouri looked at this with all the data that the Justice Department made available, they had two fixes. It's not what a lot of people thought the lessons of Ferguson were going to be. Step one is they limited how much any city or municipality can get in fines and fees. They saw the centrality of what this did to the entire city's relationship with each other and they put the cap was lowered from 30 percent to 20 for most of the state but to 12.5 percent for Saint Louis County. And they went in and started to reduce the actual fines that you could put in for a first time offense.

I think they were focused on a key issue there and there is some -- I would add to that the other

1	reason that I skipped over, there were more outstanding
2	traffic citations in Ferguson prior to the shooting
3	than there are citizens in Ferguson. This was not
4	a this was a massive, significant, deep problem,
5	continuing problem. Hundreds of people would show up.
6	There are only two days that you could come in and do
7	this during the course of a month and pay your fees.
8	There would be hundreds of people in line. If you
9	didn't get to the line in time, you had to come back
10	and then, if you didn't make it or you had to work, or
11	you couldn't make it on time, then all of a sudden the
12	fees for being late started piling up as well.
13	So, they made it difficult, not easy, to
14	pay even the fines and taxes that they were collecting,
15	all of which suggests this is a lousy way to raise
16	revenue and it's distortive in all sorts of ways and
17	particularly damaging to a city and the citizens in a
18	city like Ferguson, which, unfortunately, became a
19	classic case of what not to do.
20	CHAIR LHAMON: Thanks very much, Mr.
21	Norquist.
22	Mr. Levin.
23	MR. LEVIN: Sure. Well thank you, so
24	much.
25	Marc Levin with Texas Public Policy

Foundation and Right on Crime.

There are some 10 million Americans who owe more than \$50 billion in criminal justice debt. And like Grover, we're a conservative organization but we feel that this is an area where people can work across the spectrum to build a better system.

I actually drafted a resolution that was adopted by the American Legislative Exchange Council, which is the leading group of conservative state lawmakers that you may be familiar with. And the following framework, which I am going to outline is based on that resolution that was unanimously adopted. And first and foremost, fines and fees must be reasonable, transparent, and proportionate, and not in conflict with the goals of improving public safety, reducing recidivism, ensuring victims get restitution, which is very important because oftentimes the first money goes to the government, not the victim in cases involving property offenses and so forth.

Many fines, of course, are not reasonable. In Texas, our penalty, it is a state felony for less than a gram of drug possession. The maximum fine is \$10,000. That's a lot of money.

Now, one of the other issues is that this can often prevent people from getting into a diversion

program because of the cost of actually the fees for 1 2 going into some alternatives to prison, 3 treatment programs, which we would want. 4 people who are poor often cannot afford lawyers who have 5 the right connections with the prosecutor who could put their time in to get that diversion sentence. 6 7 Now, this contributes to unnecessary 8 incarceration. Basically, incarceration for 9 inability to pay is found to have caused about 20 10 percent of the people -- 20 percent of the people in 11 local jails are there due to an inability to pay. 12 There was a November 16th report that I 13 would refer you to by the Massachusetts State Senate 14 Committee on post-audit and oversight. They found in 15 just three counties more than 100 people in jail simply 16 because they didn't have money. There was a man who 17 owned more than \$1,000 in fees from an old drug case 18 and was jailed for 36 days, even though he was homeless 19 and slept in a shelter the night before his court 20 appearance. These are the kinds of examples. 21 Now, this also distorts law enforcement. 22 It causes decisions to be made on grounds other than 23 public safety, as we have heard in earlier testimony. 24 So, let's look at some of these solutions.

We ought to have a sliding scale in terms of the statutes

that deal with fines and fees. In Europe, they use day 1 2 fines, which is proportionate to what the person would 3 earn in a day is how much they would have to pay. 4 Also the first funds collection should go 5 to restitution, in cases of property crimes, rather than to government entities. 6 7 The offender's ability to pay should be 8 taken into account, including arranging realistic 9 payment plans, as well as community service in lieu of 10 fines in some instances. 11 One of the other issues is people paying 12 fines and fees who are on probation, as well as parole. 13 And one of the ways to address this is to have early 14 discharge of people whose conduct has been exemplary. 15 Many jurisdictions have moved in that direction, which 16 also frees up supervision officers to focus on the 17 people that actually may be a problem. 18 We also need full transparency about where 19 the money's going that's collected and at what 20 percentage that is, of various budgets and 21 jurisdictions. 22 Also, failure to pay should not be grounds 23 for revoking somebody's probation or parole. Clearly, 24 incarceration should only be used as a very last resort,

once the person is -- we're talking about fine-only

offenses, if they fail to respond to repeated attempts to contact them and refuse to make arrangements for a payment plan or other means to discharge the debt.

One of the things is also, looking at some of these misdemeanors, in Ferguson there was someone who couldn't pay a fine for an overgrown lawn. That was a misdemeanor. That shouldn't even be a crime to begin with. It ought to be a civil matter, which takes us out of the whole notion of someone going to jail because they can't pay.

Also, family members. There is research showing family members pay about two-thirds of -- these are financial obligations owed by people who are incarcerated. But I think it's unfair to assume that, for example, a parent should be obligated to pay a fine levied against a juvenile, that each person ought to be responsible for their own conduct.

I think one of the things I'll also point to, and this is in my written testimony, but we went through each city. You heard some of the state information before but this goes by city and per capita fines, fees, and forfeiture revenue collected adjusted by cost of living. And Washington, D.C. was number one, \$227 per person collected in fines, fees and forfeitures.

some of the lowest cities, like and Charlotte, and Greensboro in North Raleigh, Carolina. And why is that? Well, it turns out North Carolina has a state law that local jurisdictions can't keep the fines, fees, and forfeitures they collect. They have to send them to the state. Well, low and behold, zero. It's actually zero in Greensboro and Raleigh collected at 21 cents in Charlotte per capita versus \$227 in Washington, D.C. So, that tells you something.

Now let me also say that I think that we have to look at how this affects policing and community relations. When so many people have warrants in Ferguson, they average three warrants per household, and obviously that's been cleaned up somewhat with the state law, but all these people have warrants and they're mostly for traffic, overgrown lawns, these kinds of things, they're not going to report serious crimes to police. And that makes us a lot less safe.

