Coping with Police Misconduct in West Virginia: Citizen Involvement in Officer Disciplinary Procedures
Alternative Models for Police Disciplinary Procedures
Previous chapters discussed difficulties with existing procedures in West Virginia and reviewed past attempts by the legislature to better deal with the police misconduct issue. Against this backdrop, the Committee reviewed academic and research literature and consulted members of the law enforcement community, state government officials, and commentators to identify successful models and programs in other jurisdictions across the nation. The Committee’s motivation is to bring these worthy models and programs to the attention of the state legislature and the general public in the hopes that they may be considered for possible adoption in West Virginia. This chapter presents the results of such research under three broad categories—external controls, accountability and identification of rogue officers, and community relations—along with observations on their feasibility.
Reforms and models that include external oversight or involve individuals from outside the police department render the complaint process with an aura of objectivity, as external control by definition is exercised by individuals who are not part of the police department. Implementing any one of the external control models, therefore, is likely to improve the public’s faith in the fairness of the complaint process. This section reviews four models effective in other jurisdictions.
Civilian Review Board
A civilian review board is an entity external to the police department’s internal affairs, and consists of citizens from outside the department, appointed by the mayor or other senior government officials. A civilian review board is generally charged with the duty of reviewing complaints and making recommendations as to disciplinary action after the police department has completed its own investigation and made a disciplinary recommendation.
A civilian review board is usually charged with reviewing the same materials or a redacted version of what the internal affairs division examined, although a civilian review board could be given investigative power in order to conduct its own inquiry into the complaint. Such authority could include subpoena power, and the ability to administer oaths and compel the production of documents. The sufficiency of individual case files, and thus the accuracy of a subsequent review, may depend heavily on what information the board is given and whether it can supplement these files on its own initiative.
A key concern with instituting a civilian review board has to do with how much weight the recommendation of the board is accorded by law, that is, how binding. The activities of the board may be symbolic, as it has indeed been suggested that civilian review boards end up “agreeing with the police department in almost all instances.” The importance of the civilian review board, therefore, rests on whether the disciplining officer is forced to accept or to provide a public account of why the recommendation is not accepted. For civilian review boards to be effective, they should be provided the authority to override the recommendations of the police, although such prospects are somewhat unrealistic.
A study of 17 law enforcement agencies found that citizen review boards sustain police brutality complaints at a higher percentage than do the police themselves, suggesting that such boards operate more fairly, although the “sustained” rate is only one means by which to measure possible success of civilian review boards. It is important to note that it is unclear exactly what power the examined civilian review boards had, such as whether they could overrule the recommended sanctions of the internal affairs division.
The suggestion of a civilian review board will likely be met by considerable opposition from the law enforcement community in West Virginia, as it has in the past. External recommendations will be viewed not only as an imposition from outsiders who are less knowledgeable in police affairs, but as another bureaucratic layer that does not aid in securing a final disposition with the police. Opposition or resistance will be proportionate to the power accorded to a civilian review board.
As noted above, a civilian review board has recently been set up in Bluefield, West Virginia. Its success or efficacy is yet to be determined since it has not received any complaints to date.
An independent monitor or auditor, appointed by the mayor or other government officials, “does not investigate individual complaints, but reviews procedures for investigating” individual complaints of police misconduct. More specifically, an independent monitor is appointed to (1) “scour and test the law enforcement agency’s policies, procedures, and practices to determine whether they are, in fact, up to the job of preventing misconduct”; (2) “propose new policies and practices where the old ones have failed”; and (3) “suggest the implementation of best practices from other law enforcement agencies.”
An independent monitor compiles and examines data, and can produce reports that could include recommendations for improving existing procedures and deterring police brutality. The monitor may also aid in the development of “use of force” standards, which can be very helpful in teaching officers when to exercise discretion in dealing with suspects. Moreover, if there is an instance in which force is used, standards can be revisited and improved as appropriate.