There was an interesting study that just came out of Milwaukee, a slightly different issue, but this found after TV reports of police shootings, and these dealt with African American men typically, there was in these communities, these high-crime communities, there was a lower percentage of crimes

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reported. And that demonstrated that distrust of the police, whether it's right or not, can reduce the rate at which people report crimes.

Similarly, if someone has a warrant for them for traffic fines, unpaid fines and things, they're going to be a lot less likely to report crime and because they distrust the police, as Grover said, because they see them as money collectors.

Now, let me just conclude by focusing a bit on this issue of driver's license suspensions. we're a very short distance from Virginia, which I think is the worst in the whole country. They have 647,000 drivers suspended solely for failure to pay. One of those is Kimberly Hopkins, a U.S. Army veteran, lost her driver's license for unpaid court costs and fees relating to speeding tickets, bald tires. court said no, you can't have a payment plan. And one of the worst things in Virginia is it's administratively done, these suspensions. So there's no discretion on the part of the judge.

And so this is automatically done if a person misses a single payment, regardless of whether they have any money.

In Texas, we have a huge problem with the driver responsibility program, which we're trying to

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1 repeal. If you have three moving violations within a 2 year, or an arbitrary 12-month period, your license is 3 suspended; you have to pay thousands of dollars to get 4 it back. 5 Now the real-world consequences of this are significant. There was a study in New Jersey, 42 6 7 percent of the people who had their driver's license 8 suspended lost their job. And so they're actually becoming more of a risk, more unstable than if we had 9 10 done this. 11 So, I will just conclude by telling you 12 that we believe in free markets. It's great that 13 really wealthy people can buy nicer things but justice 14 and liberty shouldn't be for sale. We shouldn't put 15 Whether somebody's in jail or not a price on it. 16 shouldn't depend on how much money they have and that's 17 a big problem when we say that you're going to jail but 18 you can't afford to pay a fine or a fee. 19 So thank you very much. 20 CHAIR LHAMON: Thank you, Mr. Levin. 21 Professor Sobol. 22 PROFESSOR SOBOL: Thank you. My name is 23 Neil Sobol and I'm an associate professor at Texas A&M 24 University of School of Law. The viewpoints I express 25 today are my own. I recommend that policymakers borrow

the framework created to address abusive practices in the collection of consumer debt to confront abuses in the collection of criminal justice debt. Specifically, I recommend that policymakers adopt remedies in three broad categories that are used in the consumer debt context, namely, setting out prohibited practices, establishing mandatory best practices, and encouraging the Department of Justice to coordinate enforcement, education, and outreach efforts.

Building on my practice experience in consumer protection and bankruptcy law, my scholarship focuses on addressing collection abuses in both the civil and criminal justice arenas. By applying consumer law concepts, I provide another perspective to addressing criminal justice debt. My hope is that my efforts will be useful not only to my academic colleagues but also to attorneys, judges, legislators, regulators, law enforcement, judicial personnel, and defendants. As a result, I am delighted to share my thoughts with the Commission today.

My testimony will focus on issues that I've discussed in a forthcoming article Fighting Fines & Fees: Borrowing from Consumer Law to Combat Criminal Justice Debt Abuses. That's forthcoming in the Colorado Law Review.

I assert that the rationale that led to the enactment of the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, the FDCPA and the creation of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, the CFPB, to combat consumer collection abuses parallels the reasons why a federal statute should be adopted to help the DOJ coordinate attack against abuses related to criminal justice debt.

Alternatively, if a federal statute is not adopted, the DOJ should adopt guidelines and coordinate enforcement, education and outreach with state and local authorities. A separate division within the DOJ could be tasked with these functions.

The FDCPA became effective in 1978 and was enacted in part due to the dramatic growth in debt collection abuses that accompanied the growth of consumer debt. Just as in the last 30 years, the criminal justice system has witnessed a dramatic increase in criminal justice debt, consumer debt had also increased at an exponential rate. Moreover, just as mass supervision has created an explosion in the prison, jail, probation, and parole industries, growth in consumer debt has been associated with an expansive growth in collectors, including the creation of a debt-buying industry that now annually purchases over

\$100 billion in consumer debt.

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In enacting the FDCPA, Congress issued findings about the use of abusive, deceptive, and unfair debt collection practices. Congress found that those practices contributed to personal bankruptcies, marital instability, loss of jobs, and invasion of privacy. These same concerns are shared bу individuals with criminal justice debt. But not only do they have these concerns, but they also face the creation of a criminal record, denial of welfare benefits, suspension of driver's license, arrest, and even incarceration.

As further support for the Consumer Act, Congress acknowledged that existing laws and procedures were inadequate to protect consumers. Collection abuses were widespread, national problems, and states had failed to provide adequate legislation, regulation, or enforcement. Additionally, common-law remedies were not effective, as they were limited to a case-by-case method and focused on compensation, rather than prevention.

Similarly, the current approach to criminal justice debt that fails to adequately attack a widespread national problem. By focusing on specific actions against individual municipalities, typically

by asserting constitutional violations, the current system also tends to rely on a piecemeal compensatory approach, rather than a more comprehensive preventive approach.

Additionally, the CFPB is used to administer the Consumer Act, promulgate regulations, and helps coordinate enforcement, education, and outreach efforts.

Together, the FDCPA and the CFPB provide a model for addressing abusive debt collection. The remedies they provide fall into three general categories, prohibited practices, required actions, and enforcement, outreach and education.

the FDCPA sets forth general First, restrictions on the actions of collectors of consumer For example, the Act prohibits harassment, debt. abuse, false, or misleading representations, as well as unfair, unconscionable methods of collecting debt. Similarly, public and private actors involved in the collection of criminal justice debt that should be prohibited from discriminatory assessment and collection, harassing or abusive behavior, and false or misleading representations.

Moreover, the Consumer Act provides specific examples that violate these general

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prohibitions, including threatening violence, repeatedly or continuously calling individuals, falsely asserting that communications are from legal counsel, threatening arrest or imprisonment, and collecting unauthorized amounts.

Further, the Act establishes specific time and place restrictions on communications with alleged debtors, as well as restrictions on communications with third parties.

Just as the FDCPA enumerates specific violations, legislation should also prohibit specific activities by collectors of criminal justice debt. Some examples we heard today are restricting actual or threatened use of incarceration for failure to pay fees; providing that actual or threatened use of incarceration for failure to pay fines should only be done if there is a meaningful ability to pay hearing. Additionally, using systems that allow for poverty penalties, ticket quotas, and cash bail without taking into account the ability to pay.

Secondly, not only does the FDCPA prohibit abusive actions, but also it establishes mandatory practices for collectors of consumer debt. For example, the Act establishes a system for validation and verification of debts to provide notice and

information to help prevent collection from the wrong people or for the wrong amount. Interestingly, the validation notices are often referred to as Mini-Miranda warnings.

Areas, where required, or best practices should be established in the context of criminal justice debt include the following: providing defendants notice of charges, procedures, and their rights; conducting meaningful ability to pay hearings; complying with standards and procedures for assessing, determining, and applying criminal justice debt; and conditioning employment of private companies upon compliance with established standards, reporting requirements, and approved fee schedules.

Finally, the CFPB has established an online system for collecting and responding to complaints and works with federal, state, and local authorities to investigate and enforce violations and provide outreach and education programs. The DOJ should do similar functions. In fact, a lot of things they're doing right now are similar.

Examples of things to do include establishing an online complaint database; establishing fact-gathering procedures and requiring reporting and collection of data; offering incentives

1	and grant programs to states and municipalities;
2	coordinating enforcement, education, and outreach
3	activities with state and local authorities, including
4	nonprofit and public interest groups; and working with
5	state and local authorities to establish standards and
6	procedures for the following: meaningful ability to pay
7	hearings; assessing and determining dollar amounts for
8	bails, fines, and fees, including reviewing existing
9	and new charges; creating revenue caps; and employing
10	and supervising private companies involved in the
11	assessment and collection of criminal justice debt.
12	The problems of abusive assessment and
13	collection of fines and fees in the criminal justice
14	arena are real problems with severe consequences, often
15	more severe than the problems associated with consumer
16	debt. To combat these abuses regarding criminal
17	justice debt, we should learn from and, where
18	appropriate, borrow from what we've done with consumer
19	debt abuses.
20	Thank you.
21	CHAIR LHAMON: Thanks very much,
22	Professor Sobol.
23	I'll open the time now to my fellow
24	commissioners for questions.

Commissioner Kladney.

1 COMMISSIONER KLADNEY: Thank you. Ι 2 think I have two questions I'd like to address to the 3 entire panel. 4 One is Mr. Levin, I was quite surprised. 5 You said 647,000 bench warrants -- suspended licenses and I would assume bench warrants in the State of 6 7 Virginia. And there would be many more because there 8 is other misdemeanor offenses. And I'm speaking about misdemeanors here, not felony warrants or things like 9 10 that. 11 If there was reform in terms of what you 12 all have been talking about, should there be a review 13 of these warrants or a warrant holiday like there are 14 tax holidays for corporations and things like that? 15 MR. LEVIN: Yes, no that's a great point. 16 Some jurisdictions -- actually there is a federal 17 fugitive program for people to come forward, which has 18 had really good results. Obviously, it doesn't cover 19 everything and it shouldn't but some jurisdictions do 20 now do kind of like the library, if you had a book 21 overdue for years, that you can go and return it. 22 I think that's an excellent practice to let 23 people know that you can come in and work this out, you're not going to jail. And actually jurisdictions 24

end up collecting more from it.

I mean one of the things we haven't talked about is -- and we're actually doing some research with the Brennan Center on this is the cost of collecting all this money. I mean it looks like this huge windfall surface for law enforcement and the governments, but once we actually find out, many of them have contracts with private entities to do collections, others employ people in their own agencies. you add up those costs, it turns out that it may not be such a financial benefit and there is, basically, at the end it's kind of a draw but some people who do the collections end up coming out pretty well.

COMMISSIONER KLADNEY: Anybody else? Everybody agrees?

Okay and my second question is when it comes to reform, we heard from our first panel today all the different jurisdictions, all the different requirements in the jurisdictions, all the different approaches that they have. Would it be of assistance if there was a like a uniform act in terms of collecting assessing fines and fees that states and jurisdictions could look at and adopt those parts that they like and not adopt those parts that they don't like so that these jurisdictions would have at least something, some background to go by?

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Yes, sir.

PROFESSOR SOBOL: I'll start. I know there's going to be disagreement over that. But that's essentially what I am proposing is that something like a federal act, at least with minimum standards, be established.

The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act does that in the consumer context. And after that was passed, in fact, what happened was that many states adopted similar provisions. Other states adopted even stronger provisions. So I think it sets an example there and sets a floor for that to occur.

I know there's going to be a lot of push back on federalism issues on whether that can be done or not, or whether it should be done or not, but I think establishing at least some minimum guidelines is a good start.

COMMISSIONER KLADNEY: Well, let me make it clear. When I was talking about a uniform act, I was just talking about the uniform acts that are adopted by not governments but by jurisdictions.

MR. LEVIN: Sure. Yes, of course we already have this resolution through ALEC and we could take the next step and have an actual act model legislation. And certainly there's National

Conference of State Legislatures, other groups that I think it would be very helpful and then states could, obviously customize for their own purposes. But part of it is this is such an overwhelming issue because there's so many statutes, both local and state that are responsible for this that perhaps it can seem overwhelming to an individual legislator to take it up without having that kind of framework.

MR. NORQUIST: One of the advantages of federalism is that you've got 50 local governments and many more alternatives. And so while it's nice to have a model example, I'd rather take an example that's working somewhere.

Take a look at some of the reforms in Missouri and say -- and share those with other states and say these are pieces to the puzzle. The problem is if anyone -- I have all the answers in my one bill and you must eat this entirely. One, it's probably not true. But there are pieces that work. There are some states, and cities, and towns that are doing something that works very well and other things that aren't working well. And I think it is probably best just to have them compare with each other and bump into each other and have arguments about how they compare.