This model was successfully used by the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department (LASD), where an independent monitor was instituted in part because of strained police-community relations and high-profile instances of police brutality. LASD’s monitor believes excessive force has been “substantially curbed” to some extent by having a monitor. Indeed, the number of excessive force complaints dropped from 381 in 1992–1993 (when the independent monitor was first instituted) to 70 in 1998–1999.
The police lobby appears to be quite strong in West Virginia, and as such this external reform measure would likely be met with considerable resistance from the police. This option, however, might not be as offensive to the police since the independent monitor reviews only procedures rather than individual case files and is therefore somewhat removed from the actual complaint process.
An independent investigator, who is not a member of the police department, oversees and directs the investigation of individual citizen complaints. The investigator, often appointed by the mayor, is empowered to participate in the investigation process, and is permitted to interview witnesses and review evidence. These investigators could be given greater power, such as the ability to issue subpoenas and compel production of documents.
Unlike a civilian review board that conducts an external review after the police’s own investigation is complete, the independent investigator helps shape the police’s initial investigation. If an independent investigator and civilian review board were in place together, the civilian review board would review files produced by the independent investigator and the internal affairs division he directs. If an independent investigator works in concert with an independent monitor, the independent monitor would assess the procedures in place that the independent investigator would be using while involved in individual investigations.
The existing system in West Virginia requires police departments to conduct their own investigations. Such internal investigations may be cursory and incomplete, as some individuals in a police department may have a conflict of interest that precludes them from impartially examining a claim against a colleague. The immediate value of an independent investigator is that he or she will be free of such conflict of interest. Accordingly, an independent investigator will be more likely to produce a fair investigation, and will thus help restore the public’s confidence in the integrity of the system.
An independent investigator has been operating in the Seattle (WA) Police Department and in Los Angeles County (CA) since 2001. In Los Angeles’ Office of Independent Review, “[n]o investigation can be closed unless the [independent review office] certifies that it was full, fair, and thorough.” These experiments have been said to be the most impressive alternatives to civil service commissions because of improved accountability and civilian involvement.
This alternative is an attractive reform measure for West Virginia because investigations should be more complete and impartial due to the absence of a conflict of interest with an independent investigator. However, this reform may be the least feasible because of the radical change it would impose on internal affairs’ investigative duties—the investigators would be directed by an outside investigator.
If criminal charges are sought against a police officer for police misconduct, a district attorney (DA) presents evidence to a grand jury for an indictment and argues the subsequent case. However, a central problem associated with a DA is that the DA may not want to file charges and proceed to trial against a police officer, perhaps because she does not want to either create the public impression that she is anti-police, offend the law enforcement officers to whom the DA relies on to receive evidence in other cases, or prosecute “one of her own.” For this reason, some jurisdictions have turned to a special prosecutor for cases involving police brutality and civil rights violations.
It has been noted that with an independent or special prosecutor, the “frequency and quality” of “investigations and prosecutions” will increase. The use of special prosecutors in police brutality cases has been successful in other jurisdictions, including New York and Chicago, and has been endorsed by the Human Rights Watch and the American Civil Liberties Union. A governor, judge, or the DA, who may have recused himself from the proceedings, often appoints a special prosecutor. With the benefits of a special prosecutor in mind, there should be a permanent statutory mandate for a special prosecutor in certain cases involving police misconduct.
This alternative appears to be promising. A special prosecutor was successfully used in a December 1999 suit filed against a West Virginia state police officer. Moreover, a special prosecutor does not have anything to do with the internal mechanisms of the police internal affairs division—a special prosecutor is merely a different prosecutor with identical powers, leaving the police’s duties and functions entirely intact.
Despite the benefits of a special prosecutor, police officers may provide incomplete, inaccurate, or misleading material to him in order to minimize the allegations brought against their colleague. While a DA may face these same problems, a special prosecutor may encounter even less cooperation from the police if she solely prosecutes police officers charged with misconduct.