Truly stupid ideas can only be done at the

national level. But because if you do something particularly dumb in Vermont, it's hard to sell it to New Hampshire and Massachusetts. But in Washington, you can impose it top-down and nobody knows what happened. It could be anything. It could be the weather that went wrong, not your bill.

So the more you go sideways, I think the better off you are but we could hold up those measures. And if somebody had a good amnesty legislation, I'd go further than that. I'd do an amnesty on some of those questions about licensees because it's just gotten ridiculous and rethink whether you take away somebody's license because you're mad at them.

Do you really mean that not paying the ticket, the punishment should be your job, your mobility? That seems to be awfully harsh. I'm not sure that any legislator would have voted for well, if you park too long here, you lose your job but that's what they're doing when they start that ball rolling down the hill.

COMMISSIONER KLADNEY: I understand what you're saying. I mean there's 18,000 police departments in the country. So, there's lots of municipalities.

Anybody else?

DR. SHANNON: Yes, I could add a few things from my research across the eight states. And this is maybe just augmenting what others have said but I can see three challenges to this kind of an effort at reform or really any efforts at reform.

First is that we found across these eight states that the statutes and rules governing LFOs are very complex, multi-layered, and contained in some states across the entire legal code, not just the criminal code. So, in Georgia it's in the criminal code. In California, it's across the entire legal code. You can find legal financial obligations embedded in things you wouldn't think are related at all to criminal legal financial obligations.

So, that's very complicated, speaking of federalism.

Second, the rationale. Someone asked earlier on a panel what are these things for; why are we doing them? And you know when you think about fines, we think about the more perhaps a deterrent effect or a punishment, that's what the fine is for.

Restitution, though, really has historically -- and that's not something we've talked much about today, but has more of a restorative element of trying to restore the harm to the person that was

1 harmed in the crime. 2 These other things like costs, 3 surcharges, what is motivating those? Is it revenue 4 generation? Is it recouping the cost of system 5 functioning? So I think some fundamental philosophical 6 7 questions would have to be answered about what are each 8 of these elements for and what are we trying to do with 9 them. 10 And then third, there's a diverse group of 11 stakeholders. 12 different stakeholders So many 13 involved in these policies and processes, not to 14 mention some of these funds that are being collected 15 and surcharges and others are going to things that are 16 not related to the criminal justice system. 17 heard on the earlier panel that some groups are starting 18 to freak out a little bit in certain states. If less 19 money is being collected, they are not being funded 20 anymore for things that certainly we value as a society 21 but should that funding be coming from this source? 22 these very complicated are some 23 questions that would be involved in that type of a 24 reform effort.

MS. NAGRECHA:

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If I may just add -- so I

think I don't see the harm in sort of setting forth bare minimum standards, which it seems that we are in many places probably quite far from, given that people are routinely jailed on nonpayment issues. However, I worry a little bit about a uniform act, or code, or something of that sort at this point.

One, I worry a little bit about losing sight of the kind of structural questions here. And so for example you know to the extent that we have dozens of fees and surcharges on the books in any given state, that upward pressure is going to exist and you know I worry that in sort of getting into the minutia of the definition of ability to pay we may sort of take away attention from kind of those structural questions and maybe sort of embed them into the system even more. And so I think we have to have some attention to that.

I also have some concern because you know in some areas, I don't think that the policies that are being considered currently really may be pushed far enough, so that we have the model that would really probably be the things that are most effective. And I return here to the example of warrants and the use of warrants on nonpayment.

And so I think there are jurisdictions that, for example, have decided that warrants cannot

be issued on a nonpayment but that you'd first issue a summons for an order to show cause and then a warrant can only issue upon a failure to appear. I don't think we know yet that that really fully addresses that problem of a churn of people coming into the system on warrants really related to their poverty.

And I think we're going to really have to be creative to figure out exactly how to reduce that churn into the courts that that harms people's lives.

And I don't know that we have those models yet.

I will also briefly mention, and Thomas sort of queued this in the last panel, we have a 50-state web resource that will be available in beta form March 31st and then sort of getting perfected in the months after that, where we've collected what we hope is all of the statutory law at the state level that governs fees and fines.

And that includes authorization for the actual financial penalties but also the enforcement mechanisms, the laws that set forth the structures of the court, including funding and sort of supervision issues, the collections infrastructure, the extent to which private entities are involved in that, and then the transparency laws of the state.

CHAIR LHAMON: Thank you.

1 Mr. Norquist, you look like you 2 something you want to say. 3 MR. NORQUIST: Yes. One the question of some of these fees and legal financial obligations 4 5 being hidden in different parts of the law, Texas has a good, maybe a rule that the legislature has enforced 6 7 on itself, if you're going to stick a tax in a bill, 8 you know it could be 20 pages, 50 pages, if there is 9 any tax in it anywhere, you have to put it in bold in 10 the first sentence before you get to the rest of the bill. 11 12 It would seem to me that beginning to ask 13 to get legal financial obligations, also that sort of 14 status in a state would at least end the process of 15 hiding -- sticking additional ones in that people are 16 voting and not necessarily aware that that's what 17 they're voting for. 18 Because the idea that you have to put it 19 there in a lot of cases, we'll just take it out, or 20 there's a very good reason for this and everybody should 21 We're very proud we're doing this. 22 everyone to see it, so it's right here. 23 It at least begins to get transparency on 24 how much is going on. 25 CHAIR LHAMON: Thank you.

Commissioner Yaki, it sounded like you may 1 2 have a question. And if you do, you're on mute. 3 COMMISSIONER YAKI: I am on mute. I am 4 formulating a question. I will have one in a second, 5 if someone else wants to go first. CHAIR LHAMON: Okay. 6 7 Commissioner Narasaki? COMMISSIONER NARASAKI: Thank you, Madam 8 9 I have a couple of questions. 10 So we've talked a lot this morning about 11 the states that are moving forward to address these 12 I'm wondering what are the states that 13 aren't doing anything yet and what can the Department 14 of Justice do, if anything, to try to change that? Or 15 is everybody, are all 50 states plus the District of 16 Columbia addressing the issue? 17 MS. NAGRECHA: If I could jump in. 18 So, as I mentioned about six months ago I 19 started at the Criminal Justice Policy Program and we 20 really needed to understand that question to figure 21 what it is that we were going to do. And so we sort 22 of did a survey I think and hit about 30 states and I 23 would say the vast majority weren't really doing 24 anything. And so you sort of heard the same examples

from the same handful of states that were moving

already. But I do think that even in the last -- over the last six months that that has shifted.