Accountability and Identification of Rogue Officers
Most misconduct arguably occurs because of a handful of rogue officers. For example, a 2001 National Institute of Justice publication found that “10 percent of . . . officers cause 90 percent of the problems,” and investigations have revealed that approximately “2 percent of all officers are responsible for 50 percent of all citizen complaints.” As such, measures are needed to help ensure that these officers are identified before they can harm citizens and are sufficiently deterred from misbehaving if they are on active duty.
Accountability: Incentive Strategy
This model employs rewards for police officers (through promotions, formal recognition, commendations, and monetary awards, etc.) for nonaggressive behavior with citizens under trying conditions (e.g., an officer “avoids a shooting or talks a suspect into custody”). If a reward system is in place and officers know there will be a direct positive consequence for their good actions, their behavior is likely to improve. Conversely, officers should be held accountable for their misconduct. In addition, the efficacy of the system depends on whether and to what extent officers are willing to hold one another accountable and whether the community is able to identify misbehaving officers.
This model is advisable because it is an internal accountability mechanism: the police reward and punish themselves. Moreover, the police already reward officers for “actions that led to arrest(s), the capture of a dangerous felon, or some other heroic activity.” Rewarding officers for nonviolent behavior in tough situations will merely extend the types of actions for which officers can receive recognition. More importantly, a positive reinforcement mechanism will reorient the officer’s perception as to what his role is, namely to fight crime in a citizen- and community-friendly fashion.
In West Virginia, negative behavior is not included in the performance assessment that forms the basis for an officer’s promotion. For example, for municipal police officers, “[p]romotions shall be based upon experience and by written competitive examinations,” and there is nothing “that even intimates that, to secure promotion, any further action is required than to pass the test . . . and have eligibility of an applicant.” The West Virginia State Police bases promotions on an applicant’s composite score that is drawn from a promotional examination, a written examination, physical fitness test, education and longevity, and a performance appraisal of the officer’s past two years of service. However, the officer’s performance appraisal accounts for approximately 14 percent of the applicant’s overall promotion evaluation (15 out of a possible 106 points).
A greater proportion of an officer’s composite score should be based on the officer’s performance while on duty, both positive and negative behavior. The existing statutory provisions should be amended to include consideration of negative behavior in performance evaluations. The type of disciplinary action taken or the number of complaints against an officer could measure negative behavior. Moreover, if an officer has received serious disciplinary action, frequent discipline, or a certain number of complaints in a given time period, the officer should be precluded from consideration for promotion.
The lack of adequate accountability mechanisms to check officer misconduct could be part of the reason why police brutality has not been sufficiently deterred in West Virginia, and why the public may believe that officers cannot effectively police themselves. Improving existing accountability procedures will assist in preventing police misconduct and will provide the public with confidence that such acts of misbehavior will be documented and that officers will be disciplined accordingly.
There are two specific procedures, if implemented, that would help monitor police misconduct: computerized risk-management systems and cameras in police cars.
Computerized Risk-Management System. A computerized risk-management system can help incentive strategies operate more effectively and accurately by recording the actual police behavior that is to be rewarded or punished. A computerized risk-management system tracks officers’ “use of force, search and seizure, citizen complaints, as well as criminal charges or civil lawsuits filed against officers.” The system can also be designed to track positive behavior or the recognition of positive behavior, such as commendations or monetary awards.
The effectiveness of this strategy depends first and foremost on the accuracy of the information entered into the system, as officers may not consistently or honestly record positive or negative conduct into the system. Second, the system’s effectiveness also hinges on how often the system is checked by supervisors, and what, if any, accountability procedures are in place to appropriately reward or punish the officers who are in the system.
A computerized data-collection tool, combined with real consequences that may follow for police conduct, may deter negative or encourage positive behavior. In the least, a computerized system should be encouraged because it will serve as hard evidence of police conduct. Computerized tracking systems have been installed in various police departments across the nation, including the Pittsburgh city police, the Los Angeles Police Department, and the New Jersey State Police, among others. In Pittsburgh, reports of police misconduct have dropped by more than half on average since the tracking system was installed.
Cameras in Police Cruisers. Installing video cameras in police cars can be another means to ensure officer behavior is documented and can provide useful information for implementing incentive strategies. The use of cameras, during traffic stops for instance, permits citizens to have incontrovertible proof as to what really occurred in case they later feel aggrieved by officer conduct. The installation of cameras in patrol and traffic vehicles, while costly, can not only benefit citizens who may complain of police misconduct, but also accused officers who may refer to the videotapes when a complaint is filed against them. Indeed, according to Police Chief Jerry Pauley, in Charleston, videotape from police cruisers has exonerated officers in 99.9 percent of complaints filed. To be sure, most of Charleston’s patrol vehicles and traffic vehicles have cameras; however, the installation of cameras in police cruisers should be a universally adopted program in all West Virginia law enforcement agencies.
Identification: Preemptive Evaluations
Because police brutality and misconduct can be traced to a handful of rogue officers, preemptive assessment evaluations can help identify those officers who are likely or may be predisposed to use unnecessary force, or who may be unable to handle high-pressure situations in a calm, resolute fashion. These evaluations may consist of medical and psychological tests, interviews, and performance assessments. Collectively, these tools could uncover behavioral issues, health problems, alcohol or drug abuse, or stress that may preclude an officer from exercising proper discretion. An officer identified under an “early warning system” may be compelled to undergo specialized training or may be relegated to administrative duties.
Empirical evidence compiled from three case studies (conducted in Miami-Dade, Florida, Minneapolis, Minnesota, and New Orleans, Louisiana) suggests that early warning systems “have a dramatic effect on reducing citizen complaints and other indicators of problematic police performance among those officers subject to intervention.” It should be noted that such early warning systems were used in concert with other efforts to deter police misconduct.
The West Virginia State Police has an Early Identification System to identify troopers who have a “larger than normal” number of use of force contacts, and a psychological assessment program, which reviews officers who have questionable duty judgment or persistent citizen complaints regarding their conduct. Troopers identified under the system as having larger than normal number of use of force contacts are given “additional training on the use of force to ensure the problem is not with misunderstanding or abuse of use of force.”
The local police structure indicates that “mental defects” that may incapacitate an officer are grounds for refusing to appoint or promote an officer; however, the statutory mandate for these evaluations should be as comprehensive and explicit for local police jurisdictions as those for the state police officers. Charleston has psychological testing, evaluations, and an employee assistance program. Such measures should be required, by clear statutory pronouncement, for all local-level police departments.
One noticeable advantage of these evaluations is that they can be done internally by the police force’s own designated personnel. To ensure compliance with these evaluations, they should be mandatory, and officers who fail to submit themselves to evaluation should be disciplined accordingly.
Improving Community Relations
Incidents of police brutality generate public fear and distrust of law enforcement, particularly among minority communities and in areas where police misconduct has occurred in the past. Police-community tension thus may exist because of previous incidents and cultural differences that stifle understanding. Improved relations between law enforcement and citizens will restore trust in these affected communities, and make police efforts more effective through enhanced cooperation. Three aspects of police-community relations are discussed here: community policing, recruiting minorities to the police force, and awareness training.
Community policing is a practical solution to combat tension and improve law enforcement. It is a collaborative effort between law enforcement and citizens to identify crime and disorder and work together to solve ongoing problems and create an atmosphere in which serious crime will not occur. If the community is more intimately involved in the law enforcement’s activities and strategies, citizens will believe they are being treated equitably. Conversely, officers will better understand all citizens and their respective cultures, and thus treat diverse citizens fairly and with requisite sensitivity. With fear dissipated and relations improved, community policing renders law enforcement more effective, as citizens will aid the police in establishing strategies and may be more forthcoming in reporting crime or their suspicions of crime being committed in their neighborhoods. Community policing is important in jurisdictions with large or multiple ethnic communities. The practice can help break down cultural and linguistic barriers in areas inhabited by groups that have been historically subject to “unfair and inappropriate police behavior.”