So for example, when I started I had identified Arkansas as a state that wasn't doing that much yet and there had been a lawsuit there and so, obviously, there was some attention on the issue. they then, since then have created a judicial council to look at this issue. And if I could actually just read a quote from the judge who's heading that council, she said the DOJ letter had a profound impact on every judge that read it. For those judges that proceed to these issues prior to the letter but were unable to generate enthusiasm for change, the letter provided a perfect platform for review and modification of policies and procedures. The letter directly impacted the decision of the Arkansas Judicial Council to form our joint committee and the members of the committee have expressed appreciation that the DOJ use the "Dear Colleague" Letter to raise awareness throughout the judiciary of these issues, rather than waiting until complaints and lawsuits were filed.

COMMISSIONER NARASAKI: So how many states, questimate --

MS. NAGRECHA: Yes.

COMMISSIONER NARASAKI: -- are not doing

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1 anything yet? Or you can answer it the other way, are 2 doing something. 3 MS. NAGRECHA: Yes, maybe I'll submit my materials with an answer to that. 4 5 COMMISSIONER NARASAKI: Okav. And thoughts about what the Department of Justice could be 6 7 doing to try to change that. 8 The second question I have is for Mr. 9 It's good to see you. Usually, I don't hear 10 you saying anything nice about federal government and 11 you were very appreciative of what the Department of 12 Justice had done in this area. 13 So I'm interested in what you would tell 14 the new administration about what are the programs that 15 Department of Justice and actions that the Department 16 of Justice has been taking in this area, what should 17 be sustained and are there things that they should be 18 doing that they're not yet doing. 19 MR. NORQUIST: Well, I thought the study 20 in the specific case of Ferguson was extremely well done 21 and there were a whole bunch of various lessons to be 22 drawn out of that. I mean they had a lot of data and 23 they put it together as to what was driving this 24 problem. And there were a whole bunch of theories that

people went into this with. So I thought they did an

extremely good job of that. I'm sure there are other parts of the Department of Justice that are useful but that's not my area of expertise.

MR. LEVIN: I mean I think the key is to when it comes to the issue of federalism is making sure we're clear about what the kind of linkage is why the federal government is intervening. And I do think there are issues here involving both equal protection and due process that are in the U.S. Constitution that do provide some means for the federal government to be involved.

I think, though, that's it important to make sure that we're not saying that every state and local policy that's just bad on policy grounds, necessarily, calls for the Department of Justice to intervene. So there has to be articulable reason why it presents a problem under the U.S. Constitution.

And I think in some cases, as in Ferguson, it certainly there was strong evidence of that.

MR. NORQUIST: It could be a good example to the states, many of which have been misbehaving on civil asset forfeiture and stealing people's cars and money when there's been no conviction and where, in some cases, there have been no charges. So, if the federal government would stop doing that themselves, it might

1	shame the states into knocking it off.
2	COMMISSIONER NARASAKI: And I had a
3	question about forfeitures, even though this isn't
4	about. But I'm wondering has there been
5	MR. NORQUIST: It's actually very
6	similar. Forfeiture
7	COMMISSIONER NARASAKI: Right. Right.
8	No, I agree with you. It's a very close cousin.
9	MR. NORQUIST: Taxing people who are
10	vulnerable, who are driving through town
11	COMMISSIONER NARASAKI: Yes, and I join
12	you as being opposed to it.
13	But my question is on the forfeiture, have
14	you been looking at that in terms of whether there is
15	any kind of racial disparities or is it just like bad
16	across the board?
17	MR. NORQUIST: It's bad for the government
18	to steal people's stuff and I wouldn't be surprised if
19	there are racial disparities but it's bad.
20	COMMISSIONER NARASAKI: I was just
21	wondering if there was data that
22	MR. LEVIN: Well, there's a case in Texas,
23	a town several years ago, where everyone who was black
24	driving through got their stuff taken, all the money,
25	everything they had when they got a speeding ticket,

1 pulled over for any reason. It was covered across the 2 country. 3 But one of the interesting things is the commonalities is the inability of people without 4 5 resources to fight back. And in fact when your stuff's wrongfully taken or your license is wrongfully 6 7 suspended, or you are wrongfully convicted, if you 8 can't afford to hire a lawyer, and of course, with asset 9 forfeiture, you're not -- there's no right to counsel. 10 But in a lot of places to challenge even 11 these municipal fines, you have to post bail. You have 12 post an amount to appeal. And if you don't have the 13 money to appeal, you can't appeal. And so I think 14 that's a real due process issue. 15 CHAIR LHAMON: I think Mr. Cohen wanted to 16 respond as well. 17 DR. COHEN: Yes, and I would just add to 18 what Mr. Norquist and what Mr. Levin had said is that 19 when it comes to the issue of forfeiture in and of 20 itself, the very questions that you asked, ma'am, 21 simply cannot be answered because we don't have enough 22 transparency into the process. 23 I can speak for Texas that all we have or all the local governing agencies have to do there is 24 25 just report in aggregate to the Attorney General and

1 the Attorney General then has to post online that 2 aggregate. 3 There has been some research on it. 4 Slayton's organization, the Office of Court 5 Administration, took a look at policy and some of the I believe that was towards the end dubious incentives. 6 7 of 2015. But under federal government, even where 8 9 we see the equitable sharing payments that were made 10 to the states, we have no idea about the granularity 11 of the supposed offender, the supposed situation that 12 led to that particular seizure and then ultimate 13 simply forfeiture. Wе just don't have that 14 I think that that, to Mr. Norquist's information. 15 point would be a great way of actually shining some 16 sunlight on that issue itself. 17 COMMISSIONER NARASAKI: If I could just 18 get back to the original question before I diverted us. 19 So do you think like the Department of 20 Justice's technical assistance is important? Is the grant program that they initiated, is that something 21 22 that should be continued expanded? just 23 interested in hearing your thoughts. 24 DR. COHEN: Well, I'd say 25 federalism standpoint, there is a lot of grant programs

in the Department of Justice say through the Byrne Grants or even another form of Justice Assistance Grants that it is not uncommon for there to be certain standards on it. And if that case were something as minimal as data reporting standards, or even compliance centers in terms of legal procedure to enact these fines, fees, or forfeitures, either way, I think there is a broad spectrum. I think in that spectrum there's room for disagreement but I think that might be one way that without new appropriation, there would be a way to actually start getting at the roots of these issues.