In Miami, Florida, for example, the county police department hosted a series of concerts, which “provided an excellent vehicle for the police to create and maintain positive contacts with members of the community they serve and to be seen in a positive light. Further, by initiating and participating in activities the youths enjoyed, the police had an opportunity to see youth in a positive light.”
There is evidence that community policing is effective. For example, researchers from Northwestern University found that “crime, social disorder, and physical decay decreased in the community policing districts.” Similarly, the National Criminal Justice Reference Service cited several success stories from case studies done in the early 1990s in Madison, Wisconsin (1993), Seattle, Washington (1992), and Chicago, Illinois (1995). Community-oriented policing is endorsed by the U.S. Department of Justice, and by the Carolinas Institute for Community Policing.
In West Virginia, civil rights organizations, such as the NAACP, have advocated community policing as a needed reform measure, believing that state police officers target minorities and that there is an embarrassing lack of minorities on the police force.
The Martinsburg Police Department has adopted a community policing effort by instituting a “citizens academy,” which consists of a nine-week course aiming to “educat[e] the public on topics relative to the role of the police officers” in the community. This program, however, appears one-sided, asking only the public to learn about the functions of the police. A more effective and prudent community-policing effort would emphasize, or at least involve, education of the police as to citizen needs and characteristics of minority communities. A firm relationship between the police and citizens cannot result through a unilateral public understanding of the police since officers are the ones who engage in acts of misconduct against the public. The attempt to educate the public is indeed a step in the right direction, but it must be in conjunction with efforts to decrease the propensity of officers to use excessive force.
Eight hours of instruction on community policing are included in both basic training and cadet training for the West Virginia State Police. Community policing, however, is easier said than done, and the inclusion of training or a declaration from the police that they will engage in community policing may be without real effect. As a result, the West Virginia police must recruit more minorities and establish conspicuous partnerships with local minority leaders through forums and other outreach efforts.
Moreover, the existence of community-oriented policing—that is, having a symbiotic relationship between law enforcement officers and the community—will facilitate minority recruitment efforts.
Minorities often do not view the police in a favorable light. With officers of racial or ethnic backgrounds on the police force, they will be less likely to view the police as a “them” entity and their fear and mistrust may diminish. Minority officers are likely to help their fellow officers better understand any cultural and linguistic barriers that exist. Minorities should be recruited from “top to bottom,” meaning that diversity should exist at all levels within the police force—from a cop on the beat to a senior officer directing and shaping police practices. Diversity at all levels is necessary if minorities are to have their faith restored in the police departments, and for the police themselves to better understand the concerns of various minority groups.
Awareness and Use of Force Training
Police officers should receive sensitivity or diversity training no matter what the racial composition of the force. Understanding various racial and ethnic groups will aid the police in responding to the concerns of these groups respectfully and more efficiently. For example, diversity training could help officers appreciate the fact that a vast majority of turbaned males in the United States are Sikhs of Indian origin, not Muslims from the Arab world. This training should be done early on in the officer’s career, and minorities should be involved in the training process to ensure the accuracy of the instruction. Funding would be required to develop curriculum and solicit members from the community to oversee the curriculum. As officers are required to receive training before they are certified, adding awareness training to the existing curriculum may not be difficult once the training program is developed and approved by various affected communities.
The West Virginia State Police’s cadet training (which is required for all police officers in the state) includes eight hours of “cultural diversity” training, and use of force utilization briefings are conducted at annual in-service training. It is noteworthy that administrators of the training academy themselves realize the importance of and need for raising awareness in cultural diversity. The mere existence of such training, however, is not indicative of its sufficiency, especially since it accounts for eight hours out of a total of 1,020 that cadets receive. Awareness training should not only be increased during cadet training to ensure sufficiency, but continued throughout law enforcement officers’ careers.
Substantial guidance has been obtained from “Civilian Oversight of the
Police in the United States,” written by Merrick Bobb, an independent
monitor in the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department. Merrick Bobb, Symposium:
New Approaches to Ensuring the Legitimacy of Police Conduct—Civilian
Oversight of the Police in the United States, 22 St.
Louis U. Pub. L. Rev. 151 (2003) (hereafter cited as Merrick, Civilian
Ibid., p. 163.
 Human Rights Watch, “Shielded from Justice: Police
Brutality and Accountability in the United States,” June 1998, <http://www.hrw.org/reports98/police/uspo22.htm>
(last accessed Aug. 4, 2003).
See, e.g., Editorial, “Brutality Police Need Oversight,”
Sunday Gazette Mail, June 4, 2000.
Human Rights Watch, “Shielded from Justice.”
Merrick, Civilian Oversight, p. 161.
Ibid., p. 160. For more information on
this model, see Kendall Stagg, “Who Should Police the Police?” Reno
News and Review, Apr. 18, 2002, <http://www.newsreview.com/issues/reno/2002-04-18/guest.asp>
(last accessed July 7, 2003).
Merrick, Civilian Oversight, p. 160.
Ibid., p. 162.
Ibid., p. 163.
For more information on this model, see the Malcolm X Grassroots Movement,
“Cop Watch,” 2001 <http://www. mxgm.org/copwatch.htm> (last
accessed July 8, 2003).
U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Revisiting Who Is Guarding the
Guardians? November 2000, p. x (hereafter cited as USCCR, Guardians).
Olivia Winslow, “When Call Goes Out for Special
Prosecutor,” Newsday, Oct. 3, 1995, p. A27, <http://www.injuryassist.com/News/19951003a/body_19951003a.htm> (last accessed Aug. 5, 2003).
Locke E. Bowman and Randolph N. Stone, “Cop Brutality Must Be Thorough,
Fair; Public Confidence in Our Justice System Is at Stake,” Chicago
Sun-Times, May 16, 2002, <http://www.law.uchicago.edu/mandel/police/news/cop_brutality.html>
(last accessed Aug. 5, 2003).
Human Rights Watch, “Police Brutality in the U.S.” <http://www.hrw.org/about/initiatives/police.htm>
(last accessed Aug. 5, 2003); American
Civil Liberties Union, “NYCLU Launches ‘Campaign to Stop Police
Brutality,’” press release, Jan. 10, 1999, <archive.aclu.org/news/1999/n011099a.html>
(last accessed Aug. 5, 2003).
Randy Coleman, “State Police Fighting for Overtime Money, Against Review
Board,” Associated Press State & Local Wire, Feb. 7, 2000.
USCCR, Guardians, p. 4 (stating that police misconduct is too
“pervasive and complex” to be explained away by a few officers).
Samuel Walker, Geoffrey P. Alpert, and Dennis J. Kenney, “Early Warning
Systems: Responding to the Problem Police Officer,” National Institute
of Justice, July 2001, <http://www.ncjrs.org/txtfiles1/nij/188565.txt>
(last accessed July 17, 2003).
Ibid. (citing “Kansas City Police Go After Their ‘Bad Boys,’” New
York Times, Sept. 10, 1991; “Waves of Abuse Laid to a Few Officers,”
Boston Globe, Oct. 4, 1992).
Geoffrey P. Alpert and Mark H. Moore, “Measuring
Police Performance in the New Paradigm of Policing,” <http://www.
(last accessed Dec. 17, 2003).
Robert C. Trojanowicz, “Police Accountability,” Community Policing
Pages, 1998, <http://www.concentric.net/~dwoods/ account.htm>
(last accessed July 17, 2003).
W. Va. Code
§ 8-14-17 (2001).
Gartin v. Fiedler, 38 S.E.2d 352 (W. Va. 1946).
W. Va. Code St. R. tit. 81, § 03-4.2.2 (2003).
Lucas Mearian and Linda Rosencrance,
“Police Policed with Data Mining Engines,” Computerworld.com,
Apr. 2, 2001, <http://www.computerworld.com/governmenttopics/government/policy/story/0,10801,59159,00.html>
(last accessed Dec. 8, 2003).