CHAIR LHAMON: Vice Chair, do you have a question?

VICE CHAIR TIMMONS-GOODSON: Yes, with the mention of federalism and talking about state versus federal action and even with the argument that we're calling upon folks to fight this injustice, folks that don't have resources, I was wondering if any of you have any concern about the fact that these folks are having to pay to access a branch of government to exercise their constitutional right. Our courts are designed in order to resolve disputes and so here with many of these costs, I think there is an argument that can be made that they're being required to pay for the use of the judicial branch of government to which

they're entitled to come in and to call upon for redress. I'm wondering if you have any thoughts or concerns in that connection.

MR. LEVIN: Well you know I think maybe there is a distinction to be made. I mean certainly the idea that you have to pay to appeal and if you don't have the money you can't appeal your conviction, I think that's totally wrong.

Then you take on the other hand something like probation fees. I mean in Texas and other states are similar, over half the money for probation comes from probation fees and it creates a lot of problems, including the incentive to keep people on probation longer than necessary because you have got to get the fees from the people that are exemplary to offset the cost of supervising the people who can't pay who need more supervision. And we've had probation directors admit this in testimony. It's not a secret.

Now philosophically, I don't know that there's anything wrong with those who can pay contributing because of their conduct that their on probation and otherwise, the taxpayers would have to pay all of it. And restitution for victims, I mean that ought to be the number one thing we're focused on.

VICE CHAIR TIMMONS-GOODSON: But what

1 about the fact that perhaps a portion of the costs are 2 going to constructing the courthouse or are taking care of other criminal or civil justice matters? 3 4 more of what I'm getting at. 5 MR. LEVIN: No, you're right. Some of the money is diverted to totally unrelated things. 6 7 example, in Texas there was a fee on all bail bonds that 8 goes to prosecutor longevity pay. And again I mean 9 these are things that we ought to be funding out of 10 general revenue. And you're making it more expensive 11 for people to bail out of jail so more people are in 12 jail. 13 So, I think that the -- now, in civil cases, 14 there's fees, too, that cover the courthouse and things 15 like that. So people, you kind of have to say you have 16 like toll roads, which is a user fee and that's what 17 this is analogous to. And on the other hand, you are 18 funding things through general revenues. 19 So I think that the key is to make sure that 20 certainly any fines and fees are not onerous and they're 21 not kind of diverted to unrelated purposes. 22 course, that there's exceptions based on ability to 23 pay.

to move a system with no user fees whatsoever.

But I think it's going to be kind of hard

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1 CHAIR TIMMONS-GOODSON: Anybody VICE 2 else? Thank you. 3 CHAIR LHAMON: Commissioner Kladney, did 4 you have a question? 5 COMMISSIONER KLADNEY: Actually I quess more of a statement to see if you all agree. When you 6 7 were talking about civil forfeiture, you were talking 8 about the motivation to forfeit, I think the police 9 departments keep all that money for equipment and 10 things like that in most jurisdictions. And I was 11 wondering if that was akin to the courts keeping money 12 here. 13 In New Mexico, one of the MR. NOROUIST: 14 reforms that they did, because I think you have to be 15 convicted now, but when you are convicted and you can 16 take the stuff, the stuff goes into general revenue. 17 And that reduces the incentive to take things from 18 people that maybe you shouldn't be taking their stuff. 19 Unfortunately, the federal government 20 allows you to do an end run around that, which would 21 need to be fixed. But I think New Mexico was moving 22 in the right direction when they took the incentive out 23 that if somebody's a bad guy and it was stolen money 24 and a stolen car and they shouldn't have it, and it

should be forfeit, that that should go to general

1 The guy making the decision on whether to revenue. 2 take the car should not be the guy who will be driving 3 it next week. 4 DR. COHEN: And I can only speak for the 5 Texas experience where in our Chapter 59 Code of Criminal Procedure, which actually dictates how these 6 7 forfeitures progress, we'd simply divvy up the funds based on agreement between the law enforcement agency 8 9 and the prosecutorial agency. And depending on what 10 year it is, it shifts radically for who gets what you 11 know everywhere from 6535 one way to 6535 the other. 12 But what you generally see though, is that, 13 to Mr. Norquist's point, you don't see that separation 14 of the incentive to enforce or to prosecute, especially 15 with the dubious circumstances that attend that. 16 CHAIR LHAMON: Commissioner Kirsanow. 17 COMMISSIONER KIRSANOW: Thank you, Madam 18 Chair, and thank you to the panels also. 19 As an anarchist, I'm easily persuaded that 20 any kind of fee, or tax, or a levy of any kind should 21 be thrown into the ashbin of history. However, I think 22 it was Churchill who said that democracy is the worst 23 form of government, except for all the others. don't have fines, I'm curious -- I posed this question 24 25 to the previous panel -- does anyone have any data or

any studies that show what form of deterrent would be best to prevent the type of activity sought to be prevented by these fines? Would it be community service? Would it be a certain level of fine that is graduated of some sort? Would it be forfeiture? Because we're talking about the fact that what's currently the model is bad but is there somewhere where we should be going that actually deters the behavior?

I'm presuming we don't want this behavior to continue. Speeding is something we don't want to happen. If you speed down my street, you may hit a little kid. How do we deter that and what's the best way of deterring it?