Jerry Pauley, chief of police, Charleston, West Virginia, e-mail to Marc
Pentino, Eastern Regional Office, USCCR, Oct. 9, 2003 (hereafter cited as
Carrie Smith, “City Police Taking Precautions; Cameras, Training Used to
Prevent Excessive Force,” Charleston Daily Mail, July 22, 2000.
 W. Va. Code St. R. tit. 81 § 10-9 (2003); Howard E. Hill Jr., superintendent, West Virginia State Police, facsimile to Marc Pentino, Eastern Regional Office, USCCR, Sept. 24, 2003, p. 5 (hereafter cited as Hill Jr. facsimile).
 Id. § 81-10-10.
 Hill Jr. facsimile, p. 5. During the affected agency review process, Superintendent Hill noted that a larger than normal number of use of force contacts is correlated to the area in which the trooper is assigned as well as to the trooper’s physical size and gender.
 W. Va. Code § 8-14-13 (2001).
 Pauley e-mail.
 DC Watch, Report of the Special Committee on Police Misconduct and Personnel Management of the Council of the District of Columbia, Oct. 6, 1998, <http://www.dcwatch.com/ police/981006b.htm> (last accessed July 8, 2003).
 Community Policing Consortium, “About Community Policing,” <http://www.communitypolicing.org/about2.html> (last accessed Dec. 17, 2003).
 USCCR, Guardians, p. 4.
 Alpert and Moore, “Paradigm.”
 Institute for Policy Research, “IPR News: Community Policing Book,” July 10, 1997, (reviewing Wesley G. Skogan and Susan M. Hartnett, Community Policing, Chicago Style, 1997, <http://www.northwestern.edu/ipr/news/caps.html> (last accessed July 17, 2003)).
 Bertus R. Ferreira, “The Use and Effectiveness of Community Policing in a Democracy,” National Criminal Justice Reference Service, 1996, <http://www.ncjrs.org/policing/use 139.htm> (last accessed July 17, 2003).
 The Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, created in the U.S. Department of Justice as a result of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, “is to advance community policing in all jurisdictions of all sizes across the country.” U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, “What Is Community Policing?” <http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/default.asp?Item=36> (last accessed July 9, 2003).
 For more information on this model, see U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services Web site, <http://www.cops.usdoj.gov> (last accessed July 8, 2003); Carolinas Institute for Community Policing, “Community Oriented Policing,” <http://www.cicp.org/COPprogram. html> (last accessed July 8, 2003).
 Nathaniel Ingram, “Everyone Must Join in Attacking the Racism Problem,” Herald Dispatch, July 31, 1997; Philip W. Carter, testimony before the West Virginia Advisory Committee to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Aug. 22, 1997 (hereafter cited as Carter testimony).
 City of Martinsburg, “Public Safety,” <http://www.martins burg.com/city/pubsafe.index.htm> (last accessed Aug. 7, 2003).
 West Virginia State Police, “Basic Curriculum,” Feb. 13, 2001, <http://www.wvstatepolice.com/training/109thbasic.htm> (last accessed July 18, 2003); West Virginia State Police, “Cadet Curriculum,” <http://www.wvstatepolice.com/training/cadet_curr.htm> (last accessed July 18, 2003).
 See Ingram, “Everyone Must Join in Attacking the Racism Problem”; Carter testimony.
 USCCR, Guardians, p. viii.
 Ibid., p. ix.
 W. Va. Code § 30-29-5 (2001).
 West Virginia State Police, “Cadet Curriculum”; Hill Jr. facsimile, p. 5.
 Captain Steve Cogar, former director of training for the West Virginia State Police, commented that “we know that we need to raise the awareness in these areas,” namely cultural diversity, hate crimes, and dealing with disabled citizens. Steve Cogar, testimony before the West Virginia Advisory Committee to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, community forum, Charleston, West Virginia, Apr. 20, 2000, transcript, p. 105.
 West Virginia State Police, “Cadet Curriculum.”