MS. NAGRECHA: If I may. I will probably answer in a similar way to the folks on the last panel in that I don't have a direct study to share. But you know I do think that -- you know I'm skeptical that the way it is now actually creates a deterrent effect. I think that given that the penalties are so out of reach for most people, it is quite a natural reaction to not be deterred because you simply aren't really thinking about it as a reasonable thing that you're going to accomplish. And so I think you lose your deterrent effect in sort of structuring it the way that we do. And so at the very least, I imagine, if we got fines

1	down from some nearly \$1,000 for a first but in Arizona,
2	I think it's actually maybe more, that that might
3	actually you might see some of this more reasonable
4	effect from that.
5	COMMISSIONER KIRSANOW: Also, a cousin of
6	deterrents is recidivism. I wonder if there is any
7	data that would show that certain types of penalties
8	or sanctions may reduce the incidence of recidivism
9	among the offenders. Does anybody have any data along
10	this line?
11	DR. SHANNON: So, I will say that those
12	types of studies are extremely scarce and it goes back
13	to the availability of the appropriate data. To
14	measure recidivism, you really need data on individuals
15	over time and you need to understand what's happening
16	in what order.
17	COMMISSIONER KIRSANOW: Can't you get a
18	grant from your university to fund one?
19	DR. SHANNON: Gosh, wouldn't that be nice?
20	COMMISSIONER KIRSANOW: I'll write a
21	letter.
22	DR. SHANNON: Let's talk later. That
23	sounds good.
24	But I think the other side so there are
25	very few studies. You know there's one that kind of

indicated that perhaps restitution, which, again, has
that more restorative element, can lead to lower
recidivism rates. So it's something that's aimed more
at a restorative approach, something that's trying to
help address harm, as opposed to a form of punishment
can actually perhaps lead to lower recidivism. But
there was also a very recent study done on the juvenile
system, finding that kids who owed restitution and
other court costs at higher rates were significantly
more likely to recidivate, net of a whole bunch of other
important factors. And I think given the extent
of the other collateral consequences that come with
monetary sanctions that we've already discussed,
common sense and anecdotal, as well as some of this
empirical evidence, there's a good a substantial
reason to expect that assessing these kinds of fines
and fees would actually be criminogenic, that it will
increase the extent to which people are committing more
crime. Just you know if you can't pay your bills, you
might be a bit more tempted to obtain that money in
illegitimate ways.

And so I think that the jury is out. We need more data. We need more evidence but some of the existing research would point us in the direction of it perhaps being much more detrimental than beneficial.

MR. LEVIN: If I could. Now, we're talking about like things that are property crimes, people that are stealing. We've done a lot of research on victim-offender mediation, where there's a binding It is used particularly in juvenile agreement. systems to make restitution and, of course, an apology, an in-person meeting between the victim and the offender. And the victim, research shows a lot of victim satisfaction increased a much higher rate of actually collecting restitution. When it's done through that, of course, there's not the government fines and fees. There's not this carnal letter of a conviction.

Now as far as like traffic offenses, I mean I think speeding tickets, for me, they do deter me from speeding. I think some of these other things we're talking about are things where people aren't making necessarily a rational calculation. So deterrence is less of a factor.

But as far as alternatives, I mean certainly community service I think is good and, obviously adjusting it based on ability to pay, you know the whole day fine concept. You know deterrence -- a speeding ticket is not going to deter a billionaire from speeding, right, because you know. And so I think

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having it be based, tied to like the day fine practice 1 to a person's income. 2 3 But I also think you know I mean what if 4 someone signed up for reminders that you have got to 5 get -- okay, you can't afford your speeding ticket well but for the next whatever several months, every other 6 7 day, you're going to be getting a text message reminding 8 you not to speed or something, something that's 9 annoying but reminding that you did something wrong. 10 So, those are kind of we could think 11 creatively about ways to remind people of their need 12 to comply with the law. Because there is some 13 research. It's kind of the nudging research. That 14 nudging does actually work, nudging people into 15 compliance. 16 COMMISSIONER KLADNEY: Is there any 17 deterrence now? 18 MR. NORQUIST: People speed less because 19 you might get a ticket? They speed less in places that 20 cops are expected to be. They slow down at all those 21 nice photo --22 COMMISSIONER KLADNEY: But I mean the 23 The fines and jail times. Is that deterring fines. 24 anybody -- 647,000 drivers in Virginia driving on a 25 suspended license because they can't pay the fines.

MR. NORQUIST: Not everybody.

MR. LEVIN: Yes, well that's because the consequences of not driving, in terms of your job, your family are so great that that -- you're willing to risk going to jail for the evening because the consequences are so great of not driving.

You know and as far as speeding tickets, to me it's also the experience of being pulled over that's such a deterrent, as much as the \$200. It's, I mean really unpleasant and it delays you.

DR. COHEN: I think the important thing here is tying together the professor and Marc's testimony here is that when it comes to large scale studies on criminogenic risk factors, can we say that we are getting at what we know causes recidivism or even first-time offending? That's a very difficult, tenuous connection to make. It exists even when it comes to the more measurable in there as well, the higher crimes.

But the bigger thing, and what I think he's talking about collateral consequences is if you were to take the surcharge program that we have in Texas under the Driver's Responsibility Program, deterrence is a bit of an afterthought because these are fines and fees that people, or that people that come under this

1	program, don't even realize that they're subject to.
2	And then when they go try to renew their license, then
3	they're notified by the Department of Public Safety
4	that their license is no longer valid. And then the
5	cascading issue of your insurance being canceled and
6	everything like that then kicks in.
7	And so even if that weren't to be a
8	deterrent, let's look at the actual externality of
9	that. Now, we have people driving, hopefully much more
10	safely now, but we have people driving that aren't
11	insured as well. And this actually starts that
12	snowball rolling down the hill as well.
13	COMMISSIONER KLADNEY: Thank you.
14	MR. NORQUIST: I am familiar with a small
15	study on deterrents because I asked my daughter why we
16	look both ways when we cross the street and she said
17	to check for cops.
18	CHAIR LHAMON: Now we have devolved but
19	thank you.
20	Commissioner Kirsanow, have you completed
21	your questioning?
22	MR. NORQUIST: A small study.
23	CHAIR LHAMON: Thank you. Commissioner
24	Adegbile.
25	COMMISSIONER ADEGBILE: So I think

embedded in Mr. Levin's testimony I heard one story of deterrence and that was the reference to the way in which North Carolina handles where the money goes, the idea being that the money does not go to the local officials. It goes to the state fisc. And based on the numbers that you're telling us, it serves as some deterrent, apparently, to the local officials to engage in these practices. Is that a fair construction of what you shared with us?

MR. LEVIN: Yes, absolutely. I mean it's stunning because you have the bottom of the list in terms of fines, fees, and forfeitures per capita, Raleigh and Greensboro at zero and then you have Charlotte at 21 cents. Those were the three cities in North Carolina that were on this list of the top 50 cities. So, it makes a huge impact not having an eat what you kill type of system.

COMMISSIONER ADEGBILE: So in light of this, I want to ask the panelists if folks have ideas about what the most important federal contribution could be in this area, the things, the tools that DOJ has at its disposal. Is there something that you think is greatest bang for the buck? And then same idea from the states because we all recognize that this is an issue that operates at both levels.

Mr. Levin pointed out that there are important federal considerations with respect to due process and equal protection. I take it those things are both important on the state level and the federal level but there certainly is a federal role in regard to those things.

So one thing that I'm thinking about, as I sit here, is that in order to understand what's going on there, you need data in order to be able to exercise dominion in that area.

But I'm wondering if the panelists have ideas about you know if you could do it, if you were king for a day in the American tradition, what would your biggest bang for the buck be at the federal level and then so too at the state level.

DR. COHEN: I would go a step further. I would not just say data but I would say granularity in data, having a case by case by case representation on where these fines and fees are assessed and not only that, what is their collection rate, and any sort of relevant factors in there.

Now the problem is, again, this is king for a day, there is no such architecture for collecting that information right now. And I'm sure the doctor can even point out that even where the best examples of data

collection and data dissemination are present, it's not getting every single variable that would inform how these fines and fees work where the rubber hits the road.

But to the federal standpoint, there could be -- again, they could show granularity whether it's on the census' data with their state and local fiscal survey or if it's in the Department of Justice when this is relayed up through the Uniform Crime Report. I think that's actually probably the most promising, looking at where in the Uniform Crime Reports and in the current reporting structure, where could these variables, where could the useful variables be added.

MR. LEVIN: Well and there's also a lot of grant programs to police departments from the federal government that certainly could be a vehicle for saying look, if you want to receive this grant, you have to comply with certain best practices.

MS. NAGRECHA: You know one thing that I hear a lot in talking to people across the country in the states is we're not Ferguson or we're not as bad as Ferguson. And so I think it would be helpful if the Department of Justice had a similar report about another place, another thing to kind of hang our hats on as advocates to say you know you might not have been

Ferguson but this has definitely been identified across the country and to have one other similarly very well done report to sort of point to I think would be very valuable.

At the state level, you know I think we've seen a lot of momentum in starting to think about the questions that we've all mentioned today. What does ability to pay mean, you know revoking driver's licenses less.

I do think that a lot of these problems will sort of remain until state legislatures, in most instances, really start to push on this kind of structural funding question. And I'm not convinced that the reliance on the money is real but certainly perceived. And so that becomes all the more complicated when there are many recipients of the surcharges.

And so to really, for seeds to really start planting the seeds of that I think longer, a more difficult conversation about sort of funding questions and sort of moving away from costs and surcharges, in particular, and high fines.

DR. COHEN: I think one thing that needed to be added to this discussion, although I wouldn't necessarily put it under the prerogative of the

Department of Justice is a lot of -- I think distally that a lot of researchers in this area can point to the practices of municipal finance that actually create a demand for such practices. And this includes almost anything when it comes to lack of transparency in bonding, when it comes to how municipal debt is handled. And that's going to be a state by state -- there's going to be a state by state issue to be sure.

But, again, if there's not the pressure to have these collections, at the very least, distally, again, I think that we can say that municipalities will, at the very least, be more innovative in how they tackle the problem.

MR. NORQUIST: I was in a conversation earlier today with somebody who said well, we can't on civil asset forfeiture ask the police not to take people's stuff until we pay them more money. Well, at what point, if you allow people to take stuff on top of whatever the legislature or the city approves for their pay, pension, and benefits, at what point would they say you know we're not going to take stuff?

I mean it seems to me you have to say on some of these fees and civil asset forfeiture you're not allowed to do this because it's abusive. It's not an add-on to plus up your budget or the sheriff's new

car, or however you want to do it. If you don't say no, there will always be an answer well of course we want more resources, and I'd want more pay, or we want more stuff in the office, or another car would be nice. So I'm not sure that it's an argument to say we don't say to the bank robbers first we get you a job and then you will agree to quit robbing banks. The answer is no robbing banks, with or without a job.

PROFESSOR SOBOL: I think one way, too, it might not be a difficult thing the Department of Justice could do is follow what the CFPB has done in establishing a complaint database for people to complain. Over the last five years that they've had it, they've had over a million complaints done and they've looked at that. They send the information to the party that has complained about and the party has the right to respond to it and there's a process for that.

Again, it's limited based on what you get but at the very least, it would help us identify maybe that state we want to go and do a new study on or that municipality that we want to do a new study on, and at least get that background information on what's out there.

So I think that might be something that

wouldn't be a very difficult thing necessarily to set up and advertise and have people submit complaints, and have states have the ability to respond to them. At the very least, it may even create a shaming thing for those states to get into the process and realize that they don't want to be the number one state or municipality that has that concern. So, they want to be able to respond to that and we can figure out what's going on there.

On the state level, if I was the king for the day, I would love to have the states justify the amounts that they have for fines and fees, have them independently review each of those fines and fees that are done. Because a lot these have been created many, many years ago and we don't know the basis for it.

So there are other professors that have suggested setting up independent commissions where you have citizens involved in looking at each one of those charges, both the existing charges, as well as any additional charges that are added down the road. And again, that's a more extensive item than the idea of what I would want the Department of Justice to do with an online complaint system.

CHAIR LHAMON: Thank you.

Any other commissioners? Any other

1	questions?
2	VI. ADJOURN BRIEFING
3	CHAIR LHAMON: Well with that, I will
4	thank our panel. Thank you very much for coming and
5	that will conclude our briefing today.
6	(Whereupon, the above-entitled matter
7	went off the record at 2:39 p.m.)
